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RULE 3.4. FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL, AR R RPC Rule 3.4 
Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 3.4 
RULE 3.4. FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL 
Currentness 
A lawyer shall not: 
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material 
having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act; 
(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law; 
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no 
valid obligation exists; 
(d)  in  pretrial  procedure,  make  a  frivolous  discovery  request  or  fail  to  make  reasonably  diligent  effort  to  comply  with  a 
legally proper discovery request by an opposing party; 
(e)  in  trial,  allude  to  any  matter  that  the  lawyer  does  not  reasonably  believe  is  relevant  or  that  will  not  be  supported  by 
admissible  evidence,  assert  personal  knowledge  of  facts  in  issue  except  when  testifying  as  a  witness,  or  state  a  personal 
opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of 
an accused; or 
(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless: 
(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and 
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person’s interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such 
information. 
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 
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RULE 3.4. FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL, AR R RPC Rule 3.4 
Editors’ Notes 
COMMENT 
[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshaled competitively by the 
contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of 
evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like. 
[2]  Documents  and  other  items  of  evidence  are  often  essential  to  establish  a  claim  or  defense.  Subject  to  evidentiary 
privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an 
important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. 
Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a 
pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. 
Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. Applicable law may permit a 
lawyer  to  take  temporary  possession  of  physical  evidence  of  client  crimes  for  the  purpose  of  conducting  a  limited 
examination that will not alter or destroy material characteristics of the evidence. In such a case, applicable law may require 
the lawyer to turn the evidence over to the police or other prosecuting authority, depending on the circumstances. 
[3] With regard to paragraph (b), it is not improper to pay a witness’s expenses or to compensate an expert witness on terms 
permitted by law. The common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for 
testifying and that it is improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee. 
[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another party, for the 
employees may identify their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 4.2. 
CODE COMPARISON (MODEL RULES) 
With regard to Rule 3.4(a), DR 7-109(A) provides that “a lawyer shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a 
legal obligation to reveal.” DR 7-109(B) provides that “a lawyer shall not advise or cause a person to secrete himself ... for 
the purpose of making him unavailable as a witness....” DR 7-106(C)(7) provides that a lawyer shall not “intentionally or 
habitually violate any established rule of procedure or of evidence.” 
With regard to Rule 3.4(b), DR 7-102(B)(6) provides that a lawyer shall not “participate in the creation or preservation of 
evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false.” DR 7-109 provides that “a lawyer shall not pay, offer to 
pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent on the content of his testimony or the outcome of 
the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee or acquiesce in the payment of: (1) expenses reasonably incurred by a witness 
in attending or testifying; (2) reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or testifying; (or) (3) a 
reasonable  fee  for  the  professional  services  of  an  expert  witness.”  EC  7-28  states  that  “witnesses  should  always  testify 
truthfully and should be free from any financial inducements that might tempt them to do otherwise.” 
Rule 3.4(c) is substantially similar to DR 7-106(A), which provides that “A lawyer shall not disregard ... a standing rule of a 
tribunal or a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding, but he may take appropriate steps in good faith to test the 
validity of such rule or ruling.” 
Rule 3.4(d) has no counterpart in the Code. 
Rule  3.4(e)  substantially  incorporates  DR  7-106(C)(1),  (2),  (3)  and  (4).  DR  7-106(C)(2)  proscribes  asking  a  question 




RULE 3.4. FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL, AR R RPC Rule 3.4 
“intended to degrade a witness or other person,” a matter dealt with in  Rule 4.4. DR 7-106(C)(5), providing that a lawyer 
shall not “fail to comply with known local customs of courtesy or practice,” is too vague to be a rule of conduct enforceable 
as law. 
With regard to Rule 3.4(f), DR 7-104(A)(2) provides that a lawyer shall not “give advice to a person who is not represented 
... other than advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict 
with the interests of his client.” 
Notes of Decisions (14) 
Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 3.4, AR R RPC Rule 3.4 
Current with amendments received through November 1, 2014   
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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Board of Educ. of McDowell County v. Zando, Martin &..., 182 W.Va. 597 (1990) 
390 S.E.2d 796, 59 Ed. Law Rep. 1179 
Defendant in negligence action has right to join 
joint    tort-feasor    on    cause    of    action    for 
contribution  before  judgment;  this  is  “inchoate 
right   to   contribution,”   as   distinguished   from 
statutory    right    of    contribution    after    joint 
judgment. Code, 55–7–13. 
182 W.Va. 597 
Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF McDOWELL 
COUNTY 
v. 
ZANDO, MARTIN & MILSTEAD, INC. 7 Cases that cite this headnote 
No. 18773. | Feb. 22, 1990. 
School  board  filed  action  for  damages  against  architect 
alleging  failure  adequately  to  design  and  supervise  the 
construction   of   building.   Architect   filed   third-party 
complaint  against  contractors,   and   school  board  filed 
alternate complaint against contractors. The Circuit Court, 
Kanawha  County,  John  Hey,  J.,  dismissed  contribution 
claim  of  architect  but  refused  to  grant  verdict  credit  for 
settlements   between   board   and   contractors.   Architect 
appealed. The Supreme Court of Appeals, Miller, J., held 
that:  (1)  architect  was  not  entitled  to  contribution  from 
settling   contractors,   and   (2)   architect   was  entitled   to 
[3] Negligence 
Joint and several liability 
Plaintiff  may  elect  to  sue  any  or  all  of  those 
responsible   for   his   injuries   and   collect   his 
damages from whoever is able to pay, whatever 
the   percentage   of   fault;   modified   rule   for 
contributory  negligence  did  not  remove  joint 
and several liability. Code, 55–7–13. 
verdict   credit   for   settlements   made   by   board 
contractors. 
and 2 Cases that cite this headnote 




Measure of contribution West Headnotes (23) 
Action   seeking   right   of   contribution   before 
judgment may be brought by joint tort-feasor on 
any  theory  of  liability  that  could  have  been 
asserted    by   injured    plaintiff,    even    though 
amount  of  recovery  in  third  party  action  based 
on    contribution    is    controlled    by    amount 
recovered  by  plaintiff  in  main  action.   Code, 
55–7–13. 
[1] Contribution 
Nature and grounds of obligation 
Contribution 
Payment or discharge of common liability 
Right  to  contribution  arises  if  persons  having 
common  obligation  are  sued  on  that  obligation 
and one party is forced to pay more than his pro 
tanto share of obligation. Code, 55–7–13. 
14 Cases that cite this headnote 




Time for bringing action Joint tort-feasor shall be given credit for amount 
of    any    payments    made    by    another    joint 




Board of Educ. of McDowell County v. Zando, Martin &..., 182 W.Va. 597 (1990) 
390 S.E.2d 796, 59 Ed. Law Rep. 1179 
tort-feasor  in  satisfaction  of  wrong,  if  payment 
is made and release obtained. Code, 55–7–13. 
Reparation by wrongdoer 
If  there  is  single  indivisible  loss  arising  from 
actions  of  multiple  parties  who  contributed  to 
loss, fact that different theories of liability have 
been asserted does not foreclose parties’ right of 
contribution  inter  se  or  prevent  parties  from 
obtaining  verdict  credit  for  settlements  made 
with  plaintiff  by  one  or  more  of  those  jointly 
responsible. Code, 55–7–13. 
6 Cases that cite this headnote 
[6] Contribution 
Defenses 
Party  in  civil  action  who  has  made  good  faith 20 Cases that cite this headnote 
settlement with plaintiff before judicial 
determination  of  liability  is  relieved  from  any 
liability for contribution. Code, 55–7–13. 
[10] Interest 
Contract and sales matters 
Interest 
Torts;  wrongful death 
14 Cases that cite this headnote 
School  board  which  entered  into  construction 
contract was entitled to prejudgment interest on 
damage  award  for  losses  whether  action  was 
based  on  breach  of  contract  or  on  tort.  Code, 
56–6–27. 
[7] Damages 
Reparation by wrongdoer 
Defendants in civil action against whom verdict 
is rendered  are entitled  to  have verdict reduced 
by    amount    of    any    good-faith    settlements 
previously  made  with  plaintiff  by  other  jointly 
liable parties. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
19 Cases that cite this headnote 
[11] Appeal and Error 
Conduct of trial or hearing in general 
Trial 
Discretion of court [8] Damages 
Nature and theory of compensation Whether motion for mistrial should be sustained 
or  overruled  is  matter  which  rests  within  trial 
court’s  discretion,  and  action  of  trial  court  in 
ruling  on  such  motion  will  not  be  cause  for 
reversal on appeal unless it clearly appears that 
such discretion has been abused. 
School  board  which  suffered  single,  indivisible 
loss attributable to combined actions of multiple 
defendants in designing and constructing school 
building was entitled to only one compensatory 
damages award. 
13 Cases that cite this headnote 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
[12] Trial 
Comments on Evidence or Witnesses 
[9] Contribution 
Common Interest or Liability 
Damages Comments  by  counsel  that  he  believed  in  his 




Board of Educ. of McDowell County v. Zando, Martin &..., 182 W.Va. 597 (1990) 
390 S.E.2d 796, 59 Ed. Law Rep. 1179 
client’s case, that witness for opposing party had 
been unfriendly,  and  that one  opposing  witness 
had  been  “winking  at  the  ladies  on  the  jury” 
23 Cases that cite this headnote 
while counsel’s back was turned, 
improper, did not mandate mistrial. 
while 
[16] Evidence 
Knowledge, experience, and skill in general 2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Witness who had not been educated as structural 
engineer,   but   had   many   years  experience   in 
construction   business   and   was   familiar   with 
methods used in disputed construction, could be 
allowed to testify as expert on structural matters. 
Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 702, 28 U.S.C.A. 
[13] Appeal and Error 
Rulings on admissibility of evidence in 
general 
Rulings on admissibility of evidence are largely 
within trial court’s sound  discretion and  should 
not be disturbed unless there has been abuse of 
discretion. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
[17] 5 Cases that cite this headnote Witnesses 
Persons Who May Be Required to Appear 
and Testify 
In litigation involving multiple defendants, court 
would  not  require  settling  defendant’s  expert 
witnesses   to   testify   for   remaining   defendant 
after other  defendant settled  before trial, absent 
formal agreement as to shared use of witnesses. 
[14] Evidence 
Matters involving scientific or other special 
knowledge in general 
If   scientific,   technical,   or   other   specialized 
knowledge will assist trier of fact to understand 
evidence  or  determine  fact  in  issue,   witness 
qualified    as    expert    by    knowledge,    skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in 
4 Cases that cite this headnote 
form    of    opinion    or    otherwise. 
Evid.Rule 702, 28 U.S.C.A. 
Fed.Rules 
[18] Witnesses 
Nature and grounds of exclusion in general 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
In  order  to  bar  witness’  testimony  under  Dead 
Man’s  Act,  testimony  must  relate  to  personal 
transaction with person now deceased or insane, 
witness  must  be  party  to  suit  or  interested  in 
event or outcome, and testimony must be against 
representatives, heirs at law,  or beneficiaries of 
deceased or insane person. Code, 57–3–1. 
[15] Appeal and Error 
Competency of witness 
Evidence 
Determination of question of competency 
Cases that cite this headnote Whether  witness is qualified  to state opinion is 
matter which rests within discretion of trial court 
and its ruling on that point will not be disturbed 
unless it clearly appears that discretion has been 
abused. [19] Witnesses 
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Principal of agent deceased or incompetent
Allowing testimony from construction company 
witnesses as to conversations had with 
superintendent at time construction was planned 
was not error, even though superintendent had 
died prior to trial, where suit was not against 
superintendent’s representative, but rather 
against principal for whom superintendent had 
acted as agent.
Cases that cite this headnote
Evidence
Statements by agents since deceased
Testimony of construction company’s witnesses 
concerning conversations with school 
superintendent who had died before trial was 
admissible as statement made by agent or 
employee within scope of agency or 
employment during existence of  relationship. 
Rules of Evid., Rule 801(d)(2)(D).
error where construction company failed to 
show relevance of evidence or how exclusion 
was prejudicial to its case. Rules of Evid., Rule 
801(d)(2)(D).
Cases that cite this headnote
Appeal and Error
Prejudicial Effect
If evidence is excluded and action of court in 
excluding it is relied upon in appellate court, it 
must appear on record that rejected evidence 
was or would have been relevant, material and 
important in order for its rejection to be 
available as ground of error.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
1 Cases that cite this headnote
Evidence
Agents or Employees
Statements made by agent or employee within 
scope of his agency or employment and during 
existence of agency or employment relationship 
are not hearsay and are admissible against 
principal or employer who is party to litigation. 
Rules of Evid., Rule 801(d)(2)(D).
3 Cases that cite this headnote
Appeal and Error
Examination and rulings as to competency of 
witnesses
Exclusion of statement of school superintendent 
who had died prior to trial was not reversible
**799 *600 Syllabus by the Court
1. “The doctrine of contribution has its roots in equitable 
principles. The right to contribution arises when persons 
having a common obligation, either in contract or tort, are 
sued on that obligation and one party is forced to pay 
more than his pro tanto share of the obligation.” Syllabus 
Point 4, in part, Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Prods., Inc., 
169 W.Va. 440, 288 S.E.2d 511 (1982).
2. A defendant in a civil action has a right in advance of 
judgment to join a joint tortfeasor based on a cause of 
action for contribution. This is termed an “inchoate right 
to contribution” in order to distinguish it from the 
statutory right of contribution after a joint judgment 
conferred by W.Va.Code, 55-7-13 (1923).
3. “This jurisdiction is committed to the concept of joint 
and several liability among joint tortfeasors. A plaintiff 
may elect to sue any or all of those responsible for his 
injuries and collect his damages from whomever is able to 
pay, irrespective of their percentage of fault. Our adoption 
of a modified rule for contributory negligence in Bradley 
v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 
879 (1979), did not change our adherence to joint and 
several liability.” Syllabus Point 2, Sitzes v. Anchor Motor
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
Board of Educ. of McDowell County v. Zando, Martin &..., 182 W.Va. 597 (1990) 
390 S.E.2d 796, 59 Ed. Law Rep. 1179 
Freight, Inc., 169 W.Va. 698, 289 S.E.2d 679 (1982). not   be   disturbed   unless   there   has   been   an   abuse   of 
discretion.”  State  v.  Louk,  W.Va.,  301  S.E.2d  596,  599 
(1983).’ Syllabus Point 2, State v. Peyatt, 173 W.Va. 317, 
315 S.E.2d 574 (1983).” Syllabus Point 7, State v. Miller, 
175 W.Va. 616, 336 S.E.2d 910 (1985). 
4. Our right of contribution before judgment is derivative 
in the sense that it may be brought by a joint tortfeasor on 
any theory of liability that could have been asserted by the 
injured  plaintiff.  However,  it  is  clear  that  the  amount  of 
recovery  in  a  third-party  action  based  on  contribution  is 
controlled by the amount recovered by the plaintiff in the 
main action. 
11.   “   ‘If   scientific,   technical,   or   other   specialized 
knowledge  will  assist  the  trier  of  fact  to  understand  the 
evidence  or  to  **800  *601  determine  a  fact  in  issue,  a 
witness   qualified   as   an   expert   by   knowledge,   skill, 
experience,  training,  or  education  may  testify  thereto  in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise.’ W.Va.R.Evid. 702.” 
Syllabus Point 3, Ventura v. Winegardner, 178 W.Va. 82, 
357 S.E.2d 764 (1987). 
5. “ ‘Where a payment is made, and release obtained, by 
one  joint  tort-feasor,  the  other  joint  tort-feasors  shall  be 
given  credit  for  the  amount  of  such  payment  in  the 
satisfaction  of  the  wrong.’  Point  2,  Syllabus,  Hardin  v. 
The  New  York  Central  Railroad  Company,  145  W.Va. 
676 [116 S.E.2d 697 (1960) ].” Syllabus Point 1, Tennant 
v. Craig, 156 W.Va. 632, 195 S.E.2d 727 (1973). 
12. “ ‘Whether a witness is qualified to state an opinion is 
a matter which rests within the discretion of the trial court 
and its ruling on that point will not ordinarily be disturbed 
unless  it  clearly  appears  that  its  discretion  has  been 
abused.’ Point 5, syllabus, Overton v. Fields, 145 W.Va. 
797 [117 S.E.2d 598 (1960) ].” Syllabus Point 4, Hall v. 
Nello Teer Co., 157 W.Va. 582, 203 S.E.2d 145 (1974). 
6.  A  party  in  a  civil  action  who  has  made  a  good  faith 
settlement    with    the    plaintiff    prior    to    a    judicial 
determination of liability is relieved from any liability for 
contribution. 
7. Defendants in a civil action against whom a verdict is 
rendered  are  entitled  to  have  the  verdict  reduced  by  the 
amount  of  any  good  faith  settlements  previously  made 
with  the  plaintiff  by  other  jointly  liable  parties.  Those 
defendants  against   whom  the  verdict  is  rendered   are 
jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for payment of 
the  remainder  of  the  verdict.  Where  the  relative  fault  of 
the nonsettling defendants has been determined, they may 
seek  contribution  among  themselves  after  judgment  if 
forced  to  pay  more  than  their  allocated  share  of  the 
verdict. 
13. “To summarize the basic operation of the Dead Man’s 
Act, W.Va.Code, 57–3–1, a concurrence of three general 
conditions  must  be  met  in  order  to  bar  the  witness’s 
testimony.  First,  the  testimony  must  relate  to  a  personal 
transaction with a deceased or insane person. Second, the 
witness  must  be  a  party  to  the  suit  or  interested  in  its 
event  or  outcome.  Third,  the  testimony  must  be  against 
the  deceased’s  personal  representative,  heir  at  law,  or 
beneficiaries  or  the  assignee  or  committee  of  an  insane 
person.” Syllabus Point 10, Moore v. Goode, 180 W.Va. 
78, 375 S.E.2d 549 (1988). 
8. Where there is a single indivisible loss arising from the 
actions  of  multiple  parties  who  have  contributed  to  the 
loss, the fact that different theories of liability have been 
asserted  against  them  does  not  foreclose  their  right  of 
contribution  inter  se  or  prevent  them  from  obtaining  a 
verdict  credit  for  settlements  made  with  the  plaintiff  by 
one or more of those jointly responsible. 
14. Statements made by an agent or employee within the 
scope   of   his   agency   or   employment   and   during   the 
existence  of  the  agency  or  employment  relationship  are 
not  hearsay  and  are  admissible  against  a  principal  or 
employer   who   is   a   party  to   litigation.   W.Va.R.Evid. 
801(d)(2)(D). 
15.  “When  evidence  is  excluded  and  the  action  of  the 
court in excluding it is relied upon in the appellate court, 
it  must  appear  on  the  record  that  the  evidence  rejected 
was or would have been relevant, material and important 
to  make  its  rejection  available  as  a  ground  of  error.” 
Syllabus Point 5, Maxwell v. Kent, 49 W.Va. 542, 39 S.E. 
174 (1901). 
9. “Whether a motion for a mistrial should be sustained or 
overruled  is  a  matter  which  rests  within  the  trial  court’s 
discretion  and  the  action  of  the  trial  court  in  ruling  on 
such  a  motion  will  not  be  cause  for  reversal  on  appeal 
unless  it  clearly  appears  that  such  discretion  has  been 
abused.” Syllabus Point 4, Moore, Kelly & Reddish, Inc. 
v.  Shannondale,  Inc.,  152  W.Va.  549,  165  S.E.2d  113 
(1968). 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
10.  “  ‘  “Rulings  on  the  admissibility  of  evidence  are 
largely within a trial court’s sound discretion and should Daniel  R.  Schuda,  Steptoe  &  Johnson,  Charleston,  for 
Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc. 
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Stephen  R. Crislip, William J. Powell, Jackson & Kelly, 
Charleston, for the Bd. of Educ. of McDowell County. On  February  22,  1984,  the  Board  filed  an  action  for 
damages   in   the   Circuit   Court   of   Kanawha   County, 
alleging that ZMM had been negligent and had breached 
its contracts with the Board by failing properly to design 
and  supervise  the  construction  of  the  building.  ZMM 
denied the allegations and subsequently filed a third-party 
complaint  alleging  that  any  damages  suffered  by  the 
Board  were  due  to  the  negligence  of  Nutting  and  Corte. 
The Board was then **801 *602 granted leave to file an 
alternative complaint against Nutting and Corte, charging 
each with breach of contract and with negligence. 
Opinion 
MILLER, Justice: 
In this appeal, we address the validity of the dismissal of a 
civil  defendant’s  claim  for  contribution  against  a  joint 
wrongdoer  who  has  settled  with  the  plaintiff.  We  also 
address the right of the nonsettling defendant to have the 
verdict reduced  to reflect such settlements. We conclude 
that   the   Circuit   Court   of   Kanawha   County   properly 
dismissed the contribution claims of the defendant below, 
Zando,  Martin  &  Milstead,  Inc.  (ZMM),  but  erred  in 
refusing to grant a verdict credit for settlements between 
the plaintiff below, the Board of Education of McDowell 
County (Board), and other defendants. 
In April 1987, the Board settled with Corte for $600,000. 
Corte obtained a release from liability and was dismissed 
from  the  litigation.  The  trial  court  also  dismissed  with 
prejudice   ZMM’s   cross-claims1     against   Corte   on   the 
ground that the settlement and release barred any further 
proceedings    against    Corte    arising    from    the    same 
transaction. The Board proceeded to trial against Nutting 
and  ZMM  several  weeks  later.  In  the  course  of  trial, 
however, the Board settled with Nutting for $30,000, and 
Nutting  was  dismissed  from  the  action.  The  trial  judge 
also dismissed ZMM’s cross-claims against Nutting. 
In January,  1975, the Board entered  into a contract  with 
ZMM,  an  architectural  and  engineering  firm  located  in 
Charleston, Kanawha County, to design and supervise the 
construction  of  Mount  View  High  School  near  Welch, 
McDowell County. At the recommendation of ZMM, the 
Board subsequently hired, by separate contracts, the H.C. 
Nutting  Company  (Nutting)   to  do  soil  testing  at  the 
proposed school site and the Corte Company, Inc. (Corte), 
a general contractor, to perform most of the construction. 
The  case  was  submitted  to  the  jury,  and,  on  May  21, 
1987,   a   verdict   was   returned   awarding   the   Board 
$1,000,000   in   compensatory   damages.   Interrogatories 
subsequently  submitted  to  the  jury  indicated  that  the 
verdict was predicated on findings of both negligence and 
Cracks were found in the building almost as soon as the 
school opened in September 1978, and more appeared as 
time went on. In January 1982, a steel beam supporting a 
classroom   fell.   In   July   1983,   the   south   wall   of   the 
gymnasium    suffered    a    structural    failure    during    a 
windstorm. 
breach  of  contract. 
involved as follows: 
The jury allocated the negligence 
“ 5% McDowell County Board of Education 
15% Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc. 
75% Corte Company, Inc. 
0% H.C. Nutting Company 
5% Others” 
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No punitive damages were awarded.
Following the verdict, ZMM sought to have the Nutting 
and Corte settlements deducted from the verdict. The 
Board, however, elected to have judgment rendered on the 
contract claim. The trial court refused to grant ZMM a 
credit for the Nutting and Corte settlements and, by order 
dated October 15, 1988, entered judgment against ZMM 
for the full $1,000,000.
I.
A. The Right o f Contribution
[1] ZMM first argues that the trial court’s dismissal of its 
cross-claims against Corte and Nutting impermissibly cut 
off its right to contribution. The right of contribution 
arises from liability for a joint wrong committed by two 
or more parties against the plaintiff. We explained the 
doctrine of contribution in Syllabus Point 4, in part, of 
Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Prods., Inc., 169 W.Va. 440, 
288 S.E.2d 511 (1982), as follows:
“The doctrine of contribution has 
its roots in equitable principles. The 
right to contribution arises when 
persons having a common 
obligation, either in contract or tort, 
are sued on that obligation and one 
party is forced to pay more than his 
pro tanto share of the obligation.”
See Estate o f Bayliss v. Lee, 173 W.Va. 299, 315 S.E.2d 
406 (1984).
[2] In Haynes v. City o f Nitro, 161 W.Va. 230, 240 S.E.2d 
544 (1977), we traced our prior cases in this area and 
concluded that a defendant in a negligence action has a 
right in advance of judgment to join a joint tortfeasor 
based on a cause of action for contribution. We termed 
this an “inchoate right to contribution” in order to 
distinguish it from the statutory right of contribution after 
a joint judgment conferred by W.Va.Code, 55-7-13 
(1923).2 161 W.Va. at 234, 240 S.E.2d at 547.
[3] In Sydenstricker, 169 W.Va. at 452, 288 S.E.2d at 518, 
we reaffirmed that this inchoate right of contribution “ ‘is
designed to moderate the inequity which existed in our 
law that enabled the plaintiff to cast **802 *603 the entire 
responsibility for an accident on one of several joint 
tortfeasors by deciding to sue only him.’ ” Quoting 
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332, 354, 
256 S.E.2d 879, 886 (1979). This right of the plaintiff to 
sue one or more joint tortfeasors is a companion principle 
of the doctrine of joint and several liability, which permits 
a plaintiff to recover the entire judgment from any joint 
judgment debtor. As we explained in Syllabus Point 2 of 
Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 169 W.Va. 698, 289 
S.E.2d 679 (1982):
“This jurisdiction is committed to 
the concept of joint and several 
liability among joint tortfeasors. A 
plaintiff may elect to sue any or all 
of those responsible for his injuries 
and collect his damages from 
whomever is able to pay, 
irrespective of their percentage of 
fault. Our adoption of a modified 
rule for contributory negligence in 
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.,
163 W.Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 
(1979), did not change our 
adherence to joint and several 
liability.”
[4] In Sydenstricker, 169 W.Va. at 452, 288 S.E.2d at 518, 
we explained the scope of our inchoate right of 
contribution as follows:
“Our right of contribution before 
judgment is derivative in the sense 
that it may be brought by a joint 
tortfeasor on any theory of liability 
that could have been asserted by 
the injured plaintiff. However, it is 
clear that the amount of recovery in 
a third-party action based on 
contribution is controlled by the 
amount recovered by the plaintiff 
in the main action.”
Thus, the right of inchoate contribution is not confined 
only to cases of joint negligence. Instead, it arises under 
any theory of liability which results in a common 
obligation to the plaintiff. Where, as here, the plaintiff 
seeks damages for a breach of contractual obligations, the 
named defendant is entitled to assert claims for 
contribution against other parties liable to the plaintiff for
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the same injury even though the defendant was not a party 
to the contract between the plaintiff and the other parties.3 
See 18 Am.Jur.2d Contribution § 10 (1985). The 
touchstone of the right of inchoate contribution is this 
inquiry: Did the party against whom contribution is 
sought breach a duty to the plaintiff which caused or 
contributed to the plaintiff’s damages?
The fundamental purpose of inchoate contribution is to 
enable all parties who have contributed to the plaintiff’s 
injuries to be brought into one suit. Not only is judicial 
economy served, but such a procedure also furthers one of 
the primary goals of any system of justice—to avoid 
piecemeal litigation which cultivates a multiplicity of 
suits and often results in disparate and unjust verdicts. See 
Bowman v. Barnes, 168 W.Va. 111, 282 S.E.2d 613
(1981). Moreover, as we have already indicated, joinder 
of contribution claims serves to ensure that those who 
have contributed to the plaintiff’s damages share in that 
responsibility. We have also provided a method of 
apportioning the damages among the defendants 
according to fault in negligence cases.4 Finally, while the 
right of contribution is designed to promote equality 
among defendants, it is not automatic **803 *604 and 
must be properly invoked to be preserved. See Sitzes v. 
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 169 W.Va. at 713, 289 
S.E.2d at 688.
B. Termination o f Contribution Rights by Settlement
[5] Having spoken generally of the right to contribution, 
we must now discuss the law surrounding the termination 
of such a right when a joint wrongdoer settles with the 
plaintiff. Although we have never discussed this issue at 
length, we have developed, independently of any 
assertion of contribution, a practice of allowing the 
defendant against whom a verdict is rendered to reduce 
the damages to reflect any partial settlement the plaintiff 
has obtained from a joint tortfeasor. As we stated in 
Syllabus Points 1 and 2 of Tennant v. Craig, 156 W.Va. 
632, 195 S.E.2d 727 (1973):
“1. ‘Where a payment is made, and release obtained, by 
one joint tort-feasor, the other joint tort-feasors shall be 
given credit for the amount of such payment in the 
satisfaction of the wrong. ’ Point 2, Syllabus, Hardin v. 
The New York Central Railroad Company, 145 W.Va. 
676 [116 S.E.2d 697 (1960) ].
“2. Partial satisfaction of the injured person by one 
joint tortfeasor is a satisfaction, pro tanto, as to all.’ 
Point 5, Syllabus, New River & Pocahontas
Consolidated Coal Company v. Eary, 115 W.Va. 46 
[174 S.E. 573 (1934) ].”
This practice is premised on the principle that a plaintiff is 
entitled to one, but only one, complete satisfaction for his 
injury. Thornton v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 158 
W.Va. 504, 213 S.E.2d 102 (1975); Cox v. Turner, 157 
W.Va. 802, 207 S.E.2d 152 (1974); Tennant v. Craig, 
supra; New River & Pocahontas Consol. Coal Co. v. 
Eary, supra; Bloss v. Plymale, 3 W.Va. 393 (1869).
These cases implicitly stand for the proposition that one 
who settles with the plaintiff prior to verdict is discharged 
from any liability for contribution.5 This is the approach 
taken by both the Uniform Contribution Among 
Tortfeasors Act, 1955, (UCATA)6 and the Uniform 
Comparative Fault Act (UCFA).7
Such a rule furthers the strong public policy favoring 
out-of-court resolution of disputes, which we stated in 
Syllabus Point 1, in part, of Sanders v. Roselawn 
Memorial Gardens, 152 W.Va. 91, 159 S.E.2d 784 
(1968): “The law favors and encourages the resolution of 
controversies by contracts of compromise and settlement 
rather than by litigation[.]” See State ex rel. Vapor Corp. 
v. Narick, 173 W.Va. 770, 320 S.E.2d 345 (1984); Floyd 
v. Watson, 163 W.Va. 65, 254 S.E.2d 687 (1979); Janney 
v. Virginian Ry. Co., 119 W.Va. 249, 193 S.E. 187 
(1937). As the California Court of Appeals stated in 
Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236, 
132 Cal.Rptr. 843, 846 (1976):
**804 *605 “Few things would be 
better calculated to frustrate this 
policy, and to discourage 
settlement of disputed tort claims, 
than knowledge that such a 
settlement lacked finality and 
would but lead to further litigation 
with one’s joint tortfeasors, and 
perhaps further liability.”
“No defendant wants to settle when he remains open to 
contribution in an uncertain amount, to be determined on 
the basis of a judgment against another in a suit to which 
he will not be a party.” Unif. Contribution Among 
Tortfeasors Act, 1955, § 4(b), comment, 12 U.L.A. at 99. 
See Rakowski v. Lucente, 104 Ill.2d 317, 84 Ill.Dec. 654, 
472 N.E.2d 791 (1984).
From a practical standpoint, the reduction of the verdict to 
reflect partial settlements counterbalances the loss of the 
right of contribution, since the remaining defendants, who 
would otherwise have been entitled to such right, obtain
WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 8
Board of Educ. of McDowell County v. Zando, Martin 182 W.Va. 597 (1990)
390 S.E.2d 796, 59 Ed. Law Rep. 1179
These considerations have led most jurisdictions 
recognizing a right of contribution to conclude that a 
nonsettling defendant’s right of contribution from a joint 
wrongdoer is extinguished by the plaintiff’s settlement 
with and release of such wrongdoer prior to verdict. See, 
e.g., Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1967); 
American Motorcycle A ss’n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.3d 
578, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899 (1978); State ex rel 
Deere & Co. v. District Court, 224 Mont. 384, 730 P.2d 
396 (1986); Theobald v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 208 A.2d 
129 (1965); Charles v. Giant Eagle Mkts., 513 Pa. 474, 
522 A.2d 1 (1987); Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. Mineral 
Explorations Co., 704 P.2d 1266 (Wyo. 1985). We believe 
this approach is consistent with our principles regarding 
settlements and allocation of liability.
Some jurisdictions have recognized a limited exception to 
the finality of such settlements where the agreement is 
collusive in nature by refusing to cut off the nonsettling 
defendants’ right to contribution unless the settlement has 
been made in “good faith.” See Stifle v. Marathon Oil Co., 
684 F.Supp. 552 (S.D.I11.1988), rev’d on other grounds, 
876 F.2d 552 (7th Cir.1989) (applying Illinois law); 
Torres v. State, 67 A.D.2d 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1979). 
The determination of whether a settlement was made in 
good faith does not necessarily turn on whether the 
amount of the settlement accurately reflects the jury’s 
ultimate apportionment of liability. The Appellate Court 
of Illinois recently stated in Jachera v. Blake-Lamb 
Funeral Homes, Inc., 189 Ill.App.3d 281, 288, 136 
I11.Dec. 790, 795, 545 N.E.2d 314, 319 (1989):
Accord Noyes v. Raymond, 28 Mass.App. 186, 548 
N.E.2d 196 (1990). As we implicitly recognized in the 
context of “Mary Carter” agreements,8 the chief 
consideration is **805 *606 whether the settlement 
arrangement substantially impaired the remaining 
defendants from receiving a fair trial. State ex rel. Vapor 
Corp. v. Narick, 173 W.Va. at 773, 320 S.E.2d at 348. See 
Grillis v. Monongahela Power Co., 176 W.Va. 662, 346 
S.E.2d 812 (1986).
[6] The good faith test carries its own safeguards. It is 
highly unlikely that a plaintiff will make a minimal 
settlement with a defendant who has the financial ability 
to pay and whose liability is substantial. We, therefore 
conclude that a party in a civil action who has made a 
good faith settlement with the plaintiff poor to a judicial 
determination of liability is relieved from any liability for 
contribution. In this case, there is no suggestion that the 
settlements were not entered into in good faith. 
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court 
committed reversible error in dismissing with prejudice 
ZMM’s cross-claims against Corte and Nutting for 
contribution.
“Since damages are often 
speculative and liability uncertain, 
the amount of a settlement 
legitimately might be far different 
from a damage award which results 
from full litigation. ( [O ’Connor v.
C. Calculation o f Verdict Credit
We confirm our traditional practice of granting a 
nonsettling defendant a pro tanto, or dollar-for-dollar, 
credit for partial settlements against any verdict ultimately 
rendered for the plaintiff. See Tennant v. Craig, supra; 
Butler v. Smith’s Transfer Corp., 147 W.Va. 402, 128 
S.E.2d 32 (1962). In Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 
163 W.Va. at 345, 256 S.E.2d at 886, we stated: “Our 
comparative negligence rule does not change the right of 
a joint tortfeasor to obtain a pro tanto credit on the 
plaintiffs judgment for monies obtained by the plaintiff 
in a settlement with another joint tortfeasor.” (Citations
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 9
Pinto Trucking Serv.,149 
Ill.App.3d 911, 103 I11.Dec. 242, 
501 N.E.2d 263 (1986) ] ). An 
ensuing jury verdict is not 
necessarily an accurate measure of 
good faith in a settlement made 
prior to trial; at the time of the 
settlement, it is an unknown factor, 
so that any analysis based on the 
subsequent verdict necessarily 
relies on hindsight. ( [Lowe v. 
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 124 
Ill.App.3d 80, 79 I11.Dec. 238, 463 
N.E.2d 792 (1984)]) ”
the benefit of the settlement. See Dunn v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 645 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.1981); Poupore v. Suguin, 
82 Misc.2d 1, 367 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1975). Verdict 
reduction also allocates liability to some extent among 
those jointly responsible for the plaintiff’s injury. The 
settling defendant is, in effect, paying a share of liability 
on the verdict. At the same time, the use of the verdict 
credit ensures against double recovery by the plaintiff 
See Luth v. Rogers & Babler Constr. Co., 507 P.2d 761 
(Alaska 1973); Lafayette v. Los Angeles County, 162 
Cal.App.3d 547, 208 Cal.Rptr. 668 (1984); Utter v. South 
Brookhaven Obstetric & Gynecological Assocs., P.C., 
135 A.D.2d 811, 522 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1987). See generally 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 885(3) comment f 
(1979).
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omitted). The pro tanto verdict reduction method has also 
been approved in cases decided after our adoption of 
comparative negligence. See Reager v. Anderson, 179 
W.Va. 691, 703, 371 S.E.2d 619, 632 (1988); Groves v. 
Compton, 167 W.Va. 873, 280 S.E.2d 708 (1981).
Our practice with regard to verdict reduction basically 
comports with Section 4 of the UCATA, which states that 
a prior settlement by one joint tortfeasor “reduces the 
claim against the others to the extent of any amount 
stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount 
of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater.”9 
12 U.L.A. at 98. Jurisdictions adhering to this approach 
assert that it (1) encourages the plaintiff to settle by 
guaranteeing that the portion of the verdict not paid by the 
settling defendant will be chargeable to the defendant 
against whom the verdict is returned and (2), at the same 
time, clearly furthers the strong public policy against the 
plaintiff recovering more than one complete satisfaction. 
Tommy’s Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 754 P.2d 243 
(Alaska 1988); American Motorcycle A ss’n v. Superior 
Court, supra; Department o f Tramp. v. Webb, 409 So.2d 
1061 (Fla.App.1981), modified on other grounds, 438 
So.2d 780 (Fla.1983); Nobriga v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 
Inc., 67 Haw. 157, 683 P.2d 389 (1984); Mayhew v. 
Berrien County Road Comm’n, 414 Mich. 399, 326 
N.W.2d 366 (1982); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 
(Mo.1983); State ex rel. Deere & Co. v. District Court, 
224 Mont. at 397, 730 P.2d at 405; Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. 
Mineral Explorations Co., 704 P.2d at 1277.
We recognize that this model for verdict reduction does 
not take into account the settling party’s actual degree of 
fault.10 **806 *607 However, the importance and 
accuracy of the jury’s allocation of liability is necessarily 
undermined by the fact that the settling party, who is out 
of the case, is not present to defend himself.
[7] We, therefore, conclude that the defendants in a civil 
action against whom a verdict is rendered are entitled to 
have the verdict reduced by the amount of any good faith 
settlements previously made with the plaintiff by other 
jointly liable parties. Those defendants against whom the 
verdict is rendered are jointly and severally liable to the 
plaintiff for payment of the remainder of the verdict. 
Where the relative fault of the nonsettling defendants has 
been determined, they may seek contribution among 
themselves after judgment if forced to pay more than their 
allocated share of the verdict.11
D. ZMM’s Entitlement to Verdict Credit
The Board’s action against ZMM was based on two 
theories, i.e., breach of its architectural and engineering 
contract to design the building and to supervise the 
construction and negligence in supervising the work.12 
The same damages were proved under both theories. The 
jury was instructed on both theories13 and returned 
interrogatories which supported both theories. The Board, 
after the verdict, elected to accept the verdict on the 
contract theory. Presumably, the Board believed that 
ZMM could not obtain the benefit of the Corte and 
Nutting settlements in the contract action because Corte 
and Nutting were not parties to the Board’s contract with 
ZMM and vice versa. The trial court apparently adopted 
this view and held that ZMM was not entitled to a set off 
against the verdict reflecting the prior settlements.
**807 *608 We have already recognized that the right of 
inchoate contribution exists in both tort and contract 
cases. Our definition of the right of contribution in 
Sydenstricker makes no distinction among theories of 
recovery, but focuses on the common liability of the 
defendants for plaintiff’s injuries. If those injuries arise 
from the combined actions of the defendants, they are 
jointly liable to the plaintiff and may seek inchoate 
contribution among themselves regardless of the theories 
of recovery asserted against them individually.
The right of contribution was not designed to provide a 
windfall for the plaintiff by permitting him to achieve a 
double recovery for the same injury. Our general law in 
this area is in line with the general law of damages 
elsewhere and is set out in Syllabus Point 7 of Harless v. 
First N at’l Bank in Fairmont, 169 W.Va. 673, 289 S.E.2d 
692 (1982):
“It is generally recognized that 
there can be only one recovery of 
damages for one wrong or injury.
Double recovery of damages is not 
permitted; the law does not permit 
a double satisfaction for a single 
injury. A plaintiff may not recover 
damages twice for the same injury 
simply because he has two legal 
theories.”
See also Sewell v. Gregory, 179 W.Va. 585, 371 S.E.2d 
82 (1988); Wiggins v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 178 
W.Va. 63, 357 S.E.2d 745 (1987); Flannery v. United 
States, 171 W.Va. 27, 297 S.E.2d 433, 34 A.L.R.4th 281
(1982).
This rule of damages is independent of the right of 
contribution. In Harless, the plaintiff sought recovery for
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mental anguish and emotional distress as a result of a 
retaliatory discharge by his employer. He also had a 
second theory of recovery—the tort of outrageous 
conduct. The trial court permitted both theories to go to 
the jury, and the jury awarded separate amounts on both 
theories. We held that because both theories involved 
essentially the same items of damages, a duplicate 
recovery could not be made.
Other jurisdictions have recognized that a joint obligation 
may arise in both contract and tort, but give rise to a 
single damage recovery.14 In Town o f Winnsboro v. 
Barnard & Burk, Inc., 294 So.2d 867 (La.App.), writ 
refused, 295 So.2d 445 (La.1974), for example, an 
engineering firm and a testing laboratory tried to escape 
common liability for defects in the construction of a city 
street system on the ground that they had entered into 
separate contracts with the plaintiff city. While conceding 
that the defendants were not joint obligors, the court held:
“It matters not that the obligation of the defendants to 
repair the damages and bear the loss arose from 
separate breaches of separate contracts to do separate 
things. The jurisprudence recognizes that solidary 
obligations may result even though the parties are 
bound under separate contracts and even though one 
party may be bound under contract and the other 
through some other basis of law.” 294 So.2d at 886. 
Where such joint obligation for damages is found, a credit 
is allowed for any settlement prior to verdict, as illustrated 
by Kassman v. American Univ., 178 U.S.App.D.C. 263, 
546 F.2d 1029 (1976). There, the Court of Appeals noted 
that the idea of a credit is premised on the principle that 
“[t]he office of compensatory damages is to make the 
plaintiff whole, but certainly not more than whole,” and 
went on to say:
“There is nothing in logic or precedent which requires 
limitation of the underlying principle to situations 
involving joint tortfeasors or to those involving 
unintentional torts; on the contrary, there is the 
soundest of reasons to indulge its operation wherever 
more than one is responsible for a single injury. Where 
there has been only one injury, the law confers only 
one recovery, irrespective of the multiplicity of parties 
whom or theories which the plaintiff pursues.” **808 
*609 178 U.S.App.D.C. at 267-68, 546 F.2d at 
1033-34. (Footnotes omitted).
The court in Kassman found that regardless of the 
different theories and parties pursued by the plaintiff, 
“there was but one loss” and that “if the amount paid in 
settlement reimbursed Kassman for part of the loss 
established by the verdict, the judgment on that verdict 
should have been credited with the payment on
settlement.” 546 F.2d at 1035. See Reliable Tire Distribs., 
Inc. v. Kelly Springfield Tire Co., 607 F.Supp. 361 
(E.D.Pa.1985); J.F. Equip., Inc. v. Owatonna Mfg. Co., 
Inc., 143 Ill.App.3d 208, 98 Ill.Dec. 394, 494 N.E.2d 516 
(1986); Laurendeau v. Kewaunee Scientific Equip. Corp., 
17 Mass.App. 113, 456 N.E.2d 767 (1983), review 
denied, 390 Mass. 1106, 459 N.E.2d 824 (1984); Great 
Northern Packaging, Inc. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 
154 Mich.App. 777, 399 N.W.2d 408 (1986); Ross v. 
Holton, 640 S.W.2d 166 (Mo.App.1982); TSC Indus., Inc. 
v. Tomlin, 743 S.W.2d 169 (Tenn.App.1987). See also 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A(2) (1979).
The same result was reached in a factual pattern closely 
analogous to the one here. In Young M en’s Christian 
Ass ’n v. Midland Architects, Inc., 174 Ill.App.3d 966, 124 
Ill.Dec. 468, 529 N.E.2d 288 (1988), the plaintiff brought 
suit for breach of contract and breach of warranties 
against the architects, the general contractor, and the 
manufacturer of a roof system installed on the plaintiff’s 
building. Prior to trial, the contractor and manufacturer 
settled and were dismissed from the action. The case 
proceeded to trial against the architects on a breach of 
contract theory and resulted in a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff. The architects then sought to have the verdict 
reduced by the amount of the pretrial settlements.
In ruling that the trial court erred in its manner of 
reducing the verdict, the Illinois appellate court relied on 
cases involving joint tortfeasors and stated:
“This is a case where the actions of all the defendants 
(the architects, the general contractor, and the roofing 
manufacturer) caused a single, indivisible injury to 
plaintiff as a result of the construction and installation 
of a defective roof.
“The law is well settled that, where there is a single and 
indivisible injury, the damages are inseparable and any 
amounts received from any of the defendants must be 
deducted from the total damages sustained. (Weaver v. 
Bolton (1965), 61 Ill.App.2d 98, 209 N.E.2d 5.) 
Applicable to the case at bar is the holding in Eberle v. 
Brenner (1987), 153 Ill.App.3d 700, 702 [106 Ill.Dec. 
144, 146, 505 N.E.2d 691, 693], where the court said:
‘An injured person is entitled to one full 
compensation for his injuries, and a double recovery 
for the same injury is against public policy. 
[Citation.] Thus, a plaintiff who has recovered for his 
damages should have no basis to complain because a 
defendant benefited from a setoff. ’ ”
174 Ill.App.3d at 970, 124 Ill.Dec. at 471, 529 N.E.2d
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[8] We believe that under the foregoing legal principles, a 
verdict reduction reflecting the settlements was required 
here. The Board suffered a single, indivisible loss 
attributable to the combined actions of the multiple 
defendants in designing and constructing the high school. 
The defendants therefore shared a common liability for 
the damages suffered by the Board. The evidence and 
measure of compensatory damages was the same under 
both theories of liability. In essence, the Board merely 
asserted alternative grounds for the same **809 *610 
relief. It is, therefore, entitled to only one compensatory 
damage award.
[9] Under these circumstances, where there is a single 
indivisible loss arising from the actions of multiple parties 
who have contributed to the loss, the fact that different 
theories of liability have been asserted against them does 
not foreclose their right of contribution inter se or prevent 
them from obtaining a verdict credit for settlements made 
with the plaintiff by one or more of those jointly 
responsible. Accordingly, we conclude that ZMM was, in 
fact, entitled to reduction of the verdict to reflect prior 
payments by Corte and Nutting in satisfaction of the 
Board’s loss.15
[10] On cross-assignment of error, the Board contends that 
the trial court erred in refusing to grant its post-judgment 
motion for prejudgment interest on the verdict. The trial 
court granted the Board post-judgment interest on the 
$1,000,000 verdict from the verdict date, but held that 
since the Board had elected to have judgment entered on 
the breach of contract theory, it was not entitled to 
prejudgment interest.
Admittedly, there is some confusion in our cases with 
regard to prejudgment interest in contract cases. In Bond
v. City o f Huntington, 166 W.Va. 581, 596, 276 S.E.2d 
539, 547 (1981), for example, we commented that 
W.Va.Code, 56-6-27 (1923),16 embodied the common 
law principle that in contract claims, interest was awarded 
as part of the compensatory damages “where the principal 
is certain or can be rendered certain by some reasonable 
calculation.” See Bischoff v. Francesa, 133 W.Va. 474, 56 
S.E.2d 865 (1949); Cresap v. Brown, 82 W.Va. 467, 96 
S.E. 66 (1918). In Bond, however, we were concerned 
primarily with the award of interest in a tort action in the 
absence of an authorizing statute. A cursory reading of 
W.Va.Code, 56-6-27, clearly demonstrates that an award 
of interest in a contract action is not limited to cases in 
which the amount in question is undisputed. Interest is 
allowable “in any action founded on contract.” As we 
indicated in Syllabus Point 1 of Corte Co., Inc. v. County 
Comm’n o f McDowell County, 171 W.Va. 405 , 299 
S.E.2d 16 (1982): “Pursuant to W.Va.Code, 56-6-27 
[1931], a county commission may be liable, in an action 
founded on contract, for interest on the principal due, or 
any part thereof, at the time of trial, after allowing all 
proper credits, payments and sets off.” Such awards are 
intended to compensate the plaintiff for the losses he 
could have avoided or money he could have earned if the 
contract obligation had been timely performed.
Here, the jury found the Board’s loss to be one million 
dollars. ZMM does not dispute that an award of 
prejudgment interest would have been proper on a tort 
judgment. In Arcuri v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 176 W.Va. 
211, 219, 342 S.E.2d 177, 185 (1986), we held that the 
plaintiffs, who had sued their fire and hazard insurers in 
both contract and tort for delay in payment of insurance 
proceeds, were entitled to interest on the proceeds of the 
policies “whether the action against the insurers is for 
breach of contract or for the tort of bad **810 *611 faith 
delay in payment.” We believe the Board is entitled to no 
less.
On remand, the trial court should recall the rate of interest 
spelled out in Syllabus Point 7 of Bell v. Inland Mut. Ins. 
Co., 175 W.Va. 165 , 332 S.E.2d 127, cert, denied sub 
nom. Camden Fire Ins. A s s n v. Justice, 474 U.S. 936, 
106 S.Ct. 299, 88 L.Ed.2d 277 (1985):
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See also Morley v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(applying Maryland law); Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 846 
F.2d 482 (8th Cir. 1988); Raben-Pastal v. City o f Coconut 
Creek, 545 So.2d 885 (Fla.App. 1989); Reeves v. Dixie 
Brick, Inc., 403 So.2d 792 (La.App. 1981); Doundoulakis 
v. Town o f Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 440, 398 N.Y.S.2d 401, 
368 N.E.2d 24 (1977); South Union, Ltd. v. George 
Parker & Assocs., 29 Ohio App.3d 197, 29 O.B.R. 241, 
504 N.E.2d 1131 (1985); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 
665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
at 291.
II.
“Prejudgment interest accruing on 
amounts as provided by law prior 
to July 5, 1981 [W.Va.Code,
56-6-27 and -29 [1931]] is to be 
calculated at a maximum annual 
rate of six percent under 
W. Va. Code, 47-6-5(a) [1974], and 
thereafter, at a maximum annual 
rate of ten percent in accordance
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with the provisions of W.Va.Code,
56-6-31 [1981].”
Weimer-Godwin v. Board o f Educ. o f Upshur County, 179 
W.Va. 423, 428, 369 S.E.2d 726, 731 (1988).
Prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date 
on which the cause of action accrued. See Syllabus Point 
2, Grove v. Myers, 181 W.Va.342, 382 S.E.2d 536 (1989).
Although from the record before us, it is difficult to 
pinpoint the precise date when the cause of action arose, it 
would appear that the major damage had occurred at least 
by July, 1983. Prejudgment interest should be awarded on 
the entire $1,000,000 verdict from the date of the cause of 
action.17 Because the Board received the Corte and 
Nutting settlements less than one month before the jury 
verdict, there is no necessity to adjust the prejudgment 
interest for the settlement amounts. Finally, the principal 
on which the award of post-judgment interest will be 
calculated should be arrived at by subtracting the dollar 
amount of all settlements from the $1,000,000 verdict 
plus prejudgment interest.
III.
ZMM next contends that the trial court erred in not 
granting its motion for a mistrial. The motion, made after 
the jury had retired to deliberate, was based on allegedly 
improper comments made by counsel for the Board in 
closing arguments18 indicating that the attorney “believed 
in” his client’s case, that witnesses for ZMM had been 
unfriendly to the Board’s witnesses, and that one ZMM 
witness had been “winking at the ladies on the jury” while 
counsel’s back was turned.
[11] In Syllabus Point 2 of Jenrett v. Smith, 173 W.Va. 
325, 315 S.E.2d 583 (1983), we stated:
“ ‘Though wide latitude is accorded counsel in 
arguments before a jury, such arguments may not be 
founded on facts not before the jury, or inferences 
which must arise from facts not before the jury.’ Syl. 
pt. 3, Crum v. Ward, 146 W.Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18 
(1961).”
Certainly, the comments of the Board’s attorney stated 
matters not in evidence. In Syllabus Point 4 of Moore, 
Kelly & Reddish, Inc. v. Shannondale, Inc., 152 W.Va. 
549, 165 S.E.2d 113 (1968), we recognized:
“Whether a motion for a mistrial 
should be sustained or overruled is
a matter which rests within the trial 
court’s discretion and the action of 
the trial court in ruling on such a 
motion will not be cause for 
reversal on appeal unless it clearly 
appears that such discretion has 
been abused.”
We have also held on several occasions that improper 
personal remarks of counsel do not always require 
reversal of a judgment. See Jenrett v. Smith, supra; 
Leftwich v. Wesco Corp., 146 W.Va. 196, 119 S.E.2d 401 
(1961), overruled on other grounds, Bradley v. 
Appalachian Power Co., supra.
[12] *612 Reviewing the record as a whole, we cannot say 
that counsel’s improper comments **811 were such as to 
mandate the granting of a mistrial. Accordingly, we find 
no abuse of discretion by the trial court which would 
warrant reversal of the judgment for refusal to grant a 
mistrial.
IV.
[13] ZMM also raises several assignments of evidentiary 
error. We are guided in our inquiry by the well-settled 
rule stated in Syllabus Point 7 of State v. Miller, 175 
W.Va. 616, 336 S.E.2d 910 (1985):
“ ‘ “Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are largely 
within a trial court’s sound discretion and should not be 
disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion.” 
State v. Louk, 171 W.Va. 639, 301 S.E.2d 596, 599
(1983).’ Syllabus Point 2, State v. Peyatt, 173 W.Va. 
317, 315 S.E.2d 574 (1983).”
See West Virginia D ep’t o f Highways v. Mountain, Inc., 
167 W.Va. 202, 279 S.E.2d 192 (1981); Casto v. Martin, 
159 W.Va. 761, 230 S.E.2d 722 (1976).
A.
ZMM first contends that the trial court erred in allowing 
J.E. Caffrey, a consulting engineer, to testify as an expert 
witness on matters of structural engineering and design. 
Mr. Caffrey had been educated as a mining engineer, but 
had over twenty-five years experience supervising various 
kinds of engineers and construction. Mr. Caffrey stated 
that his experience had made him familiar with the
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construction methods used in building the high school. 
The court qualified him to testify as an expert as to 
structural matters.
[14] [15] In Syllabus Point 3 of  Ventura v. Winegardner, 178 
W.Va. 82, 357 S.E.2d 764 (1987), we stated:
“ ‘If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise.’ W.Va.R.Evid. 702.”
See West Virginia D ep’t o f Highways v. Thompson, 180 
W.Va. 114, 375 S.E.2d 585 (1988). In Ventura, we 
recognized that Rule 702 “liberally allows a witness to 
testify as an expert[.]” 178 W.Va. at 86, 357 S.E.2d at 
768. Federal court decisions interpreting Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, which is identical to our rule, 
hold that the witness may be qualified as an expert by any 
one of the means listed, i.e., knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education. Friendship Heights Assocs. v. 
Vlastimil Koubek, A.I.A., 785 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir.1986); 
Garrett v. Desa Indus., Inc., 705 F.2d 721 (4th Cir.1983); 
Dychalo v. Copperloy Corp., 78 F.R.D. 146 (E.D.Pa.), 
aff’d, 588 F.2d 820 (3d Cir.1978). See generally 3 J. 
Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence   702[04] 
(1988); F. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West 
Virginia Lawyers § 7.1(B) at 419-20 (2d ed. 1986). 
Adoption of W.Va.R.Evid. 702 did not affect the 
well-settled rule of our prior law which was stated in 
Syllabus Point 4 of Hall v. Nello Teer Co., 157 W.Va. 
582, 203 S.E.2d 145 (1974):
“ ‘Whether a witness is qualified to state an opinion is a 
matter which rests within the discretion of the trial 
court and its ruling on that point will not ordinarily be 
disturbed unless it clearly appears that its discretion has 
been abused.’ Point 5, syllabus, Overton v. Fields, 145 
W.Va. 797 [117 S.E.2d 598 (1960) ].”
See State v. M.M., 163 W.Va. 235, 256 S.E.2d 549 
(1979); Byrd v. Virginian Ry. Co., 123 W.Va. 47, 13 
S.E.2d 273 (1941). See generally 3 Weinstein & Berger, 
supra.
[16] The evidence here demonstrated that although Mr. 
Caffrey had not been educated as a structural engineer, he 
had many years experience in the construction business 
and was familiar with the methods used in this instance. 
In view of this evidence, we are unwilling to say that the 
trial court abused its discretion in allowing Mr. Caffrey to 
testify as an expert on structural matters.
**812 *613 B.
[17] ZMM next contends that the trial court erred in not 
allowing it to present the testimony of certain witnesses 
on the issue of damages. These witnesses were originally 
secured by Corte, who had taken the primary pretrial 
responsibility for presentation of evidence regarding 
damages. As part of its settlement with the Board, 
however, Corte agreed not to “make available to the 
remaining parties in the civil action ... any expert 
witnesses named by it in connection with said civil 
action.”
When ZMM attempted to call the Corte witnesses at trial, 
the trial court ruled that they were “expert witnesses” 
within the meaning of the settlement agreement and 
refused to make them available to testify for ZMM. The 
court did grant ZMM a recess to attempt to obtain an 
expert of its own, but when trial resumed five days later, 
ZMM asserted that it had been unable to locate any 
witnesses who could offer the same testimony.19
This is not the first time that we have had a claim of this 
nature. In Riggle v. Allied Chem. Corp., 180 W.Va. 561, 
378 S.E.2d 282 (1989), one of the defendants settled with 
the plaintiffs during the first day of trial. This left the 
remaining defendant without the benefit of the settling 
defendant’s experts. We rejected the nonsettling 
defendant’s claim of error, stating:
“Appellant had two possible courses of action to 
protect itself against a settlement between plaintiffs and 
Allied. Given the substantial evidence that appellant 
was at least partially at fault and the existence of the 
indemnity provision in appellant’s contract with Allied, 
appellant would have been well advised to settle the 
case itself. Alternatively, if appellant wanted to fight 
plaintiffs’ claim, it could have prepared its own case 
rather than relying on Allied’s experts. Appellant chose 
neither course of action and has only itself to blame for 
the result.” 180 W.Va. at 569, 378 S.E.2d at 290.
It is obvious to any sophisticated trial lawyer that in 
litigation involving multiple defendants there is the 
likelihood that settlements will occur before trial. To rely 
on another party defendant’s witnesses without some 
formal agreement as to shared use is to invite the 
consequences that arose in Riggle and in the present case. 
The end result is that no error can be claimed.
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C.
Finally, ZMM contends that the trial court erred in not 
allowing ZMM’s witnesses to testify as to their 
conversations with John Drosick, Superintendent of 
McDowell County Schools at the time the construction 
was being planned. Mr. Drosick had died prior to trial. 
When Mr. Zando attempted to testify as to Mr. Drosick’s 
statements to him concerning the site of the high school, 
counsel for the Board objected on grounds that the 
testimony was hearsay and violated W.Va.Code, 57-3-1 
(1937),20 also known as the Dead Man’s Statute. The 
circuit court sustained the objection.
[18] ZMM contends that the trial court erred in excluding 
this testimony. We agree that W.Va.Code, 57-3-1, does 
not prevent the admission of the testimony in question. In 
Syllabus Point 10 of Moore v. Goode, 180 W.Va. 78, 375 
S.E.2d 549 (1988), we outlined its general operation:
“To summarize the basic operation 
of the Dead Man’s Act, 
W.Va.Code, 57-3-1, a concurrence 
of three general conditions must be 
met in order to bar the witness’s 
**813 *614 testimony. First, the 
testimony must relate to a personal 
transaction with a deceased or 
insane person. Second, the witness 
must be a party to the suit or 
interested in its event or outcome.
Third, the testimony must be 
against the deceased’s personal 
representative, heir at law, or 
beneficiaries or the assignee or 
committee of an insane person.”
It is apparent that the third condition is not met in this 
case. This suit was not against Mr. Drosick’s personal 
representative.
[19] Moreover, we have traditionally held that a witness 
can testify about the statements of a deceased agent when 
the suit is against the principal. A rather similar situation 
existed in Board o f Educ. o f Elk Dist. v. Harvey, 70 
W.Va. 480, 74 S.E. 507 (1912), where the plaintiff, who 
had sued the school board over the ownership of a school 
building, testified to a conversation he had had with a 
member of the school board who subsequently died. We 
held in Syllabus Point 1 that this testimony did not 
transgress the Dead Man’s Act: “A party to a suit is 
competent to testify in his own behalf, against a board of 
education in relation to a personal transaction, between 
himself and a deceased member of such board.” See also
Cross v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 182 W.Va. 320, 
387 S.E.2d 556 (1989); Keatley v. Hanna Chevrolet Co., 
121 W.Va. 669, 6 S.E.2d 1 (1939).
[20] [21] Finally, such evidence was not inadmissible as 
hearsay. Both Rule 801(d)(2)(D) of the West Virginia 
Rules of Evidence21 and our prior law recognize that 
statements made by an agent or employee within the 
scope of his agency or employment and during the 
existence of the agency or employment relationship are 
not hearsay and are admissible against a principal or 
employer who is a party to the litigation. See Coates v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 W.Va. 455, 57 S.E.2d 265 
(1949); Cleckley, supra § 8.5(E) at 481-82.
[22] [23] Although we conclude that the trial court erred in 
excluding the evidence of Mr. Drosick’s statement, ZMM 
fails to demonstrate the relevance of this evidence or how 
the exclusion of it at trial was prejudicial to its case. As 
the Court stated in Syllabus Point 5 of Maxwell v. Kent, 
49 W.Va. 542, 39 S.E. 174 (1901):
“When evidence is excluded and 
the action of the court in excluding 
it is relied upon in the appellate 
court, it must appear on the record 
that the evidence rejected was or 
would have been relevant, material 
and important to make its rejection 
available as a ground of error.”
See Papenhaus v. Combs, 170 W.Va. 211, 292 S.E.2d 621 
(1982); Crawford v. Roeder, 169 W.Va. 158, 286 S.E.2d 
273 (1982). In view of ZMM’s failure to make such a 
showing, we cannot say that the exclusion of this 
evidence was reversible error.
V.
For all the reasons stated above, we find no error 
warranting reversal of the jury’s verdict, but we do 
conclude that the trial court erred in entering judgment 
against the defendant for the full amount of the verdict. 
We also agree that the Board is entitled to prejudgment 
interest. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the 
Circuit Court of Kanawha County and remand the case to 
that court for entry of judgment in accordance with the 
principles enunciated herein.
Affirmed, in part, Reversed, in part, and Remanded.
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As we earlier stated, ZMM initially brought Corte and Nutting into the litigation by third-party complaint. See W.Va.R.Civ.P. 14. 
When the Board subsequently amended its complaint to name Corte and Nutting as defendants, ZMM, in its answer, filed 
cross-claims against them on the same grounds. See W.Va.R.Civ.P. 13(g). The law discussed herein is equally applicable to both 
third-party complaints and cross-claims.
W.Va.Code, 55-7-13, provides: “Where a judgment is rendered in an action ex delicto against several persons jointly, and 
satisfaction of such judgment is made by any one or more of such persons, the others shall be liable to contribution to the same 
extent as if the judgment were upon an action ex contractu.”
The concept of contribution is not foreign to those whose joint obligations arise by contract. W.Va.Code, 55-7-13, suggests that a 
right of contribution after a joint judgment was recognized at common law in contract actions. For the text of W.Va.Code, 
55-7-13, see note 2, supra. There is no question that this was the prevailing rule at common law. E.g., Estate o f Bayliss v. Lee, 
supra; Cost v. MacGregor, 124 W.Va. 204, 19 S.E.2d 599, 140 A.L.R. 882 (1942); Gooch v. Gooch, 70 W.Va. 38, 73 S.E. 56 
(1911). See generally  18 Am.Jur.2d Contribution § 32 (1985).
It also appears that an inchoate right of contribution could be asserted in equity on a joint contract obligation. 18 Am.Jur.2d 
Contribution § 86 (1985). Undoubtedly, the earlier unwillingness of courts to permit such a claim at law arose from the rigidity 
of the common law forms of pleading. With the merger of law and equity into one form of civil action, such procedural 
impediments no longer exist. See W.Va.R.Civ.P. 2.
After discussing the question at some length, we concluded in Syllabus Point 3 of Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., supra: “As 
between joint tortfeasors, a right of comparative contribution exists inter se based upon their relative degrees of primary fault or 
negligence.”
This result is statutorily mandated in medical malpractice cases. W.Va.Code, 55-7B-9(c) (1986), provides, in pertinent part: “No 
right of contribution exists against any defendant who entered into a good faith settlement with the plaintiff prior to the jury’s 
report of its findings to the court or the court’s findings as to the total dollar amount awarded as to damages.”
Section 4 of the UCATA provides:
“When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons 
liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:
“(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so 
provide; but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent o f any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in 
the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and
“(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.” 12 U.L.A. at 98 
(1975).
Section 6 of the UCFA provides:
“A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable discharges that person 
from all liability for contribution, but it does not discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. 
However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons is reduced by the amount of the released person’s equitable 
share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 2.” 12 U.L.A. at 52 (Supp. 1989).
In such a settlement, the settling defendant agrees to help the plaintiff under the following terms:
“(1) The agreeing defendant(s) must remain in the action in the posture of defendant(s); (2) The agreement must be kept 
secret; (3) The agreeing defendant(s) guarantee to the plaintiff a certain monetary recovery regardless of the outcome of the 
action; and (4) The agreeing defendant(s)’ liability is decreased in direct proportion to the increase in the nonagreeing 
defendant(s)’ liability.” Reager v. Anderson, 179 W.Va. 691, 703, 371 S.E.2d 619, 629 (1988). (Footnote omitted).
For the complete text of  Section 4 of the UCATA, see note 6, supra.
10 Section 2 of the UCFA provides for reduction of the verdict by the percentage of negligence the jury, in allocating fault among all 
of the responsible parties, attributed to the settlor. Jurisdictions adhering to this model do not require the settlement to be in “good 
faith.” See Gomes v. Brodhurst, supra; Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.1984).
The UCFA model has drawbacks, however. If the amount of the settlement is less than the settling party’s pro rata share of the
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verdict, the plaintiff absorbs the loss. He cannot collect the difference from the remaining defendants, and they cannot be 
required to pay more than their individual allocate shares. This procedure essentially destroys the concept of joint and several 
liability. Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 759 (5th Cir.1983); American Motorcycle Ass’n v. Superior Court, supra; Glidden v. 
German, 360 N.W.2d 716 (Iowa 1984); State ex rel. Deere & Co. v. District Court, supra. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff 
obtains an amount in settlement greater than the percentage of damages attributable to the settling party, he may keep the 
difference as a “windfall.” The other parties must still pay their allocate shares of the verdict. This permits the plaintiff a 
recovery in excess of the jury verdict. See Wadle v. Jones, 312 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1981); Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. Mineral 
Explorations Co., supra.
The perceived equities or inequities between these models, as well as other statutory variations, is a subject of ongoing academic 
debate. For a West Virginia sampling, see J. Stoneking, Beyond Bradley: A Critique o f Comparative Contribution in West 
Virginia and Proposals for Legislative Reform, 89 W.Va.L.Rev. 167, 184-87 (1986); J. Lewin, Comparative Negligence in West 
Virginia: Beyond Bradley to Pure Comparative Fault, 89 W.Va.L.Rev. 1039, 1045-51 (1987). See generally Reager v. 
Anderson, 179 W.Va. at 703 n. 9, 371 S.E.2d at 631 n. 9.
In Reager, we recognized that a settling defendant who remains in the case is susceptible to contribution claims where his 
settlement was less than his allocate share of joint liability. 179 W.Va. at 704, 371 S.E.2d at 632. In such a case, the settling 
defendant becomes bound by the joint judgment under W.Va.Code, 55-7-13. For the text of W.Va.Code, 55-7-13, see note 2, 
supra.
In Prosser & Keeton, The Law o f Torts § 92 at 655 (5th ed. 1984), this rather telling observation is made:
“The distinction between tort and contract liability, as between parties to a contract, has become an 
increasingly difficult distinction to make. It would not be possible to reconcile the results of all cases.
The availability of both kinds of liability for precisely the same kind of harm has brought about 
confusion and unnecessary complexity. It is to be hoped that eventually the availability of both 
theories—tort and contract—for the same kind of loss with different requirements both for the 
claimant’s prima facie case and the defendant’s affirmative defenses will be reduced in order to 
simplify the law and reduce the costs of litigation.”
The instructions advised the jury that the proper measure of compensatory damages under either theory was “the cost of repairing 
the defects proximately caused by the architect/engineer’s negligence, if any, and/or breach of contract, if any[,]” plus “all other 
expenses stemming from the injury in accordance with the law, including the loss of use of the gym during the repair.” The jury 
was also instructed that “damages for breach of contract are intended to put the non-breaching party in as good a position as it was 
as if the promises contained in the contract were kept.” Although the issue of punitive damages was submitted to the jury, none 
were awarded.
In Syllabus Point 1, in part, of Gamble v. Main, 171 W.Va. 369, 300 S.E.2d 110 (1983), we recognized that inherent in a 
construction contract is the implied warranty that it will be “constructed by the builder in a workmanlike manner.”
The Board contends the jury has already performed this verdict reduction function. At trial, however, the jury was not advised of 
the amounts of the Corte and Nutting settlements, only of their existence and that Corte and Nutting were no longer parties to the 
case. The jury was instructed to return a verdict which would fairly compensate the Board for its damages if they believed ZMM 
was liable. The Board produced evidence of damages of between $1.5 and $1.9 million. However, ZMM developed evidence that 
the expert responsible for these estimates relied on specifications provided by the Board rather than on an independent assessment 
of the damage. There was also evidence that the repair work could have been accomplished at a lesser cost. Under these 
circumstances, we cannot accept the Board’s factual argument that the jury deducted the settlements, the amounts of which were 
unknown to it, before rendering the verdict of $1,000,000.
W.Va.Code, 56-6-27, provides:
“The jury, in any action founded on contract, may allow interest on the principal due, or any part 
thereof, and in all cases they shall find the aggregate of principal and interest due at the time of the trial, 
after allowing all proper credits, payments and sets-off; and judgment shall be entered for such 
aggregate with interest from the date of the verdict.”
The Board’s election to accept the jury verdict on the contract theory, as earlier indicated, does not preclude the settlement offsets. 
It does, however, preclude reduction of the verdict to reflect the 5 percent contributory negligence the jury allocated to the Board in 
the negligence action.
ZMM also alleges that improper remarks were made by the Board’s attorney in his opening statement. No objection was made at 
the time of the alleged impropriety, however, nor was the issue raised at the time of the motion for a mistrial. ZMM may not,
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therefore, assert the matter now. Ritz v. Kingdon, 139 W.Va. 189, 79 S.E.2d 123 (1953); Yuncke v. Welker, 128 W.Va. 299, 36 
S.E.2d 410 (1945).
It does not appear that ZMM attempted to subpoena Corte’s witnesses in order to challenge the validity of the settlement contract 
language as to unavailability.
W.Va.Code, 57-3-1, provides, in pertinent part:
“No party to any action, suit or proceeding, nor any person interested in the event thereof, nor any 
person from, through or under whom any such party or interested person derives any interest or title by 
assignment or otherwise, shall be examined as a witness in regard to any personal transaction or 
communication between such witness and a person at the time of such examination, deceased, insane or 
lunatic, against the executor, administrator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee or 
survivor of such person, or the assignee or committee of such insane person or lunatic.”
W.Va.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) provides, in pertinent part:
“(d) Statements Which are not Hearsay.—A statement is not hearsay if—
“(2) Admission by Party-Opponent.—The statement is offered against a party and is ... (D) a statement by his agent or servant 
concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship[.]”
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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United States District Court,
D. North Dakota,
Northeastern Division.
ESTATE OF Cody Alan HALAMA, By and through 
its Administrator, Scott Rodney Halama, and Scott 
Rodney Halam, Individually, Plaintiffs, 
v.
Murray BARKMAN, Individually, and d /b /a  
Barkman Transport, and Ralph William Eslinger, 
Defendants.
Cory D. Knust, Individually and Cory D. Knust, as 
Administrator of the Estate of Heather Ann Knust, 
Deceased, Plaintiffs, 
v.
Ralph Eslinger, Murray Barkman, d /b /a  Barkman 
Transport, and Dwight Barkman, Defendants.
Civil Nos. 3:06cv53, 2:06cv63. | Aug. 8, 2007. 
Attorneys and Law Firms
Fredd J. Haas, Fredd J. Haas Law Offices PC, Jason M. 
Casini, Robert L. Fanter, Whitfield & Eddy PLC, Des 
Moines, IA, Thomas V. Omdahl, Omdahl Law Office, 
Grand Forks, ND, M. Daniel Vogel, Vogel Law Firm, 
Fargo, ND, for Plaintiffs.
Michael T. Rengel, Pemberton Sorlie Rufer & Kershner 
PLLP, Fergus Falls, MN, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
KAREN K. KLEIN, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 The following order memorializes the court’s rulings 
on the discovery motions addressed during the hearing on 
July 13, 2007.
Deposition o f Knust Experts
The parties to this consolidated action engaged in 
settlement discussions on June 4, 2007. Plaintiff Knust’s
case settled, plaintiff Halama’s did not. As part of the 
settlement, plaintiff Knust and defendants agreed that 
Knust’s experts cannot be used by plaintiff Halama in his 
case against the defendants. Plaintiff Halama moved to 
take the deposition of Knust’s experts William Frank and 
Dr. Stanley Sangdahl, arguing first that the rules do no 
allow defendants to “lock up” the opinions of expert 
witnesses, and secondly that Halama reserved the right to 
call expert witnesses disclosed by other parties in the 
litigation in his Rule 26(A)(2) Disclosures and Answers to 
Interrogatories.
Defendants oppose Halama’s motion, asserting that 
Knust’s experts are not qualified to testify as experts, and 
that defendants “placed value on excluding any use of 
Knust’s experts by anyone else, including 
Halama.”Defendants ’ Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Halama’s Motion to Allow Testimony o f Knust 
Experts and Other Discovery Issues, at 2 (Doc. # 120). 
Plaintiff Knust also weighed in on the issue, asserting that 
Halama declined the opportunity to jointly retain expert 
witnesses and share in the cost and should not now be 
permitted to “utilize work product and opinions 
developed in connection with the prosecution of separate 
claims....”Plaintiff Cory Knust’s Response to Plaintiff 
Scott Halama’s Motion fo r  Order Allowing Depositions of 
Plaintiff Knust’s Expert Witnesses, at 2 (Doc. # 123).
The court conditionally denied plaintiff Halama’s request, 
finding that Halama is not entitled to receive benefit from 
Knust’s experts given his refusal to participant in the 
concomitant costs, and further that the subject matter of 
the experts duplicates, to some extent, those Halama is 
prepared to offer. The court’s ruling is not changed by its 
review of Scott, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W .2d 556 
(Tex.1990), cited by Halama during the discovery 
conference. Rather, the court finds persuasive the 
reasoning in Wolt v. Sherwood, A Div. o f Harsco Corp., 
828 F.Supp. 1562 (D.Utah 1993), wherein the court 
rejected the public policy considerations raised in Scott, 
Inc. in favor of the rationale espoused by the West 
Virginia Supreme Court in Board o f Education v. Zando, 
Martin & Milstead, 182 W.Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796 
(1990):
The West Virginia Supreme Court found the settlement 
agreement acceptable and rejected the architect’s claim. 
The court stated that defendants in a multi-party case 
should retain their own experts, and not rely upon other 
defendants. The court noted:
“[i]t is obvious to any sophisticated trial lawyer that 
in litigation involving multiple defendants there is a 
likelihood that settlement will occur before trial. To
WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
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rely on another party defendant’s witnesses without 
some formal agreement as to the shared use is to 
invite the consequences that arose ... in the present 
case.”
*2 Wolt v. Sherwood, A Division o f Harsco Corp., 828 
F.Supp. 1562, 1567 (C.D. UT 1993)(quoting Board o f 
Educ. v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 182 W.Va. 597, 
390 S.E.2d 796, 812 (1990)). Therefore, Plaintiff 
Halama’s Motion for Extension of Court Deadlines 
Concerning Discovery and Order Allowing Depositions 
of Knust Experts (Doc. # 117) is DENIED.
Employment Records
Although defendant Eslinger contends his employment 
records are not relevant to this proceeding, his counsel has 
continued to produce them upon receipt. The court will 
not order additional time for the production of 
employment records without specific information 
concerning the need for such time. However, if highly 
relevant information develops from incoming 
employment records, plaintiff Halama may request 
appropriate relief.
Mental Health Records
Reiterating that the court has never stated the mental 
condition of defendant Eslinger is relevant, the court
End of Document
nevertheless permitted limited discovery of his military 
medical records for impeachment purposes. Plaintiff 
Halama now seeks to obtain mental health records for 
treatment Eslinger obtained in Des Moines, Iowa. 
Counsel argued defendant Eslinger’s qualification to be a 
truck driver is at issue, as well as the truthfulness of his 
statements on his CDL application. Plaintiff’s request is 
DENIED based on the marginal relevancy of defendant 
Eslinger’s mental condition, the significant issue of 
privilege, and the existence of other testimony.
Cell Phone Records/Deposition
Plaintiff Halama requests leave to take the deposition of 
defendants’ cell phone provider. Apparently defendant 
Eslinger testified that he left his cell phone with his wife 
in January 2006. Counsel’s review of the phone records 
indicate the phone was being used on the day of the 
accident. Plaintiff wants to depose a cell phone company 
representative to determine the truthfulness of defendant 
Eslinger’s statements, specifically whether or not he had 
the phone and where he was when it was used. Defendant 
objected, arguing plaintiff had the records as early as 
October 2006. Plaintiff’s motion to take the telephone 
deposition of a representative of the cell phone company 
is GRANTED.
IT IS ORDERED.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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United States District Court,
E.D. California.
FMC CORPORATION, Plaintiff, 
v.
VENDO COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
And Related Third-Party Claims
No. CIV.F-00-5295 OWW LJO. | April 17, 2002.
broad discretion of district court. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 16(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
Cases that cite this headnote
Environmental Law
   Joint and several liability; divisibility
In contribution action under Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) and state law, defendants filed third party 
complaints seeking contribution from railroad. On 
railroad’s motion for summary judgment and defendants’ 
motion to quash railroad’s proposed subpoenas of 
plaintiff’s experts, the District Court, Wanger, J., held 
that: (1) defendants could not maintain third party 
contribution action against railroad to recover costs paid 
pursuant to settlement agreement with plaintiff; (2) 
defendants could seek contribution from railroad for costs 
they incurred in response to state or federal administrative 
agency directives; and (3) railroad was not entitled to 
depose or call as witnesses at trial experts designated by 
plaintiff.
Motions granted in part, and denied in part.
West Headnotes (11)
Federal Civil Procedure
    Pretrial Order
Carelessness is not basis for permitting 
modification of scheduling conference. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 16(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
Cases that cite this headnote
Federal Civil Procedure
    Pretrial Order
Decision to modify scheduling order is within
Single harm may be divisible among several 
potentially responsible parties (PRP), for 
purposes of determining contribution liability 
under CERCLA, if it is possible to discern 
degree to which different parties contribute to 
damage. Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, § 113(f), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f).
1 Cases that cite this headnote
Environmental Law
    Contribution and indemnity; allocation of 
liability
Owner’s action against potentially responsible 
parties (PRPs) under CERCLA to recover for 
response costs incurred in remediating 
contamination of site was contribution action, 
not direct cost recovery action, and thus settling 
PRPs could not maintain third party contribution 
action against non-settling PRP for 
reimbursement of payments made to owner in 
settlement of its claims against them, even if 
owner’s claims against non-settling PRP were 
divisible from its own responsibility for 
contamination such that it could have brought 
direct cost recovery action against non-settling 
PRP, absent evidence that owner acted in 
collusion with non-settling PRP to maximize 
settling PRPs’ liability; settling PRPs were 
liable only for their fair and several shares of 
site liability. Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, §§107(a), 113(f), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9607(a), 
9613(f).
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2 Cases that cite this headnote
Environmental Law
    Contribution and indemnity; allocation of 
liability
Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance 
Account Act (HSAA) to seek contribution from 
other potentially responsible party (PRP) for 
costs they incurred in response to state or federal 
administrative agency directives, even if PRP 
was not liable to defendants for original 
plaintiff’s claims relating to its response costs. 
West’s Ann.Cal.Health & Safety Code § 
25363(e).
Defendants in CERCLA contribution action 
were entitled to seek contribution from other 
potentially responsible party (PRP) for costs 
they incurred in response to state or federal 
administrative agency directives, even if PRP 
was not liable to defendants for original 
plaintiff’s claims under CERCLA relating to its 
response costs, where PRP was potentially liable 
to defendants for plaintiffs’ state law claims for 
wich defendant could be held jointly and 
severally liable, and claims were inextricably 
intertwined. Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, § 113(f), (g)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f), 
(g)(2); Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 14(a), 28 
U.S.C.A.
3 Cases that cite this headnote
3 Cases that cite this headnote
Environmental Law
      Federal preemption 
States
     Environment; nuclear projects
CERCLA did not preempt settling potentially 
responsible parties’ (PRPs) state-law causes of 
action against non-settling PRP concerning 
cleanup of hazardous materials. Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980, § 302(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 
9652(d).
Cases that cite this headnote
Federal Civil Procedure
     Liability of third party in general
Impleader may be appropriate where third-party 
defendant is potentially liable to third-party 
plaintiff for damages to extent necessary to put 
third-party plaintiff in position he would have 
been in absent alleged wrongdoing by 
third-party defendant. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
14(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
Cases that cite this headnote
Federal Civil Procedure
    Persons subject
Exceptional circumstances sufficient to justify 
opposing party’s discovery of non-testifying 
expert’s facts and opinions may exist where (1) 
object or condition at issue is destroyed or has 
deteriorated after non-testifying expert observes 
it but before moving party’s expert has 
opportunity to observe it; or (2) there are no 
other available experts in same field or subject 
area. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(b)(4)(B), 28 
U.S.C.A.
Environmental Law
     Contribution and indemnity; allocation of 
liability
Under California law, defendants in hazardous 
waste contribution action were entitled under
17 Cases that cite this headnote
[ 10] Federal Civil Procedure
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[11]
      Persons Whose Depositions May Be Taken 
Witnesses
      Persons Who May Be Required to Appear 
and Testify
Non-settling potentially responsible party (PRP) 
in CERCLA contribution action was not entitled 
to depose or call as witnesses at trial experts 
retained and designated by plaintiff before 
plaintiff and settling PRPs agreed to dismiss 
claims against each other in settlement of their 
dispute, despite non-settling PRP’s contention 
that it had justifiably relied on plaintiff’s 
designation of experts, where settlement 
agreement prohibited plaintiff from giving 
non-settling PRP access to its expert reports, and 
non-settling PRP did not cross-designate experts 
prior to settlement, or provide evidence showing 
cost of any studies it sought to use or that such 
tests could not be replicated by its own experts. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 26(b)(4)(B), 28
U.S.C.A.; Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, § 101 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq.
10 Cases that cite this headnote
Federal Civil Procedure
     Pretrial Order
Non-settling potentially responsible party (PRP) 
in CERCLA contribution action was not entitled 
to modification of scheduling order to extend 
time to engage experts in connection with 
settling PRPs’ claims against it, even though 
settlement of claims with plaintiff precluded 
non-settling PRP from using testimony and 
reports prepared by plaintiff’s experts, where 
non-settling PRP waited over one year after 
claims were asserted against it by settling PRPs 
to file claims against them in separate action, 
failed to co-designate experts with plaintiff, and 
chose not to participate in settlement. 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 101 
et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq.; Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 16(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
5 Cases that cite this headnote
Attorneys and Law Firms
*1025 James Arthur Bruen, Farella Braun and Martel, San 
Francisco, CA, Stephen Roy Cornwell, Cornwell and 
Sample, Fresno, CA, for FMC Corp.
Stephen Terry Holzer, Parker Milliken Clark OHara and 
Samuelian, Los Angeles, CA, Mark E. Elliott, Pillsbury 
Madison and Sutro, Los Angeles, CA, for Vendo Co.
Chrisptopher J. McNevin, Mark E. Elliott, Pillsbury 
Madison and Sutro, Los Angeles, CA, for Vendorlator 
Mfg. Co.
Stephen Terry Holzer, Parker Milliken Clark OHara and 
Samuelian, Los Angeles, CA, Mark Fall, Jones Day 
Reavis and Pogue, Los Angeles, CA, Kevin P. 
Holewinski, Pro Hac Vice, Curt Vazquez, Pro Hac Vice, 
Jones Day Reavis and Pogue, Pittsburgh, PA, for Weir 
Floway Inc.
John F Barg, Barg Coffin Lewis and Trapp LLP, San 
Francisco, CA, for Burlington Northern Santa Fe R. Co.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE: 
BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE 
RAILWAY COMPANY’S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc.194); THE VENDO 
COMPANY’S MOTION TO QUASH BURLINGTON 
NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY 
COMPANY’S PROPOSED SUBPOENAS OF FMC 
CORPORATION’S EXPERTS (Doc.199); BNSF’S 
APPLICATION TO MODIFY THE SCHEDULING 
ORDER
WANGER, District Judge.
Before the court is third-party defendant Burlington 
Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company’s (“BNSF”) 
motion for *1026 summary judgment and the Vendo 
Company’s motion to quash BNSF’s proposed subpoenas 
of Plaintiff FMC Corporation’s experts. See Docs.194, 
199, filed March 6, 2002. Also before the court is BNSF’s 
application to modify the scheduling order, lodged 
February 12, 2002, and originally heard on shortened time 
on February 20, 2002. Oral argument was heard April 8, 
2002.
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I. BACKGROUND
BNSF contends trichloroethene (“TCE”) and chromium 
contamination emanated from a site at 2924 South 
Railroad Avenue in Fresno, California (the 
“Vendo/Floway site,” or the “Floway site”), now owned 
by Floway, and migrated into groundwater underlying 
BNSF’s property at East Church Avenue and East Avenue 
(the “BNSF site,” or the “Calwa Ice House site”).1 
Plaintiff FMC Corporation (“FMC”) is the owner of 
property at 2501 South Sunland Avenue in Fresno (the 
“FMC site”). The FMC site, the Floway site, and the 
BNSF site are clustered together along the “Railroad 
Avenue Corridor.”
On February 23, 2000, FMC filed a Complaint against 
Weir Floway (“Floway”) and two companies that, 
according to BNSF, conducted operations at the Floway 
site: Vendo Company (“Vendo”) and Vendorlator 
Manufacturing Company (“VMC”).2 See Doc.1, 
Complaint. FMC filed a First Amended Complaint 
(“FAC”) on May 19, 2000. See Doc.8. FMC alleges 
groundwater, which FMC is being required by state 
administrative agencies to remediate, is contaminated 
with TCE and chromium as a result of operations at the 
Floway site. See FAC. FMC seeks contribution under 
section 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 
42 U.S.C. § 9613; injunctive relief under section 
7002(a)(1)(B) of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (the “RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. section 
7002(a)(1)(B); declaratory relief under section 113(g)(2) 
of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. section 9613(g)(2); contribution 
under the Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous 
Substance Account Act (“HSAA”), California Health and 
Safety Code § 25363; and indemnity, contribution, 
declaratory relief, and damages (under theories of 
continuing nuisance and trespass) under California state 
law. See id.
On October 11, 2000, Vendo and VMC filed a third-party 
complaint against BNSF. See Doc.37. On October 13, 
2000, Floway filed a third-party complaint against BNSF. 
See Doc.38. Vendo and VMC’s third-party complaint 
alleges chromium was and continues to be released into 
the soil and groundwater from the BNSF Calwa Ice 
House site. See Doc.37 at   26. Vendo and VMC allege 
BNSF and other third-party defendants released and 
disposed of wastes containing TCE and/or chromium at 
their respective sites which migrated to groundwater 
under the FMC site. See id. at    62-64. Vendo and VMC 
seek contribution under section 113(f) of CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. section 9613(f), and declaratory relief for an 
equitable allocation of past, present, and future response 
costs under section 113(g)(2) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 
section 9613(g)(2). See Doc.37.
Floway’s third-party complaint alleges TCE and 
chromium were used in operations *1027 at the BNSF 
site, that there were releases of TCE and chromium from 
the BNSF site into groundwater, and that BNSF is 
responsible for all or some of the TCE and chromium 
groundwater contamination at issue in FMC’s claim 
against Weir Floway. See Doc.38. Floway seeks 
contribution under section 113(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 
section 9613(f), declaratory relief under section 113(g)(2) 
of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. section 9613(g)(2), contribution 
and apportionment under HSAA § 25363, and declaratory 
relief under state law. See id. BNSF answered these 
third-party complaints on December 1, 2000. See, 
Docs.79-80.
On November 13, 2001, BNSF filed a separate suit 
against Floway, Vendo, and VMC. See Burlington 
Northern v. Vendo, CIV F 01-6434 OWW LJO 
(E.D.Cal.) (the “RCRA action,” or “BNSF action”), 
Doc.1, complaint. On December 17, 2001, BNSF filed a 
first amended complaint. See Burlington, CIV F 01-6434, 
Doc.14. BNSF alleges the TCE and chromium 
contamination in the groundwater beneath the Railroad 
Avenue Corridor resulted from operations at the 
Vendo/Floway site. See id. at    1. BNSF alleges the 
California Department of Toxic Substances and Control 
(“DTSC”) issued an Imminent and Substantial 
Endangerment Order (the “ISE Order”) on October 19, 
1999, requiring Vendo, VMC, and Floway to investigate 
and remediate soil contamination on the Vendo/Floway 
site; to investigate the extent of the groundwater plumes 
emanating from the Vendo/Floway site; and to take 
remedial measures to clean them up. See id. BNSF alleges 
Vendo, VMC, and Floway failed to comply with the ISE 
Order and continued to release chromium and TCE from 
the Vendo/Floway site which ultimately contaminates 
groundwater beneath the BNSF site and beyond. See id.
BNSF alleges it has incurred costs and will incur 
additional costs relating to the TCE and chromium 
contamination caused by Floway, Vendo, and VMC, and 
that the contamination has diminished the value of its 
property. See id. BNSF asserts claims for injunctive relief 
under sections 7002(a)(1)(A) and (B) of the RCRA, 42 
U.S.C. sections 6972(a)(1)(A) and (B); to enforce the 
terms of the ISE Order against Vendo, VMC, and Floway; 
to enjoin them from continuing to endanger health and the 
environment; and to order them to remediate the 
Vendo/Floway and BNSF sites. See id. at    24-39.
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BNSF seeks damages under state law claims for nuisance 
and trespass. See id. at    40-53.3
On January 24, 2002, Vendo/VMC and Floway answered 
BNSF’s FAC. See BNSF action, Docs.22-23. Floway 
asserted an affirmative defense that BNSF’s claims are 
barred because they are compulsory counterclaims to the 
third-party claims against BNSF in the FMC action. See 
BNSF action, Doc.22 at p. 9:18-19.
On February 8, 2002, counsel for Vendo faxed a letter to 
BNSF informing BNSF that FMC had reached a 
settlement with Weir, Vendo, and VMC. See Doc.186 at    
2, Exh. A. The letter indicated the settling “parties intend 
to take certain of the depositions noticed by them off 
calendar.” Id. at Exh. A. According to the letter, Vendo 
and Floway intend to proceed with their third-party claims 
and/or defenses against BNSF in this case and the related 
cases, Burlington Northern v. Vendo, CIV F 01-6434, and 
Zacky Farms, v. FMC Corp., The Vendo Co., Vendorlator 
Mfg. Co., & Weir Floway, Inc., CIV F 01-5380 OWW 
DLB. See id. Vendo indicated its intent to proceed with 
certain depositions *1028 as currently noticed related to 
those claims and defenses. See id.
On February 11, 2002, BNSF requested that Vendo and 
Floway stipulate to an extension of the pretrial and trial 
dates in this case. See Doc.186 at     3, Exh. B. Later in the 
day, BNSF asked Vendo and Floway to stipulate to a 
scheduling conference on February 15, 2002. See id. at     
4, Exh. B. Vendo and Floway declined to so stipulate. On 
February 12, 2002, BNSF applied to modify the 
scheduling order in the FMC case. See Doc.185. Vendo 
and Floway filed oppositions on February 19, 2002. See 
Doc.190. As amended, the scheduling order specified 
March 6, 2002, as the deadline for completing fact and 
expert discovery. See Doc.179, filed December 12, 2001. 
This date was effectively vacated pending resolution of 
the instant motions. Trial is currently set for May 29, 
2002. See id.
On March 21, 2002, partial judgment pursuant to Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 54(b) was entered as to FMC’s claims against 
Vendo/Floway pursuant to the terms of a confidential 
settlement agreement. See Doc.211. According to the 
judgment, Vendo/Floway are jointly and severally to pay 
$3,750,000 to FMC within thirty days of the entry of 
judgment and perform work required by DTSC. See 
Doc.211. Other terms of the settlement agreement are set 
forth in a “Deal Point Memorandum,” submitted as part of 
a telephonic hearing on February 15, 2002, in which the 
parties formally recited their settlement for the record. See 
Doc.197, Exh. B; Doc.192. Pursuant to the terms of the 
Deal Point Memorandum, Vendo/Floway agrees to
investigate, remediate, and achieve hydraulic control of 
offsite groundwater contaminants other than nitrates, west 
of the eastern boundary of the BNSF railroad right-of-way 
and south of the northern edge of East Woodward 
Avenue. See id. FMC agrees to investigate, remediate, 
and achieve hydraulic control of offsite groundwater 
contaminants other than nitrates, east of the eastern 
boundary of the BNSF railroad right-of-way and south of 
the northern edge of East Woodward Avenue. See id. 
Vendo/Floway agree to pay two-thirds of the amount 
necessary to settle the Zacky Farms action, including a 
compromised amount of Zacky’s net replacement water 
costs, and investigate and remediate the Zacky parcel. See 
id. FMC agrees to pay the remaining one-third of these 
costs, unless Vendo/Floway recovers from BNSF, in 
which case FMC’s share drops to one-quarter of these 
costs. See id. FMC agrees not to assist BNSF in its 
prosecution or defense of the claims between BNSF and 
Vendo/Floway, “such as by providing BNSF with FMC’s 
attorney work product, expert work product or by waiving 




Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed.R. Civ.P. 
56(c); see California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th 
Cir.1998). The evidence must be viewed in *1029 light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Lopez v. 
Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc).
The moving party bears the initial burden of 
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact. See 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 
2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If  the moving party fails to 
meet this burden, “the nonmoving party has no obligation 
to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would 
have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 
1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir.2000). However, if the
nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the 
moving party must only show “that there is an absence of 
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex 
Corp., 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Once the moving party has met its burden of proof, the 
nonmoving party must produce evidence on which a
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reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor viewing the 
record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden the 
law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. 
Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir.1995). The 
nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its allegations 
without any significant probative evidence tending to 
support the complaint. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 
v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir.2000). Instead, 
the nonmoving party, through affidavits or other 
admissible evidence, “must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R. 
Civ.P 56(e).
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry 
of summary judgment, after adequate time for 
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 
an element essential to the party’s case, and on which 
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such 
a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as to any 
material fact,” since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving 
party’s case necessarily renders all other facts 
immaterial.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Evidence submitted in support of, or in opposition to, a 
motion for summary judgment must be admissible under 
the standard articulated in 56(e). Properly authenticated 
documents can be used in a motion for summary 
judgment if appropriately authenticated by affidavit or 
declaration. See Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & 
Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550-51 (9th Cir.1989). Supporting 
and opposing affidavits must be made on personal 
knowledge, set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. See Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(e).
“Questions of statutory construction and legislative 
history present legal questions which are properly 
resolved by summary judgment.” T H  Agric. & Nutrition 
Co. v. Aceto Chem. Inc., 884 F.Supp. 357, 359 
(E.D.Cal.1995) (citations omitted).
B. Summary Adjudication
Summary adjudication may be appropriate on clearly 
defined, distinct issues. See Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 
918 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir.1990). Fed.R. Civ.P. 56 allows a 
party to move for summary judgment on any part of a 
claim. See Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(a)-(d). The purpose of 
summary adjudication is to salvage some results from the 
ju dicial effort involved in evaluating a summary judgment
motion and to frame narrow triable issues if the court 
finds that the order would be helpful with the progress of 
litigation. See Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(d); National Union Fire 
Ins. Co. v. L.E. Myers Co. Group, 937 F.Supp. 276, 284 
(S.D.N.Y.1996). An order under *1030 Rule 56(d) 
narrows the issues and enables the parties to recognize 
more fully their rights, yet it permits the court to retain 
full power to completely adjudicate all aspects of the case 
when the proper time arrives. See 10B Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure (3d ed.1998), § 2737 at 
316-18. Summary adjudication may be used to dispose of 
affirmative defenses. See “Z ” v. Worley, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9476 (disposing of affirmative defense to battery 
claim on summary adjudication); Sterling Bank v. Sterling 
Bank & Trust, 928 F.Supp. 1014 (1996).
The procedure under Rule 56(d) is designed to be 
ancillary to a summary judgment motion. Unlike Rule 
56(c), which allows for interlocutory judgment on a 
question of liability, Rule 56(d) does not authorize the 
entry of a judgment on part of a claim or the granting of 
partial relief. See Wright & Miller, § 2737 at 316-18. 
This aspect of the rule has been confused due to courts’ 
frequently referring to Rule 56(d) orders as “partial 
summary judgment” rather than summary adjudication. 
See Wright & Miller, § 2737 at 322-24. The obligation 
imposed on the court by Rule 56(d) to specify the 
uncontroverted material facts is technically compulsory. 
See Woods v. Mertes, 9 F.R.D. 318, 320 (D.Del.1949). 
However, if the court determines that identifying 
indisputable facts through partial summary adjudication 
would not materially expedite the adjudicative process, it 
may decline to do so. See Wright & Miller, § 2737 at 
318-19.
C. Pretrial Schedule
[1] [2] Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
authorizes the district court to control and expedite 
pretrial discovery through a scheduling order. The 
standard for permitting modification of a scheduling 
conference order pursuant to Rule 16 is “good cause.” 
Fed.R. Civ.P. 16(b) (“A schedule shall not be modified 
except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the 
district judge....”). Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” 
requirement, like that for Rule 56(f) relief, considers the 
diligence of the party seeking relief. The court may also 
modify the pretrial schedule “if it cannot reasonably be 
met despite the diligence of the party seeking the 
extension.” Fed.R. Civ.P. 16 advisory committee’s notes 
(1983 amendment); Harrison Beverage Co. v. Dribeck 
Importers, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 463, 469 (D.N.J.1990); 
Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 132 F.R.D. 213, 217 
(N.D.Ind.1990). Carelessness is not a basis for granting
WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6
FMC Corp. v. Vendo Co., 196 F.Supp.2d 1023 (2002)
54 ERC 1711, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,642
relief. Cf. Engleson v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 972 
F.2d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir.1992) (carelessness not a ground 
for relief under Rule 60(b)); Martella v. Marine Cooks & 
Stewards Union, 448 F.2d 729, 730 (9th Cir.1971) 
(same). “Although the existence or degree of prejudice to 
the party opposing the modification might supply 
additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the 
inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking 
modification.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 
975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.1992). If a party was not 
diligent, the inquiry should end. See id.; Geiserman v. 
MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 790-92 (5th Cir.1990) 
(upholding decision to exclude expert witnesses based on 
party’s failure to designate experts until two weeks after 
the expiration of the discovery deadline because 
explanations for delay were “weak, at best”). The decision 
to modify a scheduling order is within the broad 
discretion of the district court. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 607 
(quoting Miller v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 364, 369 
(9th Cir.1985)); Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 790.
III. ANALYSIS
A. BN SF’s Motion fo r  Summary Judgment
BNSF moves for summary judgment on the ground that 
Vendo/Floway as *1031 CERCLA section 113 defendants 
are liable only for their fair-and-several shares of liability 
to FMC (the PRP-Plaintiff), and as such they cannot 
bring third-party claims for section 113 contribution. See 
Doc.195 at p. 1:7-20. BNSF argues Floway’s state law 
claims for contribution, apportionment and declaratory 
relief must be dismissed because 1) liability under HSAA 
is co-extensive with liability under CERCLA, and since 
Floway’s CERCLA section 113 claims against BNSF are 
barred, its HSAA claim is barred; 2) if Floway cannot 
recover under CERCLA the response costs it has agreed 
to pay FMC, it should not be allowed to recover those 
same costs under an alternate state law theory. See 
Doc.195 at pp. 1-2.
1. Liability o f  CERCLA § 113(f) Defendants
CERCLA provides for the liability of potentially 
responsible parties (“PRPs”) for cleanup costs associated 
with contamination by hazardous substances. Title 42 
U.S.C. section 9607 provides:
... Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, 
and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection 
(b) of this section—
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any 
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility 
at which such hazardous substances were disposed 
of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or 
otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or 
arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal 
or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or 
possessed by such person, by any other party or 
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or 
operated by another party or entity and containing 
such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any 
hazardous substances for transport to disposal or 
treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites 
selected by such person, from which there is a 
release, or a threatened release which causes the 
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous 
substance, shall be liable for—
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action 
incurred by the United States Government or a 
State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the 
national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred 
by any other person consistent with the national 
contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss 
of natural resources, including the reasonable 
costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss 
resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health 
effects study carried out under section 104(i) [42 
U.S.C. § 9604(i) ].
42 U.S.C. § 9607.
When remediation of a contaminated site involves 
multiple parties, claims for contribution may arise.
Any person may seek contribution 
from any other person who is liable 
or potentially liable under section 
107(a) [42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) ], 
during or following any civil action 
under section 106 [42 U.S.C. §
9606] or under section 107(a). Such 
claims shall be brought in
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accordance with this section and 
the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and shall be governed 
by Federal law. In resolving 
contribution claims, the court may 
allocate response costs among 
liable parties using such equitable 
factors as the court *1032 
determines are appropriate.
Nothing in this subsection shall 
diminish the right of any person to 
bring an action for contribution in 
the absence of a civil action under 
section 106 or section 107.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
Section 107(a) creates the right of contribution, the 
“contours and mechanics” of which are specified in 
section 113(f). See The Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont 
Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301-02 (9th Cir.1997) 
(section 107 creates the claims of contribution, i.e., 
liability, among PRPs and section 113 qualifies the nature 
of the claim, i.e., how to apportion liability among PRPs). 
In Pinal Creek, the Ninth Circuit held that “under 
CERCLA, a PRP does not have a claim for the recovery 
of the totality of its cleanup costs against other PRPs, and 
a PRP cannot assert a claim against other PRPs for joint 
and several liability.” Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1306. 
Rather, “a PRP is limited to a contribution claim governed 
by the joint operation of §§ 107 and 113.” Id.
In City o f Merced v. R.A. Fields, 997 F.Supp. 1326 
(E.D.Cal.1998), the City of Merced discovered its 
groundwater was contaminated with tetrachloroethylene 
(“PCE”). See City o f Merced, 997 F.Supp. at 1329. The 
City sued Merced Laundry under CERCLA and state law. 
See id. The City as a PRP could maintain a CERCLA 
action only for contribution under section 113. See id. 
Merced Laundry filed third-party complaints for 
contribution under CERCLA and state law against several 
parties. See id. The court dismissed Merced Laundry’s 
claims for contribution against the third parties as to 
amounts the City spent responding to site contamination. 
See City o f Merced, 997 F.Supp. at 1332. Merced 
Laundry as a contribution defendant was liable for no 
more than its fair-and-several share of liability to the City 
under section 113, it could not maintain its own 
contribution actions against third parties. See id.
City o f Merced illustrates its holding with examples. 
Example 3 provides:
To forestall a suit by the
Government, PRP X voluntarily 
begins cleanup of Site and incurs 
costs greater than X ’s equitable 
share. X, being a PRP, brings a 
contribution action against Y and 
Z. Y and Z, being contribution 
defendants, are not liable to X for 
more than their fair-and-several 
share of the cleanup costs. Y and Z 
therefore cannot bring contribution 
actions against A, B, or C.
However, because X is a 
contribution plaintiff, and not a 
contribution defendant, X can.
City o f Merced, 997 F.Supp. at 1333. This example is 
overbroad. It analyzes X ’s right to recover contribution 
against PRPs. Although Y and Z may not bring 
contribution actions against A, B, or C for X ’s cleanup 
costs, Y and Z may bring third-party contribution actions 
against A, B, or C for Y and Z’s cleanup costs that were 
caused by A, B, and C. The example derives from a 
statement in City o f Merced at page 1332: “Therefore, as 
a matter of logic, contribution defendants, as well as the 
parties brought in by the contribution defendants, who can 
by definition owe to contribution plaintiffs no more than 
their fair-and-several share of cleanup liability, cannot 
themselves maintain contribution actions of their own.” 
City o f Merced, 997 F.Supp. at 1332. This “logic” ignores 
the PRP contribution defendant who not only is liable to a 
contribution plaintiff for cleanup costs incurred by that 
plaintiff and caused by the contribution defendant, but 
who also itself incurs cleanup costs as a result of 
contamination caused by another PRP or PRPs over and 
above the several share of liability owed to the original 
contribution plaintiff.
*1033 The overbreadth of the purported rule that 
“contribution defendants, as well as parties brought in by 
contribution defendants, cannot maintain contribution 
actions of their own,” is demonstrated by the result in City 
o f Merced, where Merced Laundry was nonetheless 
permitted to sue other parties for contribution for costs in 
excess of Merced Laundry’s equitable share for which 
other PRPs were alleged to be responsible. The necessary, 
but unstated qualification to the “rule” of City o f Merced 
is that “contribution defendants, or those joined by them, 
are only barred from asserting a contribution action for 
the costs incurred by any other PRP, when those costs are 
not incurred by such contribution defendant.” The 
statement has no application to non CERCLA based state 
law claims.
The implication at page 1332 of City o f Merced that a
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contribution action is maintained solely under CERCLA § 
113 is squarely rejected by Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1305 
n. 7 (“We also note that the Pinal Group’s argument is 
based on the incorrect premise that a contribution action 
is not brought under § 107 .... As we have concluded 
above, a PRP’s contribution action finds implicit 
recognition in § 107; § 113 merely regulates its 
implementation.”). An interpretation barring contribution 
actions thwarts CERCLA’s intended equitable allocation 
among all responsible PRPs.
BNSF argues that FMC is in the position of “X” in 
Example 3; Vendo/VMC and Floway are “Y” and “Z”; 
and BNSF is “A” (or “B” or “C”). See Doc.195 at p. 8. 
FMC sues Vendo/Floway for contribution under 
CERCLA section 113. See FAC at    1, 170. FMC has 
not sued BNSF. BNSF argues that since Vendo/Floway 
are liable to FMC only for their fair-and-several portion 
of liability, they, as “contribution defendants” like “Y” 
and “Z” in Example 3, may not bring a contribution claim 
of their own. See Doc. 195 at p. 8.
Vendo/Floway argue that because they were potentially 
jointly and severally liable to FMC for response costs 
relating to chromium and TCE contamination, they cannot 
be considered “contribution defendants” in the same 
position as “Y” and “Z”. See Doc.212 at p. 6. Pinal Creek 
notes the Seventh Circuit exception to the general rule 
that a PRP is limited to a contribution action for “PRPs 
who have not polluted the site in any way.” See Pinal 
Creek, 118 F.3d at 1303 n. 5 (citing Rumpke o f Indiana, 
Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1241 (7th 
Cir.1997) (“landowners who allege that they did not 
pollute the site in any way may sue for their direct 
response costs under § 107(a)”)). The Ninth Circuit 
explicitly declined to address the issue of whether it 
recognizes such an exception. See Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d 
at 1303 n. 5.
Vendo/Floway argue FMC falls within the Rumpke 
exception with respect to TCE and chromium, see 
Doc.212 at p. 6, because FMC seeks § 107(a) contribution 
for 100% of its response costs to clean up TCE and 
chromium for which it claims no responsibility. See 
Doc.212 at p. 7:11-24. The Rumpke exception allows a 
PRP to maintain a direct cost recovery section 107(a) 
action only if a landowner alleges it “did not pollute the 
site in any way.” Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1241 (emphasis 
added). FMC has entered into a settlement under which it 
agrees to share cleanup costs of contaminants (excluding 
nitrates), including TCE and chromium. FMC has not 
alleged it did not pollute the site in any way. Unlike the 
purported innocent landowner in Rumpke, the government 
has ordered FMC to perform remediation at the Railroad
Corridor Site, and other PRPs have brought cost recovery 
actions against FMC. See, e.g., Zacky Farms, v. *1034 
FMC Corp. et al., CIV F 01-5380 OWW DLB.
[3] Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761 (7th
Cir. 1994), the case from which the Rumpke exception was 
derived, suggests that if the harm to a contaminated site is 
divisible, a non-innocent PRP may be able to bring a 
direct cost recovery claim under section 107(a) under 
certain circumstances. See Akzo, 30 F.3d at 765. Separate 
and distinct subterranean plumes of groundwater 
contamination provide a basis to divide CERCLA liability 
for a site. See United States v. Broderick Investment Co., 
862 F.Supp. 272, 277 (D.Colo.1994). Here,
Vendo/Floway allege the contamination from BNSF 
“potentially has commingled with the plume of pesticide 
contamination in groundwater beneath and downgradient 
of the FMC site.” Doc.37 at    64; Doc.38 at    26 
(“Third-Party Complainant ... alleges ... releases and 
disposal of wastes [by Third-Party Defendants] 
containing TCE and/or chromium and other hazardous 
substances have migrated/may continue to migrate 
through groundwater to locations where such substances 
have commingled with the plume of pesticide and other 
contamination in groundwater beneath and downgradient 
of the FMC Site”). A “single harm” may be divisible if it 
is possible to discern the degree to which different parties 
contribute to the damage. See Broderick Investment, 862 
F.Supp. at 277. Single harms may be “treated as divisible 
in terms of degree,” based on the relative quantities of 
waste discharged. Matter o f Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d 889, 
895-96 (5th Cir.1993); Hercules, 247 F.3d at 718. This 
sort of divisibility may be provable even where wastes 
have become cross-contaminated and commingled, for 
“comingling is not synonymous with indivisible harm.” 
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 
722 (2nd Cir.1993) (“Alcan II ”); see also Bell, 3 F.3d at 
903. Proving divisibility is a “very difficult proposition,” 
Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 934 n. 
4 (8th Cir.1995), and the Restatement cautions against 
making an “arbitrary apportionment for its own sake.” 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. to subsection 
(2) (1965), quoted in Bell, 3 F.3d at 896.; see also United 
States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 
1535 (10th Cir.1995) (noting that “the courts have been 
reluctant to apportion costs”).
[4] Whether or not FMC’s TCE and chromium claims may 
be somehow divisible from its own responsibility for 
contamination of the Railroad Corridor Site, FMC’s 
election as a PRP to sue under CERCLA section 113 for 
contribution prevents FMC’s suit against Vendo/Floway 
from being for direct cost recovery under section 107(a). 
See FAC at 1, 170. Vendo/Floway’s contribution
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action is entirely permissible under Pinal Creek, if the 
recovery sought against other PRPs is not for response 
costs incurred by FMC. Whether FMC could have sued 
for direct cost recovery under section 107(a) is not 
relevant. The fact FMC sues under sections 107 and 113 
for contribution means that Vendo/Floway are liable only 
for their fair-and-several shares of site liability. Even if 
Vendo/Floway settled for an amount they believe is more 
than their fair share, FMC’s action is not a direct 
cost-recovery action under CERCLA § 107(a) as to 
Vendo/Floway. See Doc.212 at p. 8.
Vendo/Floway correctly argue that applying the holding 
of City o f Merced to this case in the manner suggested by 
BNSF thwarts CERCLA’s underlying policy objectives. 
See Doc.212 at p. 9. Prohibiting Vendo/Floway from 
maintaining contribution claims for FMC’s response costs 
discourages settlement between FMC and Vendo/Floway 
and derogates CERCLA’s policies of encouraging 
settlement and promoting prompt and effective cleanup of 
*1035 contaminated sites. See id. Pinal Creek rejects the 
argument that limiting PRPs to contribution claims 
undermines CERCLA’s policy of promoting rapid and 
voluntary environmental responses to hazardous waste 
threats. See Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1304 (“We reject 
this argument because it is based on policy considerations 
which we cannot consider in light of controlling text, 
structure, and logic of CERCLA and of our own 
precedent in [In re ] Dant & Russell ,” Inc., 951 F.2d 246, 
249 (9th Cir. 1991)). The court noted that rapid, voluntary 
responses by private parties may be taken into account 
under section 113(f) when equitably apportioning liability 
and that other economic incentives exist for private 
parties to initiate cleanup prior to government 
intervention. See Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1304-05. 
Allowing a PRP such as FMC to hold other PRPs jointly 
and severally liable for their response costs would 
effectively immunize the plaintiff PRP from liability for 
orphan shares (those shares attributable to PRPs who are 
either insolvent or unavailable). See Pinal Creek, 118 
F.3d at 1303. Such a rule reduces a plaintiff PRP’s 
incentive to sue all PRPs and “would undermine the 
ability of courts to allocate costs between all PRPs ‘using 
such equitable factors as the court determines are 
appropriate.’ ” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)).
There is no evidence FMC has acted in collusion with 
BNSF to maximize Vendo/Floway’s liability. To the 
contrary, according to the Deal Point Memorandum 
containing the essential terms of the settlement between 
FMC and Vendo/Floway, FMC agrees not to assist BNSF 
in its prosecution or defense of the claims between BNSF 
and Vendo/Floway, “such as by providing BNSF with 
FMC’s attorney work product, expert work product or by
waiving any conflict between BNSF and an FMC expert.” 
Doc.197, Exh. D. There is no evidence of fraud or 
coercion in the settlement or FMC’s decision not to sue 
BNSF. Although FMC had an incentive to sue BNSF if 
BNSF contributed to the contamination FMC was 
remediating, as Vendo/Floway note, “FMC refused to 
acknowledge BNSF’s [alleged] contribution to the 
chromium contamination.” Doc.212.
Any policy considerations which favor allowing 
Vendo/Floway to recover in contribution against BNSF 
for FMC’s response costs are outweighed by the 
objectives of avoiding multiple, unnecessary lawsuits, 
maintaining incentives for PRP plaintiffs to sue as many 
PRPs as possible (thereby avoiding substantial liability 
for remaining shares), and the overall concern with the 
speedy and effective cleanup of contaminated sites. See 
THAN, 884 F.Supp. at 361 (“All that the Kramer opinion 
actually accomplishes is another round of litigation—as 
defendant PRPs counterclaim against the plaintiff PRP to 
effectuate their recovery. Such an approach guarantees 
inefficiency, potential duplication, and prolongation of the 
litigation process in a CERCLA case.”) (citing United 
States v. Kramer, 757 F.Supp. 397, 416-17 (D.N.J.1991)).
To the extent Vendo/Floway make claims for contribution 
for its liability to FMC for FMC’s response costs, those 
claims are barred. Because Vendo/Floway are liable to 
FMC only for their fair-and-several shares of liability, 
they may not maintain an action under CERCLA for 
contribution to recover for liability they incur for FMC’s 
response costs, even if above their fair shares. BNSF’s 
motion for summary judgment as to Vendo/Floway’s 
claims for contribution under CERCLA as to FMC’s 
response costs is GRANTED.
2. Viability o f  Contribution Claims by §  113(f) 
Defendants fo r  “First Instance” Costs
Vendo/Floway are not necessarily precluded from 
maintaining §§ 107 and 113 *1036 contribution claims 
against BNSF or other PRPs because of their status as 
contribution defendants, for response costs they incurred 
and they allege were caused by other PRPs. Despite its 
contrary language, City o f Merced recognizes that 
contribution defendants who incur costs in response to 
state or federal administrative agency directives are 
potentially jointly and severally liable for those costs. See 
City o f Merced, 997 F.Supp. at 1333. In City o f Merced, 
Merced Laundry was permitted to maintain an action for 
costs it incurred responding to an Environmental 
Protection Agency directive to clean up the site, see id., 
and a contribution action to recover such so-called 
“administrative response” costs. See id. Vendo/Floway
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argue they seek and are entitled to the “first instance” 
costs5 they have incurred relating to characterizing the 
TCE and chromium contamination, installing and 
reporting results from off-property monitoring wells, 
investigating BNSF’s property, and evaluating the use of 
Zacky Farms’ property to establish hydraulic control over 
the contamination plume. See Doc.212 at p. 10. BNSF 
argues Vendo/Floway are precluded from recovering first 
instance costs because Vendo/Floway do not assert such a 
claim in their third-party complaints and Rule 14(a) 
requires dismissal of third-party claims not derivatively 
based on a plaintiff’s original claim. See Doc.217 at pp. 
8-9.
a. Third-Party Complaints
In their third-party complaint against BNSF and other 
third-party defendants, Vendo and VMC allege in their 
first claim, “To the extent that Complainants are found 
liable in any action or administrative proceeding for any 
past, present or future response costs, damages, or other 
fees and expenses arising from the release or disposal of 
hazardous substances ... onto or under the Vendo/Floway 
Site, the FMC site, or such other location of migration of 
such alleged hazardous substances, then Complainants are 
entitled to contributions from [third-party defendants], 
based upon equitable factors as the court determines are 
appropriate pursuant to CERCLA § 113(f) (42 U.S.C. § 
9613(f)).” Doc.37 at   77. Vendo and VMC seek 
“contribution for the equitable allocation of [third-party 
defendants] to any past, present, or future response costs, 
damages or other expenses incurred by, or assessed 
against, Complainants as a result of the release or disposal 
of hazardous substances ... onto or under the 
Vendo/Floway Site, the Calwa Ice House Site, the Valley 
Foundry Site and the CMS Site.” See id. at   85. In their 
second claim, Vendo and VMC allege third-party 
defendants “are liable for some or all response costs, 
damages or other fees and expenses incurred by 
Complainants, if any, and that [third-party defendants] are 
obligated to reimburse Complainants for such response 
costs, damages, or other fees and expenses.” See id. at   
80. Vendo and VMC seek a judicial determination of the 
relative liability of Vendo/VMC and third-party 
defendants under CERCLA section 113(g)(2). See id. at 
   79, 83, 86. Floway’s third-party complaint’s first two 
claims are nearly identical. See Doc.38 at    28-39, p. 11.
*1037 [5] While Vendo, VMC, and Floway’s first claim 
against BNSF seeks reimbursement for liability it may 
incur for FMC’s response costs, it explicitly seeks 
contribution for “any past, present, or future response 
costs, damages or other expenses incurred by” Vendo, 
VMC, and Floway. See Doc.37 at   85; Doc.38 at p.
11:4-7. Vendo/Floway also explicitly seek in their second 
claim a judicial determination of the relative liability of 
Vendo/Floway and BNSF under CERCLA section 
113(g)(2). See Doc.37 at    79, 83, 86; Doc.38 at     35, 
36, 39, p. 11:8-12. These claims include claims for first 
instance costs separate and apart from FMC’s response 
costs. The fact that Vendo/Floway did not mention the 
1999 ISE Order or the term “first instance costs” in their 
third-party complaint does not prevent these allegations 
from being sufficient to give notice that contribution is 
sought for such costs. Cf. Doc.217 at p. 7:11-16. The 
motion for summary judgment is denied as to first 
instance costs, including ISE compliance costs, caused by 
BNSF or other PRPs
b. Rule 14(a)
BNSF argues Vendo/Floway’s claims for first instance 
costs are independent and unrelated to the FMC action 
and settlement and must be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 14(a). Rule 14(a) provides, in relevant part:
At any time after commencement 
of the action a defending party, as a 
third-party plaintiff, may cause a 
summons and complaint to be 
served upon a person not a party to 
the action who is or may be liable 
to the third-party plaintiff for all or 
part of the plaintiff’s claim against 
the third-party plaintiff.
Fed.R. Civ.P. 14(a).
Vendo/Floway are entitled to bring third-party claims 
against BNSF if BNSF “is or may be liable to [FMC] for 
all or part of the [FMC’s] claim against [Vendo/Floway].” 
Fed.R. Civ.P. 14(a). A “third-party claim may be asserted 
only when the third party’s liability is in some way 
dependent on the outcome of the main claim and the third 
party’s liability is secondary or derivative.” United States 
v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 452 (9th 
Cir.1983) (affirming a trial court’s dismissal of 
defendant’s third-party complaint against federal agents 
for violation of defendant’s constitutional rights in a 
forfeiture action by the United States).
Even if BNSF may not be liable to Vendo/Floway for 
FMC’s claims under CERCLA section 113 relating to 
FMC’s response costs, BNSF can be liable to 
Vendo/Floway for FMC’s RCRA and state law claims for 
which Vendo/Floway may be held jointly and severally 
liable, if BNSF was the cause. See FAC (seeking
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injunctive relief under section 7002(a)(1)(B) of the 
RCRA, and indemnity, contribution, declaratory relief, 
and damages under California law). The bar against 
contribution defendants’ claims for contribution for a 
contribution complainant’s response costs does not apply 
to FMC’s non-CERCLA claims. Vendo/Floway may 
maintain state law claims against BNSF for contribution 
to recover the costs FMC seeks under state law, which 
were caused by BNSF. Only Floway asserts a claim under 
state law for contribution. See Doc.38. BNSF is 
potentially liable under Floway’s state law declaratory 
relief contribution and indemnity claim for at least some 
of the costs FMC seeks against Floway, Floway’s state 
law declaratory relief claim is properly brought under 
Rule 14(a). Some of Floway’s state law declaratory relief 
claim is, at least in part, derivative of FMC’s state law 
claims for continuing nuisance and trespass against 
Floway. See Doc.217 at p. 9:7-8. By BNSF’s alleged 
releases from its real property which contributed to a 
single plume, the claims are inextricably intertwined. To 
its state law claim *1038 brought in compliance with Rule 
14(a), Floway may join “as many claims, legal, equitable, 
or maritime, as the party has against” BNSF. Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 18(a); see also Banks v. City o f Emeryville, 109 
F.R.D. 535, 540 (N.D.Cal.1985) (third-party claim may 
be based on a different theory of liability than the main 
action).
[6] Vendo/VMC assert only CERCLA claims. See Doc.37. 
The distinction between FMC’s response costs and 
Vendo/Floway’s first instance costs, which determines the 
viability of Vendo/Floway’s CERCLA 113 claims, does 
not disqualify the claims under Rule 14(a). That 
Vendo/Floway’s claims for first instance costs are 
“independent,” in a CERCLA section 113 sense, from 
their claims related to FMC’s costs, does not mean they 
are “independent” and therefore not derivative of FMC’s 
claims in a Rule 14(a) sense. In Kemper Prime Indus. 
Partners v. Montgomery Watson Amer., Inc., 2000 U.S. 
Dist. Lexis 11450, 2000 WL 876222 (N.D.Ill.2000), 
plaintiff Kemper sued Montgomery Watson Americas 
(“MWA”), alleging negligent misrepresentation in an 
environmental assessment of industrial property MWA 
performed for Kemper. See Kemper, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11450 at *2, 2000 WL 876222 at *1. MWA 
impleaded third-party defendant Prime Group, alleging, 
inter alia, CERCLA claims. See id. at *6, 2000 WL 
876222 at *2-3. In denying Prime Group’s motion to 
dismiss on the grounds it was improperly impleaded 
under Rule 14(a), the court stated that “MWA set forth a 
number of facts in its complaint, which allege that the 
Prime Entities’ own negligence, in not immediately 
cleaning up the property and in performing improper 
trenching operations, exacerbated the contamination at the
Site. On this basis, secondary liability could be 
established.” Id. at *11-12, 2000 WL 876222at *4. 
Impleader may be appropriate where a third-party 
defendant is potentially liable to the third-party plaintiff 
for damages to the extent necessary to put the third-party 
plaintiff in the position he would have been in absent the 
alleged wrongdoing by the third-party defendant. See id. 
at *11, 2000 WL 876222 at *4 (citing Leaseway v. 
Carlton, 568 F.Supp. 1041 (N.D.Ill.1983)).
“The decision to allow a third-party defendant to be 
impleaded under rule 14 is entrusted to the sound 
discretion of the trial court.” Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d at 
452. “Rule 14(a) was designed to permit the liberal 
joinder of parties so that judicial energy could be 
conserved and consistency of results guaranteed.” New 
York v. Solvent Chem. Co., 179 F.R.D. 90, 93 
(W.D.N.Y.1998) (citations omitted); Lehman v. 
Revolution Portfolio L.L.C., 166 F.3d 389, 393 (1st 
Cir.1999) (“whether a third-party defendant may be 
impleaded under Rule 14 continues to be a question 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court”) 
(citation omitted). Joinder under Rule 14(a) should be 
“freely granted to promote ... efficiency unless to do so 
would prejudice the plaintiff, unduly complicate the trial, 
or would foster an obviously unmeritorious claim.” 
Solvent Chem., 179 F.R.D. at 93 (citation omitted). 
Plaintiff FMC is no longer a party. It is not prejudiced by 
the presence of BNSF in the case. Rule 14(a) does not 
require dismissal of a third-party complaint where 
discovery is not complete. Joint-trial is favored by “the 
efficiency of considering all claims involving the subject 
site in a single lawsuit, and the moving party would not 
suffer any prejudice in its ability to defend against the 
claim in the present action that it would not also suffer as 
a defendant in a separate action.” Solvent Chem., 179 
F.R.D. at 93-94. Permitting Vendo/Floway’s third-party 
complaint to go forward will not cause undue delay since 
the claims between Vendo/Floway and BNSF are the only 
claims remaining in the action. None of the reasons why 
Rule 14(a) prohibits *1039 joinder of non-derivative 
claims is present here. Requiring a duplicitous separate 
lawsuit to address inextricably related claims over 
contiguous CERCLA sites, would unnecessarily multiply 
the litigation and waste judicial and party resources.
Vendo/Floway allege BNSF is a joint tortfeasor 
responsible for the TCE and chromium contamination 
which forms the basis of FMC’s claims against 
Vendo/Floway. While FMC’s failure to name BNSF as a 
defendant may have certain consequences under 
CERCLA, those consequences do not prevent Rule 14(a), 
impleaded of BNSF on the theory that BNSF is liable for 
at least some of the TCE and chromium contamination for
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which Vendo/Floway have incurred costs. As a practical 
matter, the claims of FMC and Vendo/Floway in this 
action, and BNSF’s claims in the related action, 
Burlington Northern v. Vendo, CIV F 01-6434 OWW 
LJO, are so interrelated that the interests of justice and 
efficiency favor consolidation of the claims into a single 
action. The BNSF case arose out of contamination and the 
need for CERCLA remediation of related sites in the 
Railroad Corridor. In a separate decision, the BNSF 
claims have been consolidated with the FMC action. 
BNSF’s claims are compulsory counterclaims to 
Vendo/Floway’s third-party claims asserted against BNSF 
in the FMC case. These compulsory counterclaims have 
been consolidated with the FMC action. The limitations in 
Rule 14(a) regarding what claims may be asserted against 
third-party defendants are designed to promote judicial 
efficiency by resolving independent disputes in a single 
lawsuit. The decision on Vendo/Floway’s motion to 
dismiss, stay, or consolidate in the BNSF action held that 
“the essential facts of the various claims are so logically 
connected that considerations of judicial economy and 
fairness dictate that all the issues be resolved in one 
lawsuit.” Hydranautics, 70 F.3d at 536 (citations 
omitted). These same factors prevent dismissal of 
Vendo/Floway’s claims against BNSF based on Rule 
14(a). See Doc.146 (order denying BNSF’s severance 
motion on the grounds of fairness and judicial economy).
Vendo/Floway’s third-party complaint for contribution 
from BNSF under CERCLA sections 107 and 113(f) for 
first instance costs, which BNSF caused to be incurred, 
are properly asserted. BNSF’s motion for summary 
judgment as to Vendo/Floway’s CERCLA claims for 
contribution for first instance response costs is DENIED.
3. Floway’s HSAA Claims
BNSF argues Floway’s HSAA claims are barred because 
liability under the HSAA is coextensive with liability 
under CERCLA, and BNSF cannot be liable to Floway 
under CERCLA. See Doc.195. Floway argues that, while 
the HSAA incorporates CERCLA’s description of 
responsible parties and available defenses, HSAA does 
not incorporate the entire body of federal common law 
CERCLA jurisprudence including any interpretation of 
City o f Merced that bars contribution defendants from 
asserting their own contribution claims under HSAA 
against other PRPs. See Doc.212 at p. 12:1-12.
In THAN, 884 F.Supp. at 363, this court stated: “Liability 
under CHSAA requires a finding of liability under 
CERCLA.” THAN, 884 F.Supp. at 363 (citing Cal. Health 
& Safety Code § 25323.5(a)). Floway’s HSAA 
contribution claim against BNSF (and FMC’s HSAA
contribution claim against Vendo/Floway) is asserted 
under Cal. Health & Safety Code section 25363. See 
Doc.38; FAC. Section 25363 provides, in relevant part:
... any party found liable for any 
costs or expenditures recoverable 
under this chapter who establishes 
by a preponderance of the evidence 
that only a *1040 portion of those 
costs or expenditures are 
attributable to that party’s actions, 
shall be required to pay only for 
that portion.
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25363(a).
Section 25363(e) provides, in relevant part:
Any person who has incurred 
removal or remedial action costs in 
accordance with this chapter or the 
federal act may seek contribution 
or indemnity from any person who
is liable pursuant to this chapter...
An action to enforce a claim may 
be brought as a cross-complaint by 
any defendant in an action brought 
pursuant to Section 25360 or this 
section, or in a separate action after 
the person seeking contribution or 
indemnity has paid removal or 
remedial action costs in accordance 
with this chapter or the federal 
act.... In resolving claims for 
contribution or indemnity, the court 
may allocate costs among liable 
parties using those equitable factors 
which are appropriate.
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25363(e).
[7] Section 25363(e) expressly authorizes a contribution 
cross complaint in a pending HSAA suit, or separate 
lawsuit for contribution after payment of costs for 
removal or remedial actions under either HSAA or 
CERCLA. Contribution defendants may sue other PRPs, 
including a contribution plaintiff for first instance costs. 
Section 25363(a) recognizes the same principal of several 
liability for response costs under the HSAA; contribution 
defendants are not liable for more than each party’s 
fair-and-several share of response costs, despite the 
exposure of a PRP to joint and several liability as a 
CERCLA 107 direct cost recovery defendant. However, 
just as Vendo/Floway’s CERCLA claims for its own first
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instance response costs are properly asserted under 
CERCLA, Floway’s claim for first instance costs under 
HSAA may be asserted against BNSF under § 25363(e) 
and any other PRPs who may be liable under the HSAA. 
The state law follows the federal. BNSF’s motion for 
summary judgment as to Floway’s claim for contribution 
under HSAA as to FMC’s response costs for which 
Floway has not expended costs is GRANTED. BNSF’s 
motion for summary judgment as to Floway’s HSAA 
claim for contribution for Floway’s own first instance 
response costs is DENIED.
4. Floway’s State Law Declaratory Relief Claim
BNSF argues Floway’s state law claim for declaratory 
relief should be dismissed because 1) Floway should not 
be able to obtain contribution under a state law theory if 
such a claim is barred under a federal law CERCLA 
theory; and 2) the court should decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims 
in the absence of any viable federal claims. See Doc. 195 
at pp. 12:10—p. 15:2.
[8] Floway correctly notes that BNSF’s first argument was 
explicitly rejected in the decision in City o f Merced, 
which held “that while liability for the CERCLA claims is 
several, liability of all parties to the [PRP plaintiff] under 
state-law theories is joint and several.... CERCLA does 
not preempt state-law causes of action that concern 
cleanup of hazardous materials.” City o f Merced, 997 
F.Supp. at 1336 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d)). BNSF 
argues City o f  Merced does not apply on this point 
because here FMC, unlike the PRP City of Merced, is no 
longer a party due to its settlement with Vendo/Floway. 
See Doc.217 at p. 10:17-25. BNSF argues that here 
“Floway asks this Court to rule upon FMC’s 
now-theoretical continuing nuisance and continuing 
trespass damages and then declare BNSF liable for some 
of those theoretical damages.” Id. FMC’s claims against 
Vendo *1041 /Floway for continuing nuisance and 
trespass are asserted in its FAC; they are not “theoretical” 
simply because FMC and Vendo/Floway settled. Any 
injury to real property of a claimant from the release and 
entry of contaminants past, present, and future may be 
addressed under these state legal theories. Any 
complexity that may arise in apportioning liability due to 
the FMC settlement agreement’s lack of specificity as to 
how liability is apportioned under the settlement, has no 
effect on the basic principle that CERCLA does not 
preempt state law claims related to environmental 
cleanup.
As to BSNF’s supplemental jurisdiction argument, 
Floway retains viable CERCLA contribution claims
relating to its first instance costs; the exercise of 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims is 
required under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. BNSF’s motion for 
summary judgment as to Floway’s state law claim for 
declaratory relief is DENIED.
B. Vendo/Floway’s Motion to Quash BNSF’s Proposed 
Subpoenas o f Plaintiff FMC’s Experts
1. Vendo/Floway’s Position
Vendo/Floway argue BNSF should be prohibited from 
deposing and calling as witnesses at trial, experts retained 
and designated by FMC before FMC and Vendo/Floway 
agreed to dismiss the claims against each other in 
settlement of their dispute. See Docs.199, 201; Doc.199, 
Exh. A (the “Settlement”). The Settlement provides that 
FMC shall not make expert work product available to 
BNSF, and FMC has agreed in conjunction with the 
Settlement to withdraw its expert designations in this 
case. See Doc.199, Exh. A at    15; Doc.199, Elliott Decl. 
at    3. Vendo/Floway argue BNSF chose to designate 
only two experts in this case even though they had ample 
opportunity over a nine-month period to retain and 
prepare whatever experts they needed. See Doc.219 at p. 
2:1-3. Vendo/Floway maintain BNSF took a calculated 
risk by relying on FMC’s experts’ availability at trial 
without obtaining an agreement from FMC to 
cross-designate and share the cost of the experts. See 
Doc.199 at p. 2. Vendo/Floway argue BNSF cannot 
demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances required 
under Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B) to justify an order 
allowing it to utilize FMC’s experts’ work in 
contravention of the Settlement and at the expense of 
delaying trial in this case. See Doc.199 at p. 2:24.
Vendo/Floway contend the parties entered into no written 
stipulation pursuant to Rule 29 regarding the taking of 
depositions. See Doc.187 at p. 5:1-9. BNSF chose not to 
participate in the ultimate settlement between FMC, 
Vendo, VMC, and Floway. Vendo/Floway speculate 
“BNSF expected that the settling parties’ momentum and 
desire to resolve all claims would enable BNSF to settle at 
a bargain price. BNSF’s ‘lowball’ strategy failed and did 
not reach a settlement.” Doc.187 at p. 6:7-10. 
Vendo/Floway argue BNSF created the situation in which 
it finds itself. See id. at p. 6:11-18.
... BNSF has been a party in this 
case for fifteen months. During this 
time, while FMC designated eleven 
experts, Vendo and Floway jointly 
designated nine experts, and 
Floway designated four additional
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experts, BNSF took a calculated 
risk and designated only two 
experts, perhaps hoping to ride 
FMC’s coattails against Vendo and 
Floway. Having refused to settle on 
fair terms with the other parties,
BNSF now seeks to roll back the 
clock and start fresh with a six to 
seven month delay and a new roster 
of experts.
Id.
Floway contends BNSF should have jointly designated 
experts with FMC as is customarily done in such cases. 
Floway’s *1042 Opp. at p. 3. Floway maintains that in the 
absence of any agreement with FMC, BNSF has no right 
to “parasitically” benefit from FMC’s efforts. See id. 
Floway observes BNSF has not made any affirmative 
claims in this litigation, so it needs only to prepare for its 
defense. See id. at p. 4. This is overly simplistic because 
the origin and paths of contaminant releases cannot be 
analyzed without expert testimony and the causes of and 
need for remediation consistent with the NCP must be 
established.
2. BNSF’s Position
BNSF contends Rule 26(b)(4)(B), the “extraordinary 
circumstances” test, does not apply here since FMC has 
already designated their experts and the experts have 
exchanged reports and opinions. See Doc.204 at p. 
1:13-22. BNSF argues it lies within the sound discretion 
of the court to permit BNSF to depose FMC’s experts 
based on a balancing of the probative value of the 
testimony and the prejudice to the other party under 
Fed.R. Evid. 403. See id. According to BNSF, the 
probative value of the experts’ testimony is high, while 
Vendo/Floway will suffer minimal prejudice because they 
have already prepared to defend against FMC’s experts 
and they are not the party whose experts BNSF seeks to 
depose. See id. at p. 2. BNSF maintains it will be severely 
prejudiced if it is not allowed to use FMC’s experts. See 
id. BNSF contends the Settlement itself contains no 
provision requiring FMC to withdraw its experts or make 
them unavailable for BNSF to use, so the Settlement 
Agreement would not be breached by allowing BNSF to 
depose or subpoena for trial FMC’s experts. See Doc.204 
at p. 2:3-9. BNSF argues it did not have sufficient time, 
given the voluminous and complex nature of the material 
at issue and the late date at which it entered the litigation, 
to designate and prepare on its own all of the experts it 
needs for this case. See Doc.204 at p. 3. BNSF maintains 
it justifiably relied on being able to use FMC’s experts at
trial. See id. at p. 5. BNSF contends it had no reason to 
believe FMC would settle out of the case before February 
8, 2002. See id. FMC at oral argument stated it continues 
to work with its experts and does not wish for them to 
provide work product or services for BNSF.
3. Appropriate Standard
Vendo/Floway argue Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B), regarding 
discovery of non-testifying expert witnesses, applies to 
this situation. See Doc.199 at p. 3. Rule 26(b)(4)(B) 
provides that:
A party may ... discover facts 
known or opinions held by an 
expert who has been retained or 
specially employed by another 
party in anticipation of litigation or 
preparation for trial and who is not 
expected to be called as a witness 
at trial, only as provided in Rule 
35(b)6 or *1043 upon a showing of 
exceptional circumstances under 
which it is impracticable for the 
party seeking discovery to obtain 
facts or opinions on the same 
subject by other means.
Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B). Under the Rule 26(b)(4)(B) 
standard, BNSF must make a showing that “extraordinary 
circumstances” exist which justify its deposing FMC’s 
experts.
BNSF argues experts whose identities and opinions have 
been disclosed pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2) may be deposed 
or subpoenaed for trial by an opposing party within the 
sound discretion of the court. See Doc.204 at p. 1. In 
deciding whether to allow such a deposition or subpoena, 
the probative value of the testimony is weighed against 
the prejudice to the opposing party under Fed.R. Evid. 
403. See id. For convenience, this standard is referred to 
as the “balancing standard.”
Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(A) requires a party to disclose to 
other parties the identity of any person who may testify as 
an expert witness at trial. See Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(A). 
Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(A) provides: “A party may depose 
any person who has been identified as an expert whose 
opinions may be presented at trial.” Fed.R. Civ.P. 
26(b)(4)(A).
BNSF argues the analysis in House v. Combined Ins. Co. 
o f Amer., 168 F.R.D. 236 (N.D.Iowa 1996), applies. See
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Doc.204 at p. 5. House addressed “the vexing and 
surprisingly little explored question of whether one party 
should be able to depose or call at trial an expert 
designated by an opposing party who was expected to be 
called at trial, but whom the designating party has 
announced it will not call at trial.” House, 168 F.R.D. at 
238. In House, plaintiff sued for employment 
discrimination based on quid pro quo sexual harassment, 
seeking, inter alia, damages for emotional distress. See id. 
Defendant employer designated a psychologist, Dr. 
Taylor, as an expert to rebut testimony of plaintiff’s 
expert (a social worker, not a psychologist) regarding 
plaintiff’s emotional suffering. See id. After Dr. Taylor 
examined plaintiff and prepared a report, plaintiff noticed 
Dr. Taylor’s deposition and moved to compel production 
of his report. See id. Defendant moved to quash Dr. 
Taylor’s deposition and for a protective order precluding 
any discovery from Dr. Taylor on the ground that 
defendant had decided not to call Dr. Taylor as a witness 
at trial. See id. Although defendant had not formally 
withdrawn its designation of him as an expert, Dr. Taylor 
was included in defendant’s witness list in the final 
pretrial order. See id. The magistrate judge assigned to the 
case ruled that plaintiff was entitled to Dr. Taylor’s report 
pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 35(b) but not entitled to depose 
Dr. Taylor because no exceptional circumstances pursuant 
to Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B) had been shown. See House, 
168 F.R.D. at 238-39. Defendant filed a motion in limine 
to bar Dr. Taylor’s testimony at trial. See House, 168 
F.R.D. at 239.
The court identified four interests weighing against 
allowing an opposing party to depose or call at trial a 
consultant, non-testifying expert witness: 1) desire to 
allow counsel to obtain necessary expert advice without 
fear that every expert consultation may yield grist for the 
adversary’s mill; 2) unfairness of allowing an *1044 
opposing party to reap benefits from another party’s effort 
and expense; 3) fear of discouraging experts from serving 
as consultants if their testimony could be compelled; and 
4) the substantial risk of prejudice stemming from the fact 
of the prior retention of an expert by an opposing party. 
See House, 168 F.R.D. at 241 (citations omitted).
House analyzed the “exceptional circumstances,” 
“balancing,” and “entitlement” standards. Under the latter 
standard, a party required to submit to an expert 
examination should be “entitled” to the examining 
expert’s report and a deposition of the expert for use at 
trial. See House, 168 F.R.D. at 244. House distinguished 
between experts who will testify at trial pursuant to 
Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(A) from consultant experts who 
are not designated to testify at trial. See House, 168 
F.R.D. at 245.
... Parties should be encouraged to consult experts to 
formulate their own cases, to discard those experts for 
any reason, and to place them beyond the reach of an 
opposing party, if they have never indicated an 
intention to use the expert at trial. Such a 
consulted-but-never-designated expert might properly 
be considered to fall under the work product doctrine 
that protects matters prepared in anticipation of 
litigation. For this reason also, the ability of an 
opposing party to call a never-designated expert at trial 
should depend upon a showing of “extraordinary 
circumstances.”
However, once an expert is designated, the expert is 
recognized as presenting part of the common body of 
discoverable, and generally admissible, information 
and testimony available to all parties. The practical 
effect of a Rule 26 designation of an expert is to make 
an expert available for deposition by the opposing 
party, and such a deposition preserves the testimony of 
the expert, should the expert later become unavailable, 
or provides a basis for impeachment, should the 
expert’s opinion offered at trial differ. Thus, Rule 26 
designation waives the “free consultation” privilege a 
party enjoys as to its non-testifying experts. The court 
therefore concludes that designation of an expert as 
expected to be called at trial, pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 
26(b)(4)(A), even if that designation is subsequently 
withdrawn, takes the opposing party’s demand to 
depose and use the expert at trial out of the 
“exceptional circumstances” category of Rule 
26(b)(4)(B).
House, 168 F.R.D. at 245 (citations omitted).
The court also relied on the nature and circumstances of 
the expert testimony sought. See House, 168 F.R.D. at 
246 (“designation, and submission to a medical 
examination by the designated expert, create the kind of 
reliance on the availability of the expert that the court in 
Rubel found lacking where an expert had been consulted, 
but never designated”) (citation omitted). Although House 
noted that Rule 35 did not “entitle” a party to depose or 
use at trial another party’s examining expert, the expert 
was a psychologist who had conducted a Rule 35 mental 
examination of the plaintiff and was subject to the trial 
testimony provisions of that Rule. See House, 168 F.R.D. 
at 246 (“What, then, is the proper standard for [plaintiff] 
House’s access to and use at trial of Dr. Taylor, where 
both a Rule 26(b)(4)(A) designation has occurred, albeit a 
designation subsequently withdrawn, and a Rule 35 
medical examination has occurred?”).
The court found that the circumstances warranted the 
application of a discretionary “balancing” standard. See
WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 16
FMC Corp. v. Vendo Co., 196 F.Supp.2d 1023 (2002)
54 ERC 1711, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,642
House, 168 F.R.D. at 246. Balancing favored deposition 
and use of the expert at trial based *1045 on: 1) plaintiff’s 
interest in presenting relevant, probative information to 
the jury, non-cumulative of plaintiff’s social worker 
expert who would not present psychological expert 
testimony; 2) the court’s interest in proper resolution of 
the issues; and 3) plaintiff’s reasonable reliance on being 
able to use Dr. Taylor’s testimony because she was asked 
to consent to examination only after Dr. Taylor was 
designated. See House, 168 F.R.D. at 247. The defendant 
had not taken the necessary steps to prepare its expert 
testimony before the designation deadline. See House, 
168 F.R.D. at 248 (“The court finds little interest in 
relieving a party of the consequences of an expert 
designation made simply to meet a court-ordered 
deadline, when Rule 26 provides every protection for 
finding and using an expert to prepare for trial prior to 
designation of the expert as expected to testify at trial.”). 
The potential for prejudice to defendant from revealing to 
the jury Dr. Taylor was originally hired by defendant 
could be reduced or eliminated by excluding evidence as 
to how Dr. Taylor became involved in the case. See id. 
Plaintiff was allowed to depose Dr. Taylor. See id.; see 
also Agron v. Trustees o f Columbia Univ., 176 F.R.D. 445 
(S.D.N.Y.1997) (finding Rule 26(b)(4)(B) inapplicable 
where plaintiff voluntarily permitted discovery of its 
expert’s opinions and finding the balance favored 
allowing defendant to use plaintiff’s withdrawn expert at 
trial).
Vendo/Floway contend House has no applicability to 
cases not involving Rule 35 personal medical or 
psychological examinations, involving expert reports 
discoverable under Rule 35(b). See Doc.219 at p. 2. 
Vendo/Floway observe that the House reasoning was 
rejected in Lehan v. Ambassador Programs, Inc., 190 
F.R.D. 670 (E.D.Wash.2000). See Doc.219 at p. 2. In 
Lehan, defendant informed the court it did not intend to 
call an expert, who had performed a Rule 35 examination 
and was listed on defendant’s pretrial witness list. See 
Lehan, 190 F.R.D. at 671. Lehan denied plaintiff use of 
defendant’s expert, explicitly rejected the balancing 
standard adopted in House, and instead applied the 
exceptional circumstances standard. See Lehan, 190 
F.R.D. at 672.
In Ross v. Burlington N.R. Co., 136 F.R.D. 638
(N.D.Ill.1991), plaintiff designated his expert and 
revealed the subject matter of the expert’s testimony. 
After plaintiff withdrew his designation, defendant sought 
to depose the expert. See Ross, 136 F.R.D. at 638. Ross 
found that the “plaintiff has the prerogative of changing 
his mind” regarding the designation of experts. See Ross, 
136 F.R.D. at 639. “Since plaintiff changed his mind
before any expert testimony was given in this case, the 
witness never actually acted as a testifying expert 
witness.” Id. The Ross court was not confronted with “a 
situation where facts or opinions were disclosed” and 
applied the exceptional circumstances standard in denying 
defendant’s request to depose plaintiff’s de-designated 
expert. Id. (citing Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 
(10th Cir.1984) (affirming trial court’s exclusion of 
testimony of expert originally designated and
subsequently withdrawn by plaintiff because defendants 
failed to show exceptional circumstances)).
In Dayton-Phoenix Group, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
1997 WL 1764760 (S.D.Ohio 1997), defendant 
designated an expert to testify about equipment and 
machinery. After defendant decided not to call the expert 
as a witness, plaintiff sought to subpoena him. See 
Dayton-Phoenix, 1997 WL 1764760 at *1. 
Dayton-Phoenix considered the differing results in House 
and Ross and adopted Ross’s exceptional circumstances 
approach. See id. The court reasoned: 1) the Advisory 
Committee Notes to Rule 26(b)(4)(B) limit discovery to 
“trial witnesses,” the expert would not be a trial witness; 
2) the primary purpose of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is to allow a 
party to *1046 prepare adequately for cross-examination 
at trial, a purpose not applicable where the witness would 
not actually be called at trial; and 3) Rule 26(b)(4)(B)’s 
purpose of promoting fairness by preventing access to 
another party’s diligent trial preparation is furthered by 
denying such access. See id.
In Wolt v. Sherwood, 828 F.Supp. 1562, 1568 (D.Utah 
1993), the court held that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) “is designed to 
promote fairness by precluding unreasonable access to an 
opposing party’s diligent trial preparation.” The court in 
Wolt applied the exceptional circumstances standard in 
holding that non-settling defendants could not use experts 
retained by a settling defendant where the settlement 
agreement prevented such use. See Wolt, 828 F.Supp. at 
1567-68 (“Nonsettling parties are not prejudiced because 
the ‘expertise’ will be made available, in spite of a 
settlement, if the nonsettling parties can show 
‘exceptional circumstances’ under Fed.R. Civ.P. 
26(b)(4)(B).”). The court noted that “exceptional 
circumstances might exist where the settling party’s 
expert has unique expertise which may not be readily 
available to other non-settling parties, or where the 
settling party’s expert participated in tests which cannot 
be replicated by new experts.” Wolt, 828 F.Supp. at 1568 
n. 18.
Unlike House, the experts here have not performed a 
personal medical examination pursuant to Rule 35, nor 
scientific tests that are unavailable or unduplicatable.
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FMC and Vendo/Floway have agreed not to permit BNSF 
to use FMC’s experts. The totality of the circumstances 
justifies application of the “exceptional circumstances” 
standard to Vendo/Floway’s motion to quash.
4. Applying the Exceptional Circumstances Standard
As in Wolt, there is no showing that FMC’s experts have 
unique expertise, otherwise unavailable to BNSF, or that 
they “participated in tests which cannot be replicated by 
new experts.” Wolt, 828 F.Supp. at 1568 n. 18. In In re 
Shell Oil Refinery, 132 F.R.D. 437 (E.D.La.1990), Shell 
submitted expert reports in compliance with a 
court-ordered deadline for experts testifying at trial. See 
Shell, 132 F.R.D. at 439. Shell’s later decision not to call 
some of the authors of the reports as experts at trial was 
“permissible” and transformed those witnesses into 
“non-testifying experts,” within the meaning of Rule 
26(b)(4)(B), whose testimony could be used by another 
party only upon a showing of “exceptional
circumstances.” See Shell, 132 F.R.D. at 440-42. A 
showing that over $300,000 was required to replicate 
those tests was insufficient to demonstrate “exceptional 
circumstances” where “plaintiffs can obtain the
substantial equivalent by having their own experts 
conduct tests.” Shell, 132 F.R.D. at 443. BNSF provides 
no evidence showing the cost of any studies it seeks to 
use or that such tests cannot be replicated by its own 
experts.
5. Applying the Balancing Standard
Assuming, arguendo, the balancing standard applies to 
this case, BNSF’s showing is still inadequate to permit it 
access to FMC’s experts.
Rewarding BNSF by allowing it to use FMC’s experts 
under these circumstances has the potential to discourage 
settlement in contravention of public policy favoring 
settlement and to upset the expectations of parties, the 
court, and the policy of the law that encourages diligence 
and discourages profit from the work product and industry 
of the opponent. See Wolt, 828 F.Supp. at 1568. BNSF 
observes that the Settlement does not contain an explicit 
prohibition against BNSF’s using FMC’s experts without 
assistance from FMC. However, FMC has made an 
agreement apart from the settlement that it will withdraw 
its experts. FMC has further work for its experts and does 
not want them used by BNSF. The fact that FMC’s 
agreement is not part of the Settlement Agreement does 
not make it less enforceable or less important.
BNSF’s argument that it had inadequate time to prepare 
and designate other experts rings hollow in light of the 
fifteen months time it has had to prepare since it was 
joined in the FMC case. BNSF had over nine months after 
it was brought into this case to designate and prepare 
experts. BNSF had previously engaged outside experts to 
conduct a limited investigation into the site in 1995-96. It 
was well aware of the issues when it was named as a 
third-party defendant, allegedly responsible for 
contributing to remediation costs at the FMC site.
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“The claimed importance of expert testimony underscores 
the need for [BNSF] to have timely designated [its] expert 
witness so that [opposing counsel] could prepare for trial. 
The importance of such proposed testimony cannot 
singularly override the enforcement of local rules and 
scheduling orders.” Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 792 (footnote 
omitted). BNSF created the situation in which it finds 
itself by not cross-designating FMC’s experts to give 
notice it intended to rely on FMC’s witnesses without a 
formal agreement as to their shared use. See State ex rel. 
W ard v. Hill, 200 W.Va. 270, 278, 489 S.E.2d 24 (1997) 
(holding “that, absent a formal agreement among 
defendants in a litigation proceeding involving multiple 
defendants, the circuit court should not generally permit a 
settling defendant’s expert witnesses to testify for the 
remaining defendants,” especially where doing so would 
violate the settlement agreement). BNSF has not been 
diligent so as to entitle it to use FMC’s experts under 
Fed.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B)’s extraordinary circumstances 
standard. To the contrary, BNSF shows an unjustifiable 
lack of diligence. BNSF’s counsel are experienced and 
competent in the field of environmental law. It is 
indisputable that CERCLA litigation inevitably results in 
a “battle of the experts.” It is inconceivable that BNSF’s 
counsel could not have known of the need for experts to 
defeat the opposing parties’ claims.
[9] Under Rule 26(b)(4)(B), a party “carries a heavy 
burden in demonstrating the existence of exceptional 
circumstances.” Spearman Indus, v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 128 F.Supp.2d 1148, 1151
(N.D.I11.2001) (citation omitted). Exceptional 
circumstances may exist where 1) the object or condition 
at issue is destroyed or has deteriorated after the 
non-testifying expert observes it but before the moving 
party’s expert has an opportunity to observe it; or 2) there 
are no other available experts in the same field or subject 
area. See Spearman, 128 F.Supp.2d at 1152. BNSF makes 
no showing the plume of contamination has deteriorated 
or is inaccessible to further study by other available 
experts in the field.
*1047 [10] BNSF does not show exceptional circumstances 
exist to warrant an order allowing it use FMC’s experts.
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BNSF argues it justifiably relied upon being able to use 
FMC’s experts at trial because it had no indication that 
FMC would settle and be dismissed from the case. Yet, 
BNSF was aware of and participated in the extensive 
efforts to mediate the case. To the extent these efforts 
took place after the expert designation deadline, BNSF 
could have sought an agreement with FMC to share 
FMC’s experts, but did not. Even before the expert 
designation deadline, BNSF could have sought such an 
agreement and should have known, especially as an 
experienced party in environmental *1048 cleanup 
litigation,7 that settlement was a likely possibility which 
would leave it with only two designated experts.
BNSF has made no showing that the information and 
opinions of FMC’s experts are unobtainable from other 
experts in the field or that their studies are incapable of 
being reproduced. There is a strong policy against 
permitting a non-diligent party from free-riding off the 
opponent’s industry and diligence. See Ager v. Jane C. 
Stormont Hospital, 622 F.2d 496, 502 (10th Cir.1980) 
(noting that “the structure of rule 26 was largely 
developed around the doctrine of unfairness designed to 
prevent a party from building his own case by means of 
his opponent’s financial resources, superior diligence and 
more aggressive preparation”); Shell, 132 F.R.D. at 443 
(applying Rule 26(b)(4)(B)’s “intended purposes of 
protecting trial strategy and preventing one party from 
having a free ride at the expense of the other party”); 
Wolt, 828 F.Supp. at 1568 (“The rule is designed to 
promote fairness by precluding unreasonable access to an 
opposing party’s diligent trial preparation.”).
Now that a new schedule is being implemented in this 
case, due to the effective consolidation of this case with 
the BNSF action, BNSF will have additional time to 
retain, designate, and prepare experts regarding its claims 
against Vendo/Floway. This additional time effectively 
eliminates prejudice to BNSF caused by the unavailability 
of FMC’s experts. Even under the balancing standard, 
BNSF’s lack of diligence and the prejudice to FMC 
outweighs the probative value of the testimony of FMC’s 
experts.
Vendo’s motion to quash BNSF’s proposed subpoenas of 
Plaintiff FMC’s experts is GRANTED.
C. BNSF’s Application to Modify the Scheduling Order
BNSF requests modification of the scheduling order 
because Vendo and Floway’s “unilateral cancellation” of 
as many as 24 depositions leaves insufficient time to 
re-notice and take all of the previously scheduled
depositions by the discovery cut-off date. See Doc.185, 
Application, p. 2:1-9. BNSF contends it will suffer 
extreme prejudice unless it is permitted to engage its own 
experts in areas previously covered by FMC’s experts. 
See id. BNSF contends Vendo and Floway have rejected 
BNSF’s proposal to consolidate BNSF’s RCRA action 
with this case and extend the pretrial and trial schedule by 
approximately six months despite a pending motion to 
dismiss, stay or consolidate in the RCRA action by Vendo 
and Floway.8 See id. at *1049 p. 2:10-15.
Vendo, VMC, and Floway (together, “Vendo/Floway”) 
oppose BNSF’s application and its characterization of the 
events surrounding the settlement. See Doc.187, Vendo’s 
Opp., filed February 13, 2002; Floway’s Opp. 
Vendo/Floway contend they did not “unilaterally” take 
depositions off calendar and that no additional time is 
necessary to complete the depositions. See Doc. 187 at p. 
2:2-7. The February 8, 2002, letter informing BNSF of 
the settlement observed that BNSF had noticed no 
depositions and requested that BNSF inform
Vendo/Floway of the identities of any percipient and 
expert witnesses BNSF intends to depose. See Doc.186 at 
Exh. A. Vendo/Floway kept on calendar the depositions 
of BNSF’s experts and percipient witnesses. See Doc.187 
at p. 2:16-19. Vendo/Floway contend other depositions 
were taken off calendar “to save litigation costs and 
because it appeared that BNSF would cho[o]se to take 
only some of the depositions noticed by others and was 
not prepared to proceed under the existing schedule.” See 
id. at p. 3:1-4.
Vendo contends that during a telephone call with counsel 
for Vendo on February 8, 2002, counsel for BNSF, 
Deborah Miller, did not object to taking the depositions 
off calendar. See id. at p. 3:10-18. Vendo maintains 
BNSF changed its position on February 11, 2002, 
requesting Vendo/Floway to stipulate to the consolidation 
of Vendo/Floway’s third-party claims against BNSF in 
the FMC action with Vendo/Floway’s related 
counterclaims and defenses against BNSF in the RCRA 
action. See id. at p. 3:22-27. According to Vendo, BNSF 
requested the consolidated action be set for trial in 
November or December 2002. See id. at pp. 3-4. 
Vendo/Floway declined to so stipulate, responding that 
they wished to proceed with their motion to dismiss in the 
BNSF action on the grounds that BNSF’s claims should 
have been made as compulsory counterclaims in the 
original FMC action and were not timely filed. See id. at 
p. 4:1-6.
BNSF’s application suggests it has designated experts for 
its defense, but seeks more time to designate experts for 
its claims against Vendo/Floway. See Application at p.
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4:3-5 (“... BNSF did not engage experts relating to 
Vendo/Floway’s liability, but instead engaged experts to 
testify specifically about the BNSF site, the location of a 
former ice house.”).
[11] Vendo and VMC filed their third-party complaint 
against BNSF on October 11, 2000. See Doc.37. Floway 
filed its third-party complaint against BNSF on October 
13, 2000. See Doc.38. As a third-party defendant, BNSF 
was required to “make ... any counterclaims against the 
third-party plaintiff [s] ... as provided in Rule 13.” Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 14(a). BNSF filed no counterclaims. Instead, 
BNSF filed answers to both Vendo/VMC’s third-party 
complaint and Floway’s third-party complaint on 
December 1, 2000. See Docs.79-80. It then waited over a 
year after the third-party complaints were filed to file 
claims in a new and separate action against Weir Floway, 
Vendo, and VMC. See Burlington Northern v. Vendo, 
CIV F 01-6434 OWW LJO, Doc.1, filed November 13, 
2001. BNSF failed to co-designate experts with FMC. 
BNSF chose not to participate in the settlement which it 
claims resulted in the need to modify the scheduling 
order. Diligence, not carelessness, is the basis for granting 
relief under Rule 16(b). BNSF was not diligent.
BNSF’s contention that it will be prejudiced focuses on 
the experts necessary to *1050 prove Vendo/Floway’s 
liability, an issue that is now relevant to this action, which 
as consolidated includes compulsory claims against 
Vendo/Floway. The issue of modifying the case schedule 
now involves more than BNSF’s diligence in complying 
with the scheduling order in this case. However, in 
determining that the claims in the BNSF should have been 
alleged as compulsory counterclaims in the FMC action, 
it is true BNSF bears some responsibility for failing to 
timely allege its claims.
“ [D]elays are a particularly abhorrent feature of today’s 
trial practice. They increase the cost of litigation, to the 
detriment of the parties enmeshed in it; they are one factor 
causing disrespect for lawyers and the judicial process; 
and they fuel the increasing resort to means of 
non-judicial dispute resolution. Adherence to reasonable 
deadlines is critical to restoring integrity in court 
proceedings.” Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 792. Although 
BNSF fails to demonstrate good cause for modifying the 
scheduling order in this case on the sole ground that it 
needs more time to depose and prepare experts, which it 
should have engaged and designated for its defense 
against Vendo/Floway’s claims, in light of the 
consolidation of the BNSF action with the FMC action, 
some modification of the schedule is required. BNSF’s 
offer to consolidate the BNSF and FMC actions for trial in 
November or December of 2002 was rejected by
Vendo/Floway. See Doc.187 at pp. 3-4. Vendo/Floway 
bear some responsibility for the scheduling dispute. All 
parties were advised by the court at an earlier scheduling 
conference that the addition of PRPs would affect the case 
schedule. There is no reason BNSF cannot try its 
compulsory counterclaims in the FMC action with a 
minimum of delay. The contaminants, site, and parties are 
the same. The effective consolidation of the cases was 
precipitated by Vendo/Floway’s motion to dismiss, stay, 
or consolidate in the BNSF action. They must reasonably 
expect the outcome they requested in that action, 
dismissal with leave to file compulsory counterclaims in 
the FMC action, to have some effect on the deadlines in 
this case. Vendo/Floway do not demonstrate how a delay 
of a few months will prejudice them, while BNSF will be 
greatly prejudiced if it is not allowed reasonable time to 
prepare its case against Vendo/Floway.
Under the current schedule, the trial date is May 29, 2002. 
Pursuant to the schedule announced and accepted by the 
parties in open court on April 8, 2002, the new trial date is 
October 29, 2002. The last day to file dispositive motions 
is August 15, 2002, with a hearing date of September 16, 
2002. The expert and overall discovery cut-off date is July 
31, 2002. The last day to designate experts is May 20, 
2002. The parties shall submit a joint amended schedule 
consistent with this decision and conforming to the 
requirements outlined by the court at oral argument and 
with the Local Rules.
IV. CONCLUSION
1. BNSF’s motion for summary judgment as to 
Vendo/Floway’s CERCLA claims for contribution as to 
FMC’s response costs is GRANTED.
2. BNSF’s motion for summary judgment as to 
Vendo/Floway’s CERCLA claims for contribution 
for their own first instance response costs is 
DENIED.
3. BNSF’s motion for summary judgment as to 
Floway’s claim for contribution under HSAA as to 
FMC’s response costs is GRANTED.
4. BNSF’s motion for summary judgment as to 
Floway’s HSAA claim for contribution for its own 
first instance response costs is DENIED.
5. BNSF’s motion for summary judgment as to 
Floway’s state law claim for declaratory relief is 
DENIED.
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*1051 6. Vendo’s motion to quash BNSF’s proposed 
subpoenas of Plaintiff FMC’s experts is GRANTED.
7. BNSF’s application to modify the scheduling 
order on the ground that it needs more time to depose 
and prepare experts for its defense against 
Vendo/Floway’s claims is DENIED.
8. In light of the consolidation of the BNSF action 
into the FMC action, some modification to the 
schedule is required. Pursuant to the schedule 
announced and accepted by both parties in open 
court, the new trial date is October 29, 2002. The last 
day to file dispositive motions is August 15, 2002, 
with a hearing date September 16, 2002. The expert
Footnotes
and overall discovery cut-off date is July 31, 2002. 
The last day to designate experts is May 20, 2002. 
The parties shall submit a joint amended schedule 
consistent with this decision and conforming to the 
requirements outlined by the court at oral argument 
and with the Local Rules.
SO ORDERED.
Parallel Citations








In Vendo and VMC’s third-party complaint, the BNSF site is alleged to be “located adjacent to East Church Avenue between 
South Railroad Avenue and Sunland Street in Fresno, California at 2950 East Church Avenue, Fresno, California.” Doc.37 at     16.
Vendo, VMC, and Floway collectively are referred to variously as “Defendants,” “Third-Party Plaintiffs,” “Third-Party 
Complainants,” and “Vendo/Floway.”
The paragraphs under BNSF’s fifth claim for relief are incorrectly numbered and should be numbered 49-53. See Burlington, CIV 
F 01-6434, Doc.14.
The Settlement Agreement provides:
FMC agrees not to aid the prosecution of any pending claim against Defendants by BNSF, or the defense of any pending 
claim filed by Defendants against BNSF, whether asserted in the FMC Action, Zacky Action, BNSF Action or a potential 
DTSC action, or in future claims which may be asserted by or against BNSF arising out of the matters which are the subject of 
this Settlement Agreement, such as by providing attorney work product, expert work product or by waiving conflicts between 
a litigant and FMC experts, except to the extent required by legal process or order of the Court....
Doc.199, Exh. A at    15.
The decision in Pinal Creek defines “first instance costs” as costs incurred by a “working PRP,” a PRP that actually conducts 
cleanup operations, as opposed to one that reimburses a third party for the cost of the latter’s cleanup efforts. See Pinal Creek, 118 
F.3d at 1304 n. 6. The decision in City o f Merced defines “administrative response costs” as costs incurred by a party ordered to 
respond to a hazardous waste site by a state or federal administrative agency. See City o f Merced, 997 F.Supp. at 1333. First 
instance costs include administrative response costs and other costs of cleanup operations directly incurred.
Fed.R. Civ.P. 35(b) governs expert reports of physical and mental examinations of parties or persons under the legal control of a 
party.
(1) If requested by the party against whom an order is made under Rule 35(a) or the person examined, the party causing the 
examination to be made shall deliver to the requesting party a copy of the detailed written report of the examiner setting out 
the examiner’s findings, including results of all tests made, diagnoses and conclusions, together with like reports of all earlier 
examinations of the same condition. After delivery the party causing the examination shall be entitled upon request to receive 
from the party against whom the order is made a like report of any examination, previously or thereafter made, of the same 
condition, unless, in the case of a report of examination of a person not a party, the party shows that the party is unable to 
obtain it. The court on motion may make an order against a party requiring delivery of a report on such terms as are just, and 
if an examiner fails or refuses to make a report the court may exclude the examiner’s testimony if offered at trial.
(3) This subdivision applies to examinations made by agreement of the parties, unless the agreement expressly provides 
otherwise. This subdivision does not preclude discovery of a report of an examiner or the taking of a deposition of the 
examiner in accordance with the provisions of any other rule.
Fed.R. Civ.P. 35(b).
“[I]t is obvious to any sophisticated trial lawyer that in litigation involving multiple defendants there is a likelihood that settlement 
will occur before trial. To rely on another party defendant’s witnesses without some formal agreement as to the shared use is to
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invite the consequences that arose ... in the present case.” Wolt, 828 F.Supp. at 1567 (citation omitted).
In the BNSF action, Vendo and VMC join Floway’s motion to dismiss or stay, or in the alternative, to consolidate with FMC v. 
Vendo, CIV F 00-5295 OWW LJO. See Burlington Northern v. Vendo, CIV F 01-6434 OWW LJO, Doc.21, filed January 24, 
2002 (motion); Doc.25, filed February 5, 2002 (joinder). The moving parties contend the underlying facts in BNSF’s claims 
against them in the BNSF action are identical to Floway’s third-party claims against BNSF in the FMC action. See id. at p. 
1:24-28. Floway argues BNSF’s claims should have been presented as compulsory counterclaims against Floway in the FMC 
action and that BNSF’s separate RCRA action should be dismissed or stayed, or at least consolidated. See id. at p. 1:28-p.2:4. 
Floway asserts it “will stipulate that BNSF can file its claims as counterclaims in the FMC action.” Id. at p. 5 n. 1. Oral argument 
on the motion was heard March 4, 2002. See Doc.24, filed February 1, 2002; Doc.30. The parties were afforded an opportunity to 
file supplemental papers. A further hearing on the motion was held April 8, 2002, at the same time as the motions in the FMC 
action at issue here. A decision under separate cover grants the motion to consolidate for BNSF to assert its claims as compulsory 
counterclaims in the FMC action. See BNSF action, Doc.35.
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Bradley v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)
2007 WL 148764
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court,
D. New Hampshire.
Johnny L. BRADLEY, et al. 
v.
COOPER TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, and Ford 
Motor Company.
No. 0 7-m c-oo1-JM. | Jan. 11, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Johnny L. Bradley, pro se.
James C. Wheat, Wadleigh Starr & Peters, Manchester, 
NH, for Cooper Tire & Rubber Company.
ORDER
JAMES R. MUIRHEAD, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 Defendant Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (“Cooper 
Tire”) moves to quash plaintiffs’ subpoenas directed to 
Dr. Christopher G. Shapley who, from August 15, 2006 
until December 15, 2006, was a designated expert of 
Cooper Tire.
Background
Dr. Shapley was designated by Cooper Tire on August 
15th. Prior to that he had been deposed as a fact expert in 
connection with a claim of spoilation of the tire in 
question in the accident. He stated that he never saw the 
tire. Also on August 15th a copy of his report was 
produced. On August 16th he was offered up for a 
deposition on September 29th. Plaintiffs accepted the 
offer and noticed Shapley’s deposition for September 29. 
By letter of September 22, 2006 Attorney Richard H. 
Monk III of Bradley Arant Rose & White LLP, counsel to 
Cooper Tire, reneged on his agreement to have Shapley 
deposed on the 29th. In fact, neither Bradley Arant 
lawyers nor Shapley appeared on September 29, 2006.
Plaintiffs’ counsel alleges that Monk, to avoid a sanctions 
hearing, then proposed dates in early December. Still later 
he withdrew the proffered December dates and, by letter 
of November 17, 2006, offered a Shapley deposition on 
January 5, 9, or 12, 2007. On November 29th plaintiffs’ 
counsel issued deposition notices for January 12th. On 
December 15th Cooper Tire filed an amended expert 
designation omitting Dr. Shapley as a testifying expert. 
Cooper Tire, presumably through its counsel, informed 
plaintiffs that Dr. Shapley would not be produced because 
he was now a “consulting expert”. Plaintiffs then 
subpoenaed Dr. Shapley for deposition on the 12th. 
Cooper Tire, joined by Ford, move to quash the subpoena. 
Plaintiffs’ counsel says he cross-designated Shapley but 
no such designation appears on the designation of experts 
he attached as an exhibit to his objection.
Discussion1
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(H) permits a 
party to depose “any person who has been identified as an 
expert whose opinions may be presented at trial.” On the 
other hand, a deposition of consulting expert is permitted 
“only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of 
exceptional circumstances.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B). 
The purpose of Rule 26(b)(4)(A) is to permit for 
preparation for cross-examination at trial. Shu-Tao Lin v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 48 n. 3 (2d 
Cir.1984). The purpose of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is to preclude 
“unreasonable access to an opposing party’s diligent trial 
preparation.” Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 
(10th Cir.1984). In other words, Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is 
intended to protect the attorney’s work product.
The principal question is whether Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or (B) 
applies. On this question there is a split authority. A 
leading treatise states:
Once a party has designated an 
expert witness as someone who 
will testify at trial, the later 
withdrawal of that designation may 
neither prevent the deposition of 
that witness by the opposing party 
nor the expert’s testimony at trial. 
Furthermore, if a party is deemed 
to have waived the privilege as to 
documents provided to its named 
expert, that party may not avoid 
production of those documents 
under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) by later
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changing the designation of that 
expert from “testifying” to 
“non-testifying” expert.
*2 6 Moore’s Federal Practice § 26.80[1][a](3d ed.) 
Professor Moore cites to House v. Combined Ins. Co. of 
America, 168 F.R.D. 238 (N.D.Iowa 1996) and CP Kelco 
U.S. Inc. v. Pharmacia Corp., 213 F.R.D. 176 
(D.Del.2003). Other cases also support this view. See 
Ferguson v. Michael Foods, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 408 
(D.Minn.1999); Rubel v. Eli Lilly and Co., 160 F.R.D. 
458, 460 (S.D.N.Y.1995).
The contrary line of authority provides that a party may 
prohibit discovery from a consulting witness after his 
designation as an expert is withdrawn. See Callaway Golf 
Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Americas, 2002 WL 
1906628 (D.Del. Aug. 14, 2002) (collecting case law); 
FMC Corp. v. Vendo Co., 196 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1041-047 
(E.D.Cal.2002); Ross v. Burlington Northern R. Co, 136 
F.R.D. 638, 638-39 (N.D.Ill.1991); Netjumper Software, 
L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 2005 WL 3046271 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
10, 2005).
Understanding that I do not have time to write an 
extensive opinion before counsel must board planes for 
New Hampshire, I will nevertheless briefly set forth the
Footnotes
rationale for my decision to deny the motion to quash.
To suggest that Cooper Tire is or needs to consult with 
Mr. Shapley confidentially at this time is a charade. 
Shapley’s written opinion has been produced. He has 
been deposed as a fact witness and has given a statement. 
His opinion is offensive not defensive vis-a-vis Cooper 
Tire; that is, he has opined that the Ford Ranger is 
defective. He has no opinion on the tire. Cooper Tire is 
not prejudiced in any way. Furthermore, the change in 
designation at the last minute comes afer two 
cancellations by Cooper Tire of agreed upon depositions. 
Under the facts of this case I find the House analysis 
persuasive. Fairness requires the deposition go forward 
and there is no prejudice. Ford’s motion for joinder 
(document no. 2) is granted.
Cooper Tire’s motion to reply (document no. 6) is 
granted.




While Bradley Arant appears to have breached two “attorneys agreements” such agreements are enforceable under New Hampshire 
law only as to attorneys practicing here. As a consequence, this motion cannot be decided on the basis of the enforcement of 
attorneys’ agreements.
Nothing in this order is intended to indicate any view of the admissibility of Dr. Shapley’s testimony under Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1998) and its progeny.
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Supreme Court of the United States
Kenneth Lee BAKER and Steven Robert Baker, by 
his next friend, Melissa THOMAS, Petitioners, 
v.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.
No. 9 6 - 6 5 3 . | Argued Oct. 1 5 , 1 9 9 7 . | Decided Jan.
13, 1998.
States
    Full faith and credit in each state to the public 
acts, records, etc. of other states
Full faith and credit clause does not compel state 
to substitute statutes of other states for its own 
statutes dealing with subject matter concerning 
which it is competent to legislate. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Art. 4, § 1; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738.
Administrator of estate of motorist, who was killed after 
vehicle in which she was riding was involved in head-on 
accident and fire, brought products liability action against 
vehicle manufacturer, alleging that fuel pump was 
defective. After manufacturer failed to comply with 
court’s order to produce records of customer complaints 
of similar accidents, sanction was imposed by the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, 
Joseph E. Stephens, Jr., Chief Judge, 159 F.R.D. 519, 
under which manufacturer’s affirmative defenses were 
stricken and it was established, for purposes of action, 
that automobile had defective fuel pump and that pump 
continued to operate after engine stopped. Following trial, 
judgment was entered by the District Court on jury 
verdict, awarding administrator $11.3 million in damages. 
Manufacturer appealed. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 86 F.3d 811, reversed and 
remanded. Writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme 
Court, Justice Ginsburg, held that injunction barring 
former employee from testifying as witness against car 
manufacturer, which was entered by Michigan county 
court pursuant to parties’ stipulation in employee’s 
wrongful discharge action against manufacturer, did not 
reach beyond controversy between employee and 
manufacturer to control proceedings elsewhere, and thus, 
employee could testify in Missouri products liability 
action brought against manufacturer without offense to 
full faith and credit clause.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice Scalia filed concurring opinion.
Justice Kennedy concurred and filed opinion in which 
Justices O’Connor and Thomas joined.
23 Cases that cite this headnote
Judgment
       Adjudications operative in other states
Final judgment in one state, if rendered by court 
with adjudicatory authority over subject matter 
and persons governed by judgment, qualifies for 
recognition throughout the land; in other words, 
for claim and issue preclusion (res judicata) 
purposes, judgment of rendering state gains 
nationwide force. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 1; 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738.
98 Cases that cite this headnote
Judgment
         Adjudications operative in other states 
States
         Full faith and credit in each state to the public 
acts, records, etc. of other states
Court may be guided by forum state’s public 
policy in determining law applicable to 
controversy; however, there is no roving public 
policy exception to full faith and credit due 
judgments. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 1; 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1738.
51 Cases that cite this headnote
West Headnotes (8)
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Judgment
      Adjudications operative in other states
Full faith and credit clause is one of provisions 
incorporated into Constitution by its framers for 
purpose of transforming aggregation of 
independent, sovereign states into nation; 
however, there are no considerations of local 
policy or law which could rightly be deemed to 
impair force and effect which full faith and 
credit clause and Act of Congress require to be 
given to money judgment outside state of its 
rendition. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 1; 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1738.
Injunction
      Mode and Extent of Punishment
Sanctions for violations of injunction are 
generally administered by court that issued 
injunction.
24 Cases that cite this headnote
66 Cases that cite this headnote
Judgment
      Nature and Extent of Relief Sought or 
Granted
There is no reason why preclusive effects of 
adjudication on parties and those in privity with 
them, i.e., claim preclusion and issue preclusion 
(res judicata and collateral estoppel), should 
differ depending solely upon type of relief 
sought in civil action, whether relief is monetary 
or equitable.
Judgment
      Full Faith and Credit
Injunction barring former employee from 
testifying as witness against car manufacturer, 
which was entered by Michigan county court 
pursuant to parties’ stipulation in employee’s 
wrongful discharge action against manufacturer, 
did not reach beyond controversy between 
employee and manufacturer to control 
proceedings elsewhere, and thus, employee 
could testify in Missouri products liability action 
brought against manufacturer in federal court 
without offense to full faith and credit clause. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 1; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738.
44 Cases that cite this headnote 48 Cases that cite this headnote
Judgment
      Adjudications operative in other states 
Judgment
     Enforcement in other states
Full faith and credit does not mean that states 
must adopt practices of other states regarding 
time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing 
judgments; enforcement measures do not travel 
with sister state judgment as preclusive effects 
do, but, rather, such measures remain subject to 
even-handed control of forum law. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Art. 4, § 1; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738.
46 Cases that cite this headnote
**658 Syllabus'
*222 For 15 of the years Ronald Elwell worked for 
respondent General Motors Corporation (GM), he was 
assigned to a group that studied the performance of GM 
vehicles. Elwell’s studies and research concentrated on 
vehicular fires, and he frequently aided GM lawyers 
defending against product liability actions. The 
Elwell-GM employment relationship soured in 1987, and 
Elwell agreed to retire after serving as a consultant for 
two years. Disagreement surfaced again when Elwell’s 
retirement time neared and continued into 1991. That 
year, plaintiffs in a Georgia product liability action 
deposed Elwell. The Georgia case involved a GM pickup 
truck fuel tank that burst into flames just after a collision. 
Over GM’s objection, Elwell testified that the truck’s fuel 
system was inferior to competing products. This
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testimony differed markedly from testimony Elwell had 
given as GM’s in-house expert witness. A month later, 
Elwell sued GM in a Michigan County Court, alleging 
wrongful discharge and other tort and contract claims. 
GM counterclaimed, contending that Elwell had breached 
his fiduciary duty to GM. In settlement, GM paid Elwell 
an undisclosed sum of money, and the parties stipulated to 
the entry of a permanent injunction barring Elwell from 
testifying as a witness in any litigation involving GM 
without GM’s consent, but providing that the injunction 
“shall not operate to interfere with the jurisdiction o f the 
Court in ... Georgia [where the litigation involving the 
fuel tank was still pending].” (Emphasis added.) In 
addition, the parties entered into a separate settlement 
agreement, which provided that GM would not institute 
contempt or breach-of-contract proceedings against 
Elwell for giving subpoenaed testimony in another court 
or tribunal. Thereafter, the Bakers, petitioners here, 
subpoenaed Elwell to testify in their product liability 
action against GM, commenced in Missouri state court 
and removed by GM to federal court, in which the Bakers 
alleged that a faulty GM fuel pump caused the vehicle fire 
that killed their mother. GM asserted that the Michigan 
injunction barred Elwell’s testimony. After in camera 
review of the Michigan injunction and the settlement 
agreement, the District Court allowed the Bakers to 
depose Elwell and to call him as a witness at trial, stating 
alternative grounds for its ruling: (1) Michigan’s 
injunction need not be enforced because blocking 
Elwell’s testimony would violate Missouri’s *223 “public 
policy,” which shielded from disclosure only privileged or 
otherwise confidential information; (2) just as the 
injunction could be modified in Michigan, so a court 
elsewhere could modify the decree. Elwell testified for 
the Bakers at trial, and they were awarded $11.3 million 
in damages. The Eighth Circuit reversed, ruling, inter 
alia, that Elwell’s testimony should not have been 
admitted. Assuming, arguendo, the existence of a public 
**659 policy exception to the full faith and credit 
command, the court concluded that the District Court 
erroneously relied on Missouri’s policy favoring 
disclosure of relevant, nonprivileged information, for 
Missouri has an “equally strong public policy in favor of 
full faith and credit.” The court also determined that the 
evidence was insufficient to show that the Michigan court 
would modify the injunction barring Elwell’s testimony.
Held: Elwell may testify in the Missouri action without 
offense to the national full faith and credit command. Pp.
663-668.
(a) The animating purpose of the Constitution’s Full Faith 
and Credit Clause “was to alter the status of the several 
states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to
ignore obligations created under the laws or by the 
judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them 
integral parts of a single nation throughout which a 
remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of 
right, irrespective of the state of its origin.” Milwaukee 
County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277, 56 S.Ct. 
229, 234, 80 L.Ed. 220. As to judgments, the full faith 
and credit obligation is exacting. A final judgment in one 
State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority 
over the subject matter and persons governed by the 
judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land. 
See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 
U.S. 367, 373, 116 S.Ct. 873, 877, 134 L.Ed.2d 6. A court 
may be guided by the forum State’s “public policy” in 
determining the law applicable to a controversy, see 
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-424, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 
1188-1190, 59 L.Ed.2d 416, but this Court’s decisions 
support no roving “public policy exception” to the full 
faith and credit due judgments, see, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 
334 U.S. 541, 546, 68 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 92 L.Ed. 1561. In 
assuming the existence of a ubiquitous “public policy 
exception” permitting one State to resist recognition of 
another’s judgment, the District Court in the Bakers’ 
action misread this Court’s precedent. Further, the Court 
has never placed equity decrees outside the full faith and 
credit domain. Equity decrees for the payment of money 
have long been considered equivalent to judgments at law 
entitled to nationwide recognition. See, e.g., Barber v. 
Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 65 S.Ct. 137, 89 L.Ed. 82. There is 
no reason why the preclusive effects of an adjudication on 
parties and those “in privity” with them, i.e., claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion, should differ depending 
solely upon the type of relief sought in a civil action. Cf., 
e.g., id., at 87, 65 S.Ct., at 141-142 (Jackson, J., 
concurring). Full faith *224 and credit, however, does not 
mean that enforcement measures must travel with the 
sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such 
measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of 
forum law. See McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 13 
Pet. 312, 325, 10 L.Ed. 177. Orders commanding action 
or inaction have been denied enforcement in a sister State 
when they purported to accomplish an official act within 
the exclusive province of that other State or interfered 
with litigation over which the ordering State had no 
authority. See, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 3, 
54 L.Ed. 65. Pp. 663-665.
(b) With these background principles in view, this Court 
turns to the dimensions of the order GM relies upon to 
stop Elwell’s testimony and asks: What matters did the 
Michigan injunction legitimately conclude? Although the 
Michigan order is claim preclusive between Elwell and 
GM, Michigan’s judgment cannot reach beyond the 
Elwell-GM controversy to control proceedings against
WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3
Baker by Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998)
118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580, 66 USLW 4060, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 282...
GM brought in other States, by other parties, asserting 
claims the merits of which Michigan has not considered. 
Michigan has no power over those parties, and no basis 
for commanding them to become intervenors in the 
Elwell-GM dispute. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 
761-763, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 2184-2185, 104 L.Ed.2d 835. 
Most essentially, although Michigan’s decree could 
operate against Elwell to preclude him from volunteering 
his testimony in another jurisdiction, a Michigan court 
cannot, by entering the injunction to which Elwell and 
GM stipulated, dictate to a court in another jurisdiction 
that evidence relevant in the Bakers’ case—a controversy 
to which Michigan is foreign—shall be inadmissible. This 
conclusion creates no general exception to the full faith 
and credit command, and surely does not permit a State to 
refuse to honor a sister **660 state judgment based on the 
forum’s choice of law or policy preferences. This Court 
simply recognizes, however, that, just as the mechanisms 
for enforcing a judgment do not travel with the judgment 
itself for purposes of full faith and credit, and just as one 
State’s judgment cannot automatically transfer title to 
land in another State, similarly the Michigan decree 
cannot determine evidentiary issues in a lawsuit brought 
by parties who were not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Michigan court. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
710, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3108-3109, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039. The 
language of the consent decree, excluding from its scope 
the then-pending Georgia action, is informative. If the 
Michigan order would have interfered with the Georgia 
court’s jurisdiction, Michigan’s ban would, in the same 
way, interfere with the jurisdiction of courts in other 
States in similar cases. GM recognized the interference 
potential of the consent decree by agreeing not to institute 
contempt or breach-of-contract proceedings against 
Elwell for giving subpoenaed testimony elsewhere. That 
GM ruled out resort to the court that entered the *225 
injunction is telling, for injunctions are ordinarily 
enforced by the enjoining court, not by a surrogate 
tribunal. Pp. 666-668.
86 F.3d 811 (C.A.8 1996), reversed and remanded.
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in 
which REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS, SOUTER, and 
BREYER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion 
concurring in the judgment, post, p. 668. KENNEDY, J., 
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which 
O’CONNOR and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post, p. 668.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Laurence H. Tribe, Cambridge, MA, for petitioners.
Paul T. Cappuccio, Washington, DC, for respondent.
Opinion
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the authority of one State’s court to 
order that a witness’ testimony shall not be heard in any 
*226 court of the United States. In settlement of claims 
and counterclaims precipitated by the discharge of Ronald 
Elwell, a former General Motors Corporation (GM) 
engineering analyst, GM paid Elwell an undisclosed sum 
of money, and the parties agreed to a permanent 
injunction. As stipulated by GM and Elwell and entered 
by a Michigan County Court, the injunction prohibited 
Elwell from “testifying, without the prior written consent 
of [GM], ... as ... a witness of any kind ... in any litigation 
already filed, or to be filed in the future, involving [GM] 
as an owner, seller, manufacturer and/or designer ....” GM 
separately agreed, however, that if Elwell were ordered to 
testify by a court or other tribunal, such testimony would 
not be actionable as a violation of the Michigan court’s 
injunction or the GM-Elwell agreement.
After entry of the stipulated injunction in Michigan, 
Elwell was subpoenaed to testify in a product liability 
action commenced in Missouri by plaintiffs who were not 
involved in the Michigan case. The question presented is 
whether the national full faith and credit command bars 
Elwell’s testimony in the Missouri case. We hold that 
Elwell may testify in the Missouri action without offense 
to the full faith and credit requirement.
I
Two lawsuits, initiated by different parties in different 
States, gave rise to the full faith and credit issue before us. 
One suit involved a severed employment relationship, the 
other, a wrongful-death complaint. We describe each 
controversy in turn.
A
The Suit Between Elwell and General Motors
Ronald Elwell was a GM employee from 1959 until 1989. 
For 15 of those years, beginning in 1971, Elwell was 
assigned to the Engineering Analysis Group, which 
studied the performance of GM vehicles, most 
particularly **661 vehicles involved in product liability 
litigation. Elwell’s studies and research concentrated on
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vehicular fires. He assisted in *227 improving the 
performance of GM products by suggesting changes in 
fuel line designs. During the course of his employment, 
Elwell frequently aided GM lawyers engaged in 
defending GM against product liability actions. Beginning 
in 1987, the Elwell-GM employment relationship soured. 
GM and Elwell first negotiated an agreement under which 
Elwell would retire after serving as a GM consultant for 
two years. When the time came for Elwell to retire, 
however, disagreement again surfaced and continued into 
1991.
In May 1991, plaintiffs in a product liability action 
pending in Georgia deposed Elwell. The Georgia case 
involved a GM pickup truck fuel tank that burst into 
flames just after a collision. During the deposition, and 
over the objection of counsel for GM, Elwell gave 
testimony that differed markedly from testimony he had 
given when serving as an in-house expert witness for GM. 
Specifically, Elwell had several times defended the safety 
and crashworthiness of the pickup’s fuel system. On 
deposition in the Georgia action, however, Elwell testified 
that the GM pickup truck fuel system was inferior in 
comparison to competing products.
A month later, Elwell sued GM in a Michigan County 
Court, alleging wrongful discharge and other tort and 
contract claims. GM counterclaimed, contending that 
Elwell had breached his fiduciary duty to GM by 
disclosing privileged and confidential information and 
misappropriating documents. In response to GM’s motion 
for a preliminary injunction, and after a hearing, the 
Michigan trial court, on November 22, 1991, enjoined 
Elwell from
“consulting or discussing with or disclosing to any 
person any of General Motors Corporation’s trade 
secrets[,] confidential information or matters of 
attorney-client work product relating in any manner to 
the subject matter of any products liability litigation 
whether already filed or [to be] filed in the future which 
Ronald Elwell received, had knowledge of, or was 
entrusted with during *228 his employments with 
General Motors Corporation.” Elwell v. General 
Motors Corp., No. 91-115946NZ (Wayne Cty.) (Order 
Granting in Part, Denying in Part Injunctive Relief, pp. 
1-2), App. 9-10.
In August 1992, GM and Elwell entered into a settlement 
under which Elwell received an undisclosed sum of 
money. The parties also stipulated to the entry of a 
permanent injunction and jointly filed with the Michigan 
court both the stipulation and the agreed-upon injunction. 
The proposed permanent injunction contained two 
proscriptions. The first substantially repeated the terms of
the preliminary injunction; the second comprehensively 
enjoined Elwell from
“testifying, without the prior written consent of General 
Motors Corporation, either upon deposition or at trial, 
as an expert witness, or as a witness of any kind, and 
from consulting with attorneys or their agents in any 
litigation already filed, or to be filed in the future, 
involving General Motors Corporation as an owner, 
seller, manufacturer and/or designer of the product(s) in 
issue.” Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint and 
Granting Permanent Injunction (Wayne Cty., Aug. 26, 
1992), p. 2, App. 30.
To this encompassing bar, the consent injunction made an 
exception: “[This provision] shall not operate to interfere 
with the jurisdiction o f the Court in ... Georgia [where the 
litigation involving the fuel tank was still pending].” Ibid. 
(emphasis added). No other noninterference provision 
appears in the stipulated decree. On August 26, 1992, 
with no further hearing, the Michigan court entered the 
injunction precisely as tendered by the parties.1
Although the stipulated injunction contained an exception 
only for the Georgia action then pending, Elwell and GM 
included in their separate settlement agreement a more 
general *229 limitation. If a court or other tribunal 
ordered Elwell to testify, his testimony would “in no way” 
support a GM **662 action for violation of the injunction 
or the settlement agreement:
“ ‘It is agreed that [Elwell’s] appearance and testimony, 
if any, at hearings on Motions to quash subpoena or at 
deposition or trial or other official proceeding, if the 
Court or other tribunal so orders, will in no way form a 
basis for an action in violation of the Permanent 
Injunction or this Agreement.’ ” Settlement Agreement, 
p. 10, as quoted in 86 F.3d 811, 820, n. 11 (C.A.8 
1996).
In the six years since the Elwell-GM settlement, Elwell 
has testified against GM both in Georgia (pursuant to the 
exception contained in the injunction) and in several other 
jurisdictions in which Elwell has been subpoenaed to 
testify.
B
The Suit Between the Bakers and General Motors
Having described the Elwell-GM employment 
termination litigation, we next summarize the
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wrongful-death complaint underlying this case. The 
decedent, Beverly Garner, was a front-seat passenger in a 
1985 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer involved in a February 1990 
Missouri highway accident. The Blazer’s engine caught 
fire, and both driver and passenger died. In September 
1991, Garner’s sons, Kenneth and Steven Baker, 
commenced a wrongful-death product liability action 
against GM in a Missouri state court. The Bakers alleged 
that a faulty fuel pump in the 1985 Blazer caused the 
engine fire that killed their mother. GM removed the case 
to federal court on the basis of the parties’ diverse 
citizenship. On the merits, GM asserted that the fuel 
pump was neither faulty nor the cause of the fire, and that 
collision impact injuries alone caused Garner’s death.
The Bakers sought both to depose Elwell and to call him 
as a witness at trial. GM objected to Elwell’s appearance 
as a deponent or trial witness on the ground that the 
Michigan *230 injunction barred his testimony. In 
response, the Bakers urged that the Michigan injunction 
did not override a Missouri subpoena for Elwell’s 
testimony. The Bakers further noted that, under the 
Elwell-GM settlement agreement, Elwell could testify if a 
court so ordered, and such testimony would not be 
actionable as a violation of the Michigan injunction.
After in camera review of the Michigan injunction and 
the settlement agreement, the Federal District Court in 
Missouri allowed the Bakers to depose Elwell and to call 
him as a witness at trial. Responding to GM’s objection, 
the District Court stated alternative grounds for its ruling: 
(1) Michigan’s injunction need not be enforced because 
blocking Elwell’s testimony would violate Missouri’s 
“public policy,” which shielded from disclosure only 
privileged or otherwise confidential information; (2) just 
as the injunction could be modified in Michigan, so a 
court elsewhere could modify the decree.
At trial, Elwell testified in support of the Bakers’ claim 
that the alleged defect in the fuel pump system 
contributed to the postcollision fire. In addition, he 
identified and described a 1973 internal GM
memorandum bearing on the risk of fuel-fed engine fires. 
Following trial, the jury awarded the Bakers $11.3 million 
in damages, and the District Court entered judgment on 
the jury’s verdict.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed the District Court’s judgment, ruling, inter alia, 
that Elwell’s testimony should not have been admitted. 86 
F.3d 811 (1996). Assuming, arguendo, the existence of a 
public policy exception to the full faith and credit 
command, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 
District Court erroneously relied on Missouri’s policy
favoring disclosure of relevant, nonprivileged 
information, see id., at 818-819, for Missouri has an 
“equally strong public policy in favor of full faith and 
credit,” id., at 819.
The Eighth Circuit also determined that the evidence was 
insufficient to show that the Michigan court would 
modify *231 the injunction barring Elwell’s testimony. 
See id., at 819-820. The Court of Appeals observed that 
the Michigan court “has been asked on several occasions 
to modify the injunction, [but] has yet to do so,” and 
noted that, if the Michigan court did not intend to block 
Elwell’s **663 testimony in cases like the Bakers’, “the 
injunction would ... have been unnecessary.” Id., at 820.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the full faith and 
credit requirement stops the Bakers, who were not parties 
to the Michigan proceeding, from obtaining Elwell’s 
testimony in their Missouri wrongful-death action. 520 
U.S. 1142, 117 S.Ct. 1310, 137 L.Ed.2d 474 (1997).2
II
A
The Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause provides: 
“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of 
every other State. And the Congress may by general 
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, 
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the 
Effect thereof.” Art. IV, § 1.3
Pursuant to that Clause, Congress has prescribed:
“Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies 
thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith 
and credit in every court within the United States and 
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or 
*232 usage in the courts of such State, Territory or 
Possession from which they are taken.” 28 U.S.C. § 
1738.4
The animating purpose of the full faith and credit
command, as this Court explained in Milwaukee County v.
M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 56 S.Ct. 229, 80 L.Ed. 220
(1935),
“was to alter the status of the several states as 
independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore 
obligations created under the laws or by the judicial 
proceedings of the others, and to make them integral
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parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy 
upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, 
irrespective of the state of its origin.” Id., at 277, 56 
S.Ct., at 234.
See also Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546, 68 S.Ct. 1213, 
1217, 92 L.Ed. 1561 (1948) (the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause “substituted a command for the earlier principles 
of comity and thus basically altered the status of the 
States as independent sovereigns”).
[1] [2] Our precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws 
(legislative measures and common law) and to judgments. 
“In numerous cases this Court has held that credit must be 
given to the judgment of another state although the forum 
would not be required to entertain the suit on which the 
judgment was founded.” Milwaukee County, 296 U.S., at 
277, 56 S.Ct., at 234. The Full Faith and Credit Clause 
does not compel “a state to substitute the statutes of other 
states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter 
concerning which it is competent to legislate.” Pacific 
Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm ’n, 306 
U.S. 493, 501, 59 S.Ct. 629, 632, 83 L.Ed. 940 (1939); 
see Phillips *233 Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 
818-819, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 2977-2978, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 
(1985). Regarding judgments, however, the full faith and 
credit obligation is exacting. A final judgment in one 
State, if rendered by a court **664 with adjudicatory 
authority over the subject matter and persons governed by 
the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the 
land. For claim and issue preclusion (res judicata) 
purposes,5 in other words, the judgment of the rendering 
State gains nationwide force. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. 
Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373, 116 S.Ct. 
873, 878, 134 L.Ed.2d 6 (1996); Kremer v. Chemical 
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1899, 
72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982); see also Reese & Johnson, The 
Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 Colum. 
L.Rev. 153 (1949).
[3] [4] A court may be guided by the forum State’s “public 
policy” in determining the law applicable to a 
controversy. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-424, 
99 S.Ct. 1182, 1188-1190, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979).6 But 
our decisions support no roving “public policy exception” 
to the full faith and credit due judgments. See Estin, 334 
U.S., at 546, 68 S.Ct., at 1217 (Full Faith and Credit 
Clause “ordered submission ... even to hostile policies 
reflected in the judgment of another State, because the 
practical operation of the federal system, which the 
Constitution designed, demanded it.”); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 
210 U.S. 230, 237, 28 S.Ct. 641, 643, 52 L.Ed. 1039 
(1908) (judgment of Missouri court *234 entitled to full 
faith and credit in Mississippi even if Missouri judgment 
rested on a misapprehension of Mississippi law). In
assuming the existence of a ubiquitous “public policy 
exception” permitting one State to resist recognition of 
another State’s judgment, the District Court in the Bakers’ 
wrongful-death action, see supra, at 662, misread our 
precedent. “The full faith and credit clause is one of the 
provisions incorporated into the Constitution by its 
framers for the purpose of transforming an aggregation of 
independent, sovereign States into a nation.” Sherrer v. 
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 1092-1093, 92 
L.Ed. 1429 (1948). We are “aware of [no] considerations 
of local policy or law which could rightly be deemed to 
impair the force and effect which the full faith and credit 
clause and the Act of Congress require to be given to [a 
money] judgment outside the state of its rendition.” 
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438, 64 
S.Ct. 208, 213, 88 L.Ed. 149 (1943).
[5] The Court has never placed equity decrees outside the
full faith and credit domain. Equity decrees for the 
payment of money have long been considered equivalent 
to judgments at law entitled to nationwide recognition. 
See, e.g., Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 65 S.Ct. 137, 89 
L.Ed. 82 (1944) (unconditional adjudication of
petitioner’s right to recover a sum of money is entitled to 
full faith and credit); see also A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of 
Laws § 51, p. 182 (rev. ed.1962) (describing as 
“indefensible” the old doctrine that an equity decree, 
because it does not “merge” the claim into the judgment, 
does not qualify for recognition). We see no reason why 
the preclusive effects of an adjudication on parties and 
those “in privity” with them, i.e., claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion (res judicata and collateral estoppel),7 
should differ depending solely upon the type of relief 
sought in a civil action. Cf. *235 Barber, 323 U.S., at 87, 
65 S.Ct., at 141-142 (Jackson, J., concurring) **665 (Full 
Faith and Credit Clause and its implementing statute 
speak not of “judgments” but of “ ‘judicial proceedings’ 
without limitation”); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 2 (providing for 
“one form of action to be known as ‘civil action,’ ” in lieu 
of discretely labeled actions at law and suits in equity).
[6] Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that 
States must adopt the practices of other States regarding 
the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing 
judgments. Enforcement measures do not travel with the 
sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such 
measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of 
forum law. See McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 13 
Pet. 312, 325, 10 L.Ed. 177 (1839) (judgment may be 
enforced only as “laws [of enforcing forum] may 
permit”); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws § 99 (1969) (“The local law of the forum 
determines the methods by which a judgment of another 
state is enforced.”).8
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[7] Orders commanding action or inaction have been 
denied enforcement in a sister State when they purported 
to accomplish an official act within the exclusive province 
of that other State or interfered with litigation over which 
the ordering State had no authority. Thus, a sister State’s 
decree concerning land ownership in another State has 
been held ineffective to transfer title, see Fall v. Eastin, 
215 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 3, 54 L.Ed. 65 (1909), although such 
a decree may indeed preclusively adjudicate the rights and 
obligations running between the parties to the foreign 
litigation, see, e.g., Robertson v. Howard, 229 U.S. 254, 
261, 33 S.Ct. 854, 856, 57 L.Ed. 1174 (1913) (“[I]t may 
not be doubted that a *236 court of equity in one State in 
a proper case could compel a defendant before it to 
convey property situated in another State.”). And antisuit 
injunctions regarding litigation elsewhere, even if 
compatible with due process as a direction constraining 
parties to the decree, see Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 
107, 10 S.Ct. 269, 33 L.Ed. 538 (1890), in fact have not 
controlled the second court’s actions regarding litigation 
in that court. See, e.g., James v. Grand Trunk Western R. 
Co., 14 Ill.2d 356, 372, 152 N.E.2d 858, 867 (1958); see 
also E. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws § 24.21, p. 981 
(2d ed.1992) (observing that antisuit injunction “does not 
address, and thus has no preclusive effect on, the merits of 
the litigation [in the second forum]”).9 Sanctions for 
violations of an injunction, in any event, are generally 
administered by the court that issued the injunction. See, 
e.g., Stiller v. Hardman, 324 F.2d 626, 628 (C.A.2 1963) 
(nonrendition forum enforces monetary relief portion of a 
judgment but leaves enforcement of injunctive portion to 
rendition forum).
**666 *237 B
With these background principles in view, we turn to the 
dimensions of the order GM relies upon to stop Elwell’s 
testimony. Specifically, we take up the question: What 
matters did the Michigan injunction legitimately 
conclude?
As earlier recounted, see supra, at 661-662, the parties 
before the Michigan County Court, Elwell and GM, 
submitted an agreed-upon injunction, which the presiding 
judge signed.10 While no issue was joined, expressly 
litigated, and determined in the Michigan proceeding,11 
that order is claim preclusive between Elwell and GM. 
Elwell’s claim for *238 wrongful discharge and his 
related contract and tort claims have “merged in the 
judgment,” and he cannot sue again to recover more. See 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, n. 5,
99 S.Ct. 645, 649, n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (“Under 
the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a 
prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or 
their privies based on the same cause of action.”); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 17 (1980).
Similarly, GM cannot sue Elwell elsewhere on the 
counterclaim GM asserted in Michigan. See id., § 23, 
Comment a, p. 194 (“A defendant who interposes a 
counterclaim is, in substance, a plaintiff, as far as the 
counterclaim is concerned, and the plaintiff is, in 
substance, a defendant.”).
[8] Michigan’s judgment, however, cannot reach beyond 
the Elwell-GM controversy to control proceedings 
against GM brought in other States, by other parties, 
asserting claims the merits of which Michigan has not 
considered. Michigan has no power over those parties, 
and no basis for commanding them to become intervenors 
in the Elwell-GM dispute. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 
755, 761-763, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 2184-2185, 104 L.Ed.2d 
835 (1989). Most essentially, Michigan lacks authority to 
control courts elsewhere by precluding them, in actions 
brought by strangers to the Michigan litigation, from 
determining for themselves what witnesses are competent 
to testify and what evidence is relevant and admissible in 
their search for the truth. See Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws §§ 137-139 (1969 and rev.1988) 
(forum’s own law governs witness competence and 
grounds for excluding evidence); cf. Societe Nationale 
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for  
Southern Dist. o f Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544, n. 29, 107 
S.Ct. 2542, 2556, n. 29, 96 L.Ed.2d 461 (1987) (foreign 
“blocking statute” barring disclosure of certain 
information “do[es] not deprive an American court of the 
power to order a party subject to its jurisdiction to 
produce [the information]”); United States v. First Nat. 
City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (C.A.2 1968) (New York bank 
may not refuse to produce records of its German branch, 
even **667 though doing so might subject the bank to 
civil liability under German law).
*239 As the District Court recognized, Michigan’s decree 
could operate against Elwell to preclude him from 
volunteering his testimony. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 
26a-27a. But a Michigan court cannot, by entering the 
injunction to which Elwell and GM stipulated, dictate to a 
court in another jurisdiction that evidence relevant in the 
Bakers’ case—a controversy to which Michigan is 
foreign—shall be inadmissible. This conclusion creates 
no general exception to the full faith and credit command, 
and surely does not permit a State to refuse to honor a 
sister state judgment based on the forum’s choice of law 
or policy preferences. Rather, we simply recognize that, 
just as the mechanisms for enforcing a judgment do not
WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 8
Baker by Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998)
118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580, 66 USLW 4060, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 282...
travel with the judgment itself for purposes of full faith 
and credit, see McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 
312, 10 L.Ed. 177 (1839); see also Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws § 99, and just as one State’s judgment 
cannot automatically transfer title to land in another State, 
see Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 3, 54 L.Ed. 65 
(1909), similarly the Michigan decree cannot determine 
evidentiary issues in a lawsuit brought by parties who 
were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Michigan court. 
Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S.Ct. 
3090, 3108-3109, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (“[Exceptions 
to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly 
created nor expansively construed, for they are in 
derogation of the search for truth.”).12
*240 The language of the consent decree is informative in 
this regard. Excluding the then-pending Georgia action 
from the ban on testimony by Elwell without GM’s 
permission, the decree provides that it “shall not operate 
to interfere with the jurisdiction of the Court in ... 
Georgia.” Elwell v. General Motors Corp., No. 
91-115946NZ (Wayne Cty.) (Order Dismissing 
Plaintiff’s Complaint and Granting Permanent Injunction, 
p. 2), App. 30 (emphasis added). But if the Michigan 
order, extended to the Georgia case, would have 
“interfer[ed] with the jurisdiction” of the Georgia court, 
Michigan’s ban would, in the same way, “interfere with 
the jurisdiction” of courts in other States in cases similar 
to the one pending in Georgia.
In line with its recognition of the interference potential of 
the consent decree, GM provided in the settlement 
agreement that, if another court ordered Elwell to testify, 
his testimony would “in no way” render him vulnerable to 
suit in Michigan for violation of the injunction or 
agreement. See 86 F.3d, at 815, 820, n. 11. The Eighth 
Circuit regarded this settlement agreement provision as 
merely a concession by GM that “some courts might fail 
to extend full faith and credit to the [Michigan] 
injunction.” Ibid. As we have explained, however, 
Michigan’s power does not reach into a Missouri 
courtroom to displace the forum’s own determination 
whether to admit or exclude evidence relevant in the 
Bakers’ wrongful-death case before it. In that light, we 
see no altruism in GM’s agreement not to institute 
contempt or breach-of-contract proceedings against 
Elwell in Michigan for giving subpoenaed testimony 
elsewhere. Rather, we find it telling that GM ruled out 
resort to the court that entered the injunction, for 
injunctions are ordinarily enforced by the enjoining court, 
not by a surrogate tribunal. See supra, at 665.
In sum, Michigan has no authority to shield a witness 
from another jurisdiction’s subpoena power in a case
involving persons and causes outside Michigan’s 
governance. Recognition, *241 under full faith and credit, 
is owed to dispositions Michigan has authority to order. 
But a Michigan decree cannot **668 command obedience 
elsewhere on a matter the Michigan court lacks authority 
to resolve. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 
U.S. 261, 282-283, 100 S.Ct. 2647, 2661, 65 L.Ed.2d 757 
(1980) (plurality opinion) (“Full faith and credit must be 
given to [a] determination that [a State’s tribunal] had the 
authority to make; but by a parity of reasoning, full faith 
and credit need not be given to determinations that it had 
no power to make.”).
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice SCALIA, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that enforcement measures do not 
travel with sister-state judgments as preclusive effects do. 
Ante, at 665. It has long been established that “the 
judgment of a state Court cannot be enforced out of the 
state by an execution issued within it.” McElmoyle ex rel. 
Bailey v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 325, 10 L.Ed. 177 (1839). 
To recite that principle is to decide this case.
General Motors asked a District Court in Missouri to 
enforce a Michigan injunction. The Missouri court was no 
more obliged to enforce the Michigan injunction by 
preventing Elwell from presenting his testimony than it 
was obliged to enforce it by holding Elwell in contempt. 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause “ ‘did not make the 
judgments of other States domestic judgments to all 
intents and purposes, but only gave a general validity, 
faith, and credit to them, as evidence. No execution can 
issue upon such judgments without a new suit in the 
tribunals of other States.’ ” Thompson v. Whitman, 18 
Wall. 457, 462-463, 21 L.Ed. 897 (1873) (emphasis *242 
added) (quoting J. Story, Conflict of Laws § 609 (7th ed. 
1872)). A judgment or decree of one State, to be sure, 
may be grounds for an action (or a defense to one) in 
another. But the Clause and its implementing statute
“establish a rule of evidence, rather than of jurisdiction. 
While they make the record of a judgment, rendered
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after due notice in one State, conclusive evidence in the 
courts of another State, or of the United States, of the 
matter adjudged, they do not affect the jurisdiction, 
either of the court in which the judgment is rendered, or 
of the court in which it is offered in evidence. 
Judgments recovered in one State of the Union, when 
proved in the courts of another government, whether 
state or national, within the United States, differ from 
judgments recovered in a foreign country in no other 
respect than in not being reexaminable on their merits, 
nor impeachable for fraud in obtaining them, if 
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and 
of the parties.” Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 
265, 291-292, 8 S.Ct. 1370, 1375, 32 L.Ed. 239 (1888) 
(citation omitted).
The judgment that General Motors obtained in Michigan “ 
‘does not carry with it, into another State, the efficacy of a 
judgment upon property or persons, to be enforced by 
execution. To give it the force of a judgment in another 
State, it must be made a judgment there; and can only be 
executed in the latter as its laws may permit. ’ ” Lynde v. 
Lynde, 181 U.S. 183, 187, 21 S.Ct. 555, 556, 45 L.Ed. 
810 (1901) (quoting McElmoyle, supra, 13 Pet. at 325). 
See, e.g., Watts v. Waddle, 6 Pet. 389, 392, 8 L.Ed. 437 
(1832), a case involving a suit to obtain an equity decree 
ordering the conveyance of land, duplicating such a 
decree already issued in another State.
Because neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause nor its 
implementing statute requires Missouri to execute the 
injunction issued by the courts of Michigan, I concur in 
the judgment.
*243 Justice KENNEDY, with whom Justice 
O’CONNOR and Justice THOMAS join, concurring in 
the judgment.
I concur in the judgment. In my view the case is 
controlled by well-settled full faith and credit principles 
which render the majority’s extended analysis 
unnecessary and, with **669 all due respect, problematic 
in some degree. This separate opinion explains my 
approach.
I
The majority, of course, is correct to hold that when a 
judgment is presented to the courts of a second State it 
may not be denied enforcement based upon some 
disagreement with the laws of the State of rendition. Full
faith and credit forbids the second State to question a 
judgment on these grounds. There can be little doubt of 
this proposition. We have often recognized the second 
State’s obligation to give effect to another State’s 
judgments even when the law underlying those judgments 
contravenes the public policy of the second State. See, 
e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 544-546, 68 S.Ct. 1213, 
1216-1217, 92 L.Ed. 1561 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 
334 U.S. 343, 354-355, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 1092-1093, 92 
L.Ed. 1429 (1948); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 
U.S. 430, 438, 64 S.Ct. 208, 213, 88 L.Ed. 149 (1943); 
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294-295, 63 
S.Ct. 207, 210-212, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942); Fauntleroy v. 
Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237, 28 S.Ct. 641, 643, 52 L.Ed. 1039 
(1908).
My concern is that the majority, having stated the 
principle, proceeds to disregard it by announcing two 
broad exceptions. First, the majority would allow courts 
outside the issuing State to decline to enforce those 
judgments “purporting] to accomplish an official act 
within the exclusive province of [a sister] State.” Ante, at 
665. Second, the basic rule of full faith and credit is said 
not to cover injunctions “interfer[ing] with litigation over 
which the ordering State had no authority.” Ibid., at 665. 
The exceptions the majority recognizes are neither 
consistent with its rejection of a public policy exception 
to full faith and credit nor in accord with established rules 
implementing the Full Faith and Credit Clause. As 
employed to resolve this case, furthermore, the *244 
exceptions to full faith and credit have a potential for 
disrupting judgments, and this ought to give us 
considerable pause.
Our decisions have been careful not to foreclose all effect 
for the types of injunctions the majority would place 
outside the ambit of full faith and credit. These authorities 
seem to be disregarded by today’s holding. For example, 
the majority chooses to discuss the extent to which courts 
may compel the conveyance of property in other 
jurisdictions. That subject has proved to be quite difficult. 
Some of our cases uphold actions by state courts affecting 
land outside their territorial reach. E.g., Robertson v. 
Howard, 229 U.S. 254, 261, 33 S.Ct. 854, 856, 57 L.Ed. 
1174 (1913) (“[I]t may not be doubted that a court of 
equity in one State in a proper case could compel a 
defendant before it to convey property situated in another 
State”); see also Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87, 
105-106, 11 S.Ct. 960, 966, 35 L.Ed. 640 (1891); Muller 
v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444, 449, 24 L.Ed. 207 (1876); Massie 
v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148, 3 L.Ed. 181 (1810). See generally 
11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay 
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2945, pp. 98-102 
(2d ed.1995); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §
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102, Comment d  (1969); Reese, Full Faith and Credit to 
Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 Iowa L.Rev. 183, 199-200 
(1957). Nor have we undertaken before today to announce 
an exception which denies full faith and credit based on 
the principle that the prior judgment interferes with 
litigation pending in another jurisdiction. See, e.g., Cole v. 
Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 116-117, 10 S.Ct. 269, 272, 
33 L.Ed. 538 (1890); Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U.S. 
115, 122, 35 S.Ct. 255, 257, 59 L.Ed. 492 (1915); cf. 
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 51-52, 
62 S.Ct. 6, 9-10, 86 L.Ed. 28 (1941); Donovan v. Dallas, 
377 U.S. 408, 415-418, 84 S.Ct. 1579, 1583-1585, 12 
L.Ed.2d 409 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally 
Reese, supra, at 198 (“[T]he Supreme Court has not yet 
had occasion to determine whether [the practice of 
ignoring antisuit injunctions] is consistent with full faith 
and credit”). As a general matter, there is disagreement 
among the state courts as to their duty to recognize 
decrees enjoining proceedings in other courts. See 
Schopler, Extraterritorial recognition of, and propriety of 
counterinjunction against, injunction *245 against actions 
in courts of other states, 74 A.L.R.2d 831-834, §§ 3-4 
(1960 and Supp.1986).
**670 Subjects which are at once so fundamental and so 
delicate as these ought to be addressed only in a case 
necessarily requiring their discussion, and even then with 
caution lest we announce rules which will not be sound in 
later application. See Restatement, supra, § 102,
Comment c (“The Supreme Court of the United States has 
not had occasion to determine whether full faith and 
credit requires a State of the United States to enforce a 
valid judgment of a sister State that orders the doing of an 
act other than the payment of money or that enjoins the 
doing of an act”); E. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws § 
24.9, p. 964 (2d ed.1992) (noting that interstate 
recognition of equity decrees other than divorce decrees 
and decrees ordering payment of money “has been a 
matter of some uncertainty”). We might be required to 
hold, if some future case raises the issue, that an 
otherwise valid judgment cannot intrude upon essential 
processes of courts outside the issuing State in certain 
narrow circumstances, but we need not announce or 
define that principle here. Even if some qualification of 
full faith and credit were required where the judicial 
processes of a second State are sought to be controlled in 
their procedural and institutional aspects, the Court’s 
discussion does not provide sufficient guidance on how 
this exception should be construed in light of our 
precedents. The majority’s broad review of these matters 
does not articulate the rationale underlying its 
conclusions. In the absence of more elaboration, it is 
unclear what it is about the particular injunction here that 
renders it undeserving of full faith and credit. The Court’s
reliance upon unidentified principles to justify omitting 
certain types of injunctions from the doctrine’s 
application leaves its decision in uneasy tension with its 
own rejection of a broad public policy exception to full 
faith and credit.
The following example illustrates the uncertainty 
surrounding the majority’s approach. Suppose the Bakers 
had anticipated the need for Elwell’s testimony in 
Missouri and *246 had appeared in a Michigan court to 
litigate the privileged character of the testimony it sought 
to elicit. Assume further the law on privilege were the 
same in both jurisdictions. If Elwell, General Motors 
(GM), and the Bakers were before the Michigan court and 
Michigan law gave its own injunction preclusive effect, 
the Bakers could not relitigate the point, if general 
principles of issue preclusion control. Perhaps the 
argument can be made, as the majority appears to say, that 
the integrity of Missouri’s judicial processes demands a 
rule allowing relitigation of the issue; but, for the reasons 
given below, we need not confront this interesting 
question.
In any event, the rule would be an exception. Full faith 
and credit requires courts to do more than provide for 
direct enforcement of the judgments issued by other 
States. It also “requires federal courts to give the same 
preclusive effect to state court judgments that those 
judgments would be given in the courts of the State from 
which the judgments emerged.” Kremer v. Chemical 
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889, 
72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982); accord, Parsons Steel, Inc. v. 
First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525, 106 S.Ct. 768, 
772-773, 88 L.Ed.2d 877 (1986); Marrese v. American 
Academy o f Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 
380-381, 384, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 1331-1332, 1334, 84 
L.Ed.2d 274 (1985); Migra v. Warren City School Dist. 
Bd. o f Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 
L.Ed.2d 56 (1984); Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313, 
103 S.Ct. 2368, 2373, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983); Allen v. 
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415-416, 66 
L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). Through full faith and credit, “the 
local doctrines of res judicata, speaking generally, 
become a part of national jurisprudence....” Riley v. New 
York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349, 62 S.Ct. 608, 612, 86 
L.Ed. 885 (1942). And whether or not an injunction is 
enforceable in another State on its own terms, the courts 
of a second State are required to honor its issue preclusive 
effects. See Parsons Steel, supra; 18 Charles A. Wright, 
Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 4467, p. 635 (1981).
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II
In the case before us, of course, the Bakers were neither 
parties to the earlier litigation nor subject to the 
jurisdiction *247 of the Michigan courts. The majority 
pays scant **671 attention to this circumstance, which 
becomes critical. The beginning point of full faith and 
credit analysis requires a determination of the effect the 
judgment has in the courts of the issuing State. In our 
most recent full faith and credit cases, we have said that 
determining the force and effect of a judgment should be 
the first step in our analysis. Matsushita Elec. Industrial 
Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 375, 116 S.Ct. 873, 878, 134 
L.Ed.2d 6 (1996); Marrese, supra, at 381-382, 105 S.Ct., 
at 1332-1333; Haring, supra, at 314, 103 S.Ct., at 
2373-2374; see also Kremer, supra, at 466-467, 102 
S.Ct., at 1889-1890. “If the state courts would not give 
preclusive effect to the prior judgment, ‘the courts of the 
United States can accord it no greater efficacy’ under § 
1738.” Haring, supra, at 313, n. 6, 103 S.Ct., at 2373, n. 6 
(quoting Union & Planters’ Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 
71, 75, 23 S.Ct. 604, 606, 47 L.Ed. 712 (1903)); accord, 
Marrese, 470 U.S., at 384, 105 S.Ct., at 1334. A 
conclusion that the issuing State would not give the prior 
judgment preclusive effect ends the inquiry, making it 
unnecessary to determine the existence of any exceptions 
to full faith and credit. Id., at 383, 386, 105 S.Ct., at 1333, 
1334-1335. We cannot decline to inquire into these 
state-law questions when the inquiry will obviate new 
extensions or exceptions to full faith and credit. See 
Haring, supra, at 314, n. 8, 103 S.Ct., at 2374, n. 8.
If we honor the undoubted principle that courts need give 
a prior judgment no more force or effect that the issuing 
State gives it, the case before us is resolved. Here the 
Court of Appeals and both parties in their arguments 
before our Court seemed to embrace the assumption that 
Michigan would apply the full force of its judgment to the 
Bakers. Michigan law does not appear to support the 
assumption.
The simple fact is that the Bakers were not parties to the 
Michigan proceedings, and nothing indicates Michigan 
would make the novel assertion that its earlier injunction 
binds the Bakers or any other party not then before it or 
subject to its jurisdiction. For collateral estoppel to apply 
under Michigan law, “ ‘the same parties must have had a 
full opportunity to litigate the issue, and there must be 
mutuality of estoppel.’ ” *248 Nummer v. Treasury Dept., 
448 Mich. 534, 542, 533 N.W.2d 250, 253 (quoting 
Storey v. Meijer, Inc., 431 Mich. 368, 373, n. 3, 429 
N.W.2d 169, 171, n. 3 (1988)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 964, 
116 S.Ct. 418, 133 L.Ed.2d 335 (1995). “Although there 
is a trend in modern law to abolish the requirement of 
mutuality, this Court reaffirmed its commitment to that
doctrine in 1971 in [Howell v. Vito’s Trucking & 
Excavating Co., 386 Mich. 37, 191 N.W.2d 313]. 
Mutuality of estoppel remains the law in this 
jurisdiction....” Lichon v. American Universal Ins. Co., 
435 Mich. 408, 427-428, 459 N.W.2d 288, 298 (1990) 
(footnote omitted). Since the Bakers were not parties to 
the Michigan proceedings and had no opportunity to 
litigate any of the issues presented, it appears that 
Michigan law would not treat them as bound by the 
judgment. The majority cites no authority to the contrary.
It makes no difference that the judgment in question is an 
injunction. The Michigan Supreme Court has twice 
rejected arguments that injunctions have preclusive effect 
in later litigation, relying in no small part on the fact that 
the persons against whom preclusion is asserted were not 
parties to the earlier litigation. Bacon v. Walden, 186 
Mich. 139, 144, 152 N.W. 1061, 1063 (1915) (“Defendant 
was not a party to [the prior injunctive] suit and was not 
as a matter of law affected or bound by the decree 
rendered in it”); Detroit v. Detroit Ry., 134 Mich. 11, 15, 
95 N.W. 992, 993 (1903) (“[T]he fact that defendant was 
in no way a party to the record is sufficient answer to the 
contention that the holding of the circuit judge in that 
[prior injunctive] case is a controlling determination of 
the present”).
The opinion of the Court of Appeals suggests the 
Michigan court which issued the injunction intended to 
bind third parties in litigation in other States. 86 F.3d 811, 
820 (C.A.8 1996). The question, however, is not what a 
trial court intended in a particular case but the preclusive 
effect its judgment has under the controlling legal 
principles of its own State. Full faith and credit measures 
the effect of a judgment by all the laws of the rendering 
State, including authoritative *249 rulings of that State’s 
highest court on **672 questions of issue preclusion and 
jurisdiction over third parties. See Kremer, 456 U.S., at 
466, 102 S.Ct., at 1889-1890; Matsushita, supra, at 375, 
116 S.Ct. at 878.
The fact that other Michigan trial courts refused to 
reconsider the injunction but instead required litigants to 
return to the trial court which issued it in the first place 
sheds little light on the substance of issue preclusion law 
in Michigan. In construing state law, we must determine 
how the highest court of the State would decide an issue. 
See King v. Order o f United Commercial Travelers o f  
America, 333 U.S. 153, 160-161, 68 S.Ct. 488, 492-493, 
92 L.Ed. 608 (1948); Commissioner v. Estate o f Bosch, 
387 U.S. 456, 464-465, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 1782-1783, 18 
L.Ed.2d 886 (1967).
In this case, moreover, those Michigan trial courts which
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declined to modify the injunction did not appear to base 
their rulings on preclusion law. They relied instead on 
Michigan Court Rule 2.613(B), which directs parties 
wishing to modify an injunction to present their 
arguments to the court which entered it. See Brief for 
Respondent 10. Rule 2.613(B) is a procedural rule based 
on comity concerns, not a preclusion rule. It reflects 
Michigan’s determination that, within the State of 
Michigan itself, respect for the issuing court and judicial 
resources are best preserved by allowing the issuing court 
to determine whether the injunction should apply to 
further proceedings. As a procedural rule, it is not binding 
on courts of another State by virtue of full faith and credit. 
See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722, 108 S.Ct. 
2117, 2122, 100 L.Ed.2d 743 (1988) (“[A] State may 
apply its own procedural rules to actions litigated in its 
courts”). The Bakers have never appeared in a Michigan 
court, and full faith and credit cannot be used to force 
them to subject themselves to Michigan’s jurisdiction. See 
Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394, 403, 37 S.Ct. 
152, 155-156, 61 L.Ed. 386 (1917) ( “And to assume that 
a party resident beyond the confines of a State is required 
to come within its borders and submit his personal 
controversy to its tribunals upon receiving notice of the 
suit at the place of his residence is a futile attempt *250 to 
extend the authority and control of a State beyond its own 
territory”).
Under Michigan law, the burden of persuasion rests on 
the party raising preclusion as a defense. See Detroit v. 
Qualls, 434 Mich. 340, 357-358, 454 N.W.2d 374, 383 
(1990); E & G Finance Co. v. Simms, 362 Mich. 592, 
596, 107 N.W.2d 911, 914 (1961). In light of these 
doctrines and the absence of contrary authority, one 
cannot conclude that GM has carried its burden of 
showing that Michigan courts would bind the Bakers to 
the terms of the earlier injunction prohibiting Elwell from 
testifying. The result should come as no surprise. It is 
most unlikely that Michigan would give a judgment 
preclusive effect against a person who was not a party to 
the proceeding in which it was entered or who was not 
otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the issuing court. 
See Kremer, supra, at 480-481, 102 S.Ct., at 1897 (“We 
have previously recognized that the judicially created 
doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply when the
Footnotes
party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not 
have a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate the claim or 
issue”).
Although inconsistent on this point, GM disavows its 
desire to issue preclude the Bakers, claiming “the only 
party being ‘bound’ to the injunction is Elwell.” Brief for 
Respondent 39. This is difficult to accept because in 
assessing the preclusive reach of a judgment we look to 
its practical effect. E.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 
765, n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 2186 n. 6, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 
(1989); cf., e.g., Donovan v. Dallas, 377 U.S., at 413, 84 
S.Ct., at 1582 (“[I]t does not matter that the prohibition 
here was addressed to the parties rather than to the federal 
court itself’); Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & 
Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9, 60 S.Ct. 215, 218, 84 L.Ed. 537 
(1940) (“That the injunction was a restraint of the parties 
and was not formally directed against the state court itself 
is immaterial”). Despite its disclaimer, GM seeks to alter 
the course of the suit between it and the Bakers by 
preventing the Bakers from litigating the admissibility of 
Elwell’s testimony. Furthermore, even were we to accept 
GM’s argument that *251 the Bakers are essentially 
irrelevant to this dispute, GM’s argument **673 is flawed 
on its own terms. Elwell, in the present litigation, does not 
seek to relitigate anything; he is a witness, not a party.
In all events, determining as a threshold matter the extent 
to which Michigan law gives preclusive effect to the 
injunction eliminates the need to decide whether full faith 
and credit applies to equitable decrees as a general matter 
or the extent to which the general rules of full faith and 
credit are subject to exceptions. Michigan law would not 
seek to bind the Bakers to the injunction and that suffices 
to resolve the case. For these reasons, I concur in the 
judgment.
Parallel Citations
118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580, 66 USLW 4060, 98 Cal. 
Daily Op. Serv. 282, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 383, 98 CJ 
C.A.R. 163, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 289
1
2
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience 
of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.
A judge new to the case, not the judge who conducted a hearing at the preliminary injunction stage, presided at the settlement stage 
and entered the permanent injunction.
In conflict with the Eighth Circuit, many other lower courts have permitted Elwell to testify as to nonprivileged and
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non-trade-secret matters. See Addendum to Brief for Petitioners (citing cases).
Predating the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation contained a provision of the same order: “Full faith and credit shall be 
given in each of these States to the records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State.” 
Articles of Confederation, Art. IV. For a concise history of full faith and credit, see Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s 
Clause of the Constitution, 45 Colum. L.Rev. 1 (1945).
The first Congress enacted the original full faith and credit statute in May 1790. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738) (“And the said records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have 
such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state 
from whence the said records are or shall be taken.”). Although the text of the statute has been revised since then, the command for 
full faith and credit to judgments has remained constant.
“Res judicata” is the term traditionally used to describe two discrete effects: (1) what we now call claim preclusion (a valid final 
adjudication of a claim precludes a second action on that claim or any part of it), see Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 17-19 
(1982); and (2) issue preclusion, long called “collateral estoppel” (an issue of fact or law, actually litigated and resolved by a valid 
final judgment, binds the parties in a subsequent action, whether on the same or a different claim), see id., § 27. On use of the plain 
English terms claim and issue preclusion in lieu of res judicata and collateral estoppel, see Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. 
o f Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 77, n. 1, 104 S.Ct. 892, 894, n. 1, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984).
See also Paulsen & Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws, 56 Colum. L.Rev. 969, 980-981 (1956) (noting traditional but 
dubious use of the term “public policy” to obscure “an assertion of the forum’s right to have its [own] law applied to the 
[controversy] because of the forum’s relationship to it”).
See supra, at 664, n. 5; 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4467, p. 
635 (1981) (Although “[a] second state need not directly enforce an injunction entered by another state ... [it] may often be 
required to honor the issue preclusion effects of the first judgment.”).
Congress has provided for the interdistrict registration of federal-court judgments for the recovery of money or property. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1963 (upon registration, the judgment “shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where 
registered and may be enforced in like manner”). A similar interstate registration procedure is effective in most States, as a result 
of widespread adoption of the Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 13 U.L.A. 149 (1986). See id., at 13 
(Supp.1997) (Table) (listing adoptions in 44 States and the District of Columbia).
This Court has held it impermissible for a state court to enjoin a party from proceeding in a federal court, see Donovan v. Dallas, 
377 U.S. 408, 84 S.Ct. 1579, 12 L.Ed.2d 409 (1964), but has not yet ruled on the credit due to a state- court injunction barring a 
party from maintaining litigation in another State, see Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-in-Time 
Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 Harv. L.Rev. 798, 823 (1969); see also Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 
42 Iowa L.Rev. 183, 198 (1957) (urging that, although this Court “has not yet had occasion to determine [the issue], .... full faith 
and credit does not require dismissal of an action whose prosecution has been enjoined,” for to hold otherwise “would mean in 
effect that the courts of one state can control what goes on in the courts of another”). State courts that have dealt with the question 
have, in the main, regarded antisuit injunctions as outside the full faith and credit ambit. See Ginsburg, 82 Haw.L.Rev. at 823, and 
n. 99; see also id., at 828-829 (“The current state of the law, permitting [an antisuit] injunction to issue but not compelling any 
deference outside the rendering state, may be the most reasonable compromise between ... extreme alternatives,” i.e., “[a] general 
rule of respect for antisuit injunctions running between state courts,” or “a general rule denying the states authority to issue 
injunctions directed at proceedings in other states”).
GM emphasizes that a key factor warranting the injunction was Elwell’s inability to assure that any testimony he might give would 
steer clear of knowledge he gained from protected confidential communications. See Brief for Respondent 28-29; see also id., at 
32 (contending that Elwell’s testimony “is pervasively and uncontrollably leavened with General Motors’ privileged information”). 
Petitioners assert, and GM does not dispute, however, that at no point during Elwell’s testimony in the Bakers’ wrongful-death 
action did GM object to any question or answer on the grounds of attorney-client, attorney-work product, or trade secrets privilege. 
See Brief for Petitioners 9.
11 In no event, we have observed, can issue preclusion be invoked against one who did not participate in the prior adjudication. See 
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University o f Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1443, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 
(1971); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40, 61 S.Ct. 115, 117, 85 L.Ed. 22 (1940). Thus, Justice KENNEDY emphasizes the 
obvious in noting that the Michigan judgment has no preclusive effect on the Bakers, for they were not parties to the Michigan 
litigation. See post, at 670-671. Such an observation misses the thrust of GM’s argument. GM readily acknowledges “the 
commonplace rule that a person may not be bound by a judgment in personam in a case to which he was not made a party.” Brief 
for Respondent 35. But, GM adds, the Michigan decree does not bind the Bakers; it binds Elwell only. Most forcibly, GM insists
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that the Bakers cannot object to the binding effect GM seeks for the Michigan judgment because the Bakers have no 
constitutionally protected interest in obtaining the testimony of a particular witness. See id., at 39 (“[T]he only party being ‘bound’ 
to the injunction is Elwell, and holding him to his legal obligations does not violate anyone’s due process rights.”). Given this 
argument, it is clear that issue preclusion principles, standing alone, cannot resolve the controversy GM presents.
Justice KENNEDY inexplicably reads into our decision a sweeping exception to full faith and credit based solely on “the integrity 
of Missouri’s judicial processes.” Post, at 670. The Michigan judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit, we have endeavored 
to make plain, because it impermissibly interferes with Missouri’s control of litigation brought by parties who were not before the 
Michigan court. Thus, Justice KENNEDY’s hypothetical, see ibid., misses the mark. If the Bakers had been parties to the 
Michigan proceedings and had actually litigated the privileged character of Elwell’s testimony, the Bakers would of course be 
precluded from relitigating that issue in Missouri. See Cromwell v. County o f Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 354, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876) 
(“[Determination of a question directly involved in one action is conclusive as to that question in a second suit between the same 
parties....”); see also supra, at 664, n. 5.
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machine’s manufacturer, and thus was entitled 
to the conditional or qualified protection for the 
“work product” of an attorney. West’s 
Ann.Code Civ.Proc. §§ 2016, 2016(b, g).
11 Cases that cite this headnote
Pretrial Procedure
     Facts known and opinions held by experts
Plaintiff in personal injury action petitioned for a writ of 
mandate to compel the Superior Court, Los Angeles 
County, to require disclosure of a report prepared by an 
expert employed by counsel for one of the defendants. 
The Supreme Court, Tobriner, J., held that: (1) an 
arrangement whereby tire manufacturer agreed to 
indemnify its codefendant, the manufacturer of a 
tire-changing machine, if the codefendant would 
withdraw a certain expert witness whose report was 
unfavorable to the tire manufacturer amounted to a 
bargain for the concealment or suppression of evidence, 
and (2) because the manufacturer of the tire-changing 
machine could not be permitted to withhold an expert’s 
report that would have been discoverable but for the 
payment of consideration by one of the parties to the 
litigation, full disclosure of the expert’s report was 
required.
Writ of mandate issued.
Richardson, J., dissented and filed opinion.
Opinion, 135 Cal.Rptr. 744, vacated.
When it becomes reasonably certain that an 
expert will give his professional opinion as a 
witness on a material matter in dispute, then the 
expert’s opinion has become a factor in the case 
and, at that point, the expert ceases to be merely 
a consultant and becomes a counter in the 
litigation to be evaluated by appropriate pretrial 
discovery. West’s Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 2016.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
Pretrial Procedure
     Facts known and opinions held by experts
While “good cause” normally must be shown to 
compel discovery of expert opinions in advance 
of trial, “good cause” includes a showing that 
the expert may be called as a witness.
3 Cases that cite this headnote
West Headnotes (11)
Pretrial Procedure
   Work-product privilege
As an expert opinion developed as a result of the 
initiative of counsel in preparing for trial of 
personal injury action, investigator’s report 
concerning cause of accident which occurred 
while tire-changing machine was being used 
constituted the ‘work product” of counsel for the
Attorney and Client
   Conduct of trial
An attorney acting in the best interest of his 
client must be free to make whatever use of an 
expert’s opinion will be most likely to insure a 
good result for the client at trial; thus, an 
attorney may properly decide not to call as a 
witness even an expert whose opinion is 
favorable to the client if, in the attorney’s 
judgment, the client’s interests will otherwise be
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better served. certain expert as a witness at trial withdrew the
expert as a witness. West’s Ann.Code Civ.Proc. 
§ 2016.
Cases that cite this headnote
13 Cases that cite this headnote
Evidence
    Evidence Withheld or Falsified 
Evidence
     Suppression or spoliation of evidence
The rule embodied in the Evidence Code 
provision which permits the trier of fact to 
consider, among other things, a party’s failure to 
explain or to deny evidence against him or a 
party’s willful suppression of evidence is 
predicated on common sense and public policy 
and reflects the purpose of a trial which is to 
arrive at the true facts. West’s Ann.Evid.Code, § 
413.
Pretrial Procedure
      Discovering truth, narrowing issues, and 
eliminating surprise
One of the principal purposes of discovery is to 
make a trial less a game of blindman’s bluff and 
more a fair contest with the basic issues and 
facts disclosed to the fullest possible extent.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
4 Cases that cite this headnote
Evidence
     Evidence Withheld or Falsified
Though a party is not under a duty to produce 
testimony adverse to himself, if he fails to 
produce evidence that would naturally have 
been produced he must take the risk that the trier 
of fact will infer that the evidence, had it been 
produced, would have been adverse. West’s 
Ann.Evid.Code, § 413.
4 Cases that cite this headnote
Contracts
      Contracts with witnesses
Agreement whereby, in return for tire 
manufacturer’s promise to pay consideration, 
manufacturer of tire-changing machine agreed to 
withdraw as an expert witness an investigator 
who had concluded that the cause of the 
accident which gave rise to the suit was a 
defective tire and not any defect in the 
tire-changing machine was a bargain for the 
concealment or suppression of evidence which 
could not be condoned.
4 Cases that cite this headnote
Pretrial Procedure
     Work-product privilege
Although work product rules are designed 
explicitly to protect a party’s expense and 
industry in seeking out expert testimony, no 
policy underlying the work product doctrine 
justified arrangement whereby, in return for a 
codefendant’s promise of indemnification, 
defendant who originally intended to call a
Pretrial Procedure
     Facts known and opinions held by experts
Where withdrawal of expert witness directly 
flowed from defendants’ illegal agreement to 
suppress evidence, full disclosure of the expert 
witness’ report was required to prevent 
defendants from reaping any untoward benefit 
from their attempted illegal agreement. West’s 
Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 2016(b).
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13 Cases that cite this headnote
Contracts
     Procuring or suppressing evidence and 
prosecuting action
Court cannot place its imprimatur upon planned 
stratagems of purchased suppression of 
evidence.
Cases that cite this headnote
Attorneys and Law Firms
*831 **128 ***41 Belli & Choulos, Belli, Ashe & 
Choulos, Irmas, Simke, Chodos & Marshall, Irmas, Simke 
& Chodos, Roman M. Silberfeld and David Manning 
Chodos, Los Angeles, for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
Morgan, Wenzel & McNicholas, Dennis J. Sinclitico, 
George H. Ellis, Belcher, Henzie & Biegenzahn, Leo J. 
Biegenzahn and Uzzell S. Branson, III, Los Angeles, for 
real parties in interest.
Opinion
*832 TOBRINER, Justice.
In this petition for writ of mandate plaintiff seeks to 
discover a report prepared by an expert employed by 
counsel for one of the defendants in the underlying 
personal injury suit. Defendant had originally intended to 
call the expert as a witness at trial, and hence, under the 
relevant statute and case law, the expert’s report would 
normally have been discoverable by plaintiff. In return for 
a codefendant’s promise of indemnification, however, the 
defendant who employed the expert subsequently 
withdrew him as a witness. This case therefore presents 
the question whether the withdrawal of the expert witness 
on the basis of such an indemnification agreement 
reestablishes the privilege against disclosure enjoyed by 
defendant or leaves the plaintiff free to discover the 
content of the report. Although the trial court denied
plaintiff access to the report, we have concluded that 
under the circumstances of this case plaintiff is entitled to 
discover the contents of the report.
In September 1971, plaintiff George Williamson filed suit 
against defendants Shell Oil Company (Shell), Firestone 
Tire and Rubber Company (Firestone), and Big Four 
Automotive Equipment Corporation (Big Four), seeking 
damages for personal injuries which he sustained in 
Shell’s employ while using a tire-changing machine 
manufactured by Big Four to install a Firestone tire. 
Plaintiff alleged defects in both the tire and the 
tire-changing machine.
During the course of discovery proceedings, Big Four 
employed O. Edward Kurt to investigate the accident and 
to submit a report. Following his investigation, Kurt 
submitted a report which stated that in his opinion the 
cause of the accident was Firestone’s defective tire, and 
not any defect in the Big Four machine. After receiving 
this report, which, of course, was quite favorable to its 
case, Big Four designated Kurt as an expert witness to 
testify at trial. Plaintiff arranged to take Kurt’s deposition 
and thereby to learn the results of Kurt’s investigation.
Plaintiff, however, never learned the results of the 
investigation. On the eve of Kurt’s scheduled deposition, 
and following a meeting with Firestone’s counsel, Big 
Four withdrew Kurt’s designation as expert witness. 
Plaintiff states without contradiction that at the meeting 
between defendants’ counsel, Big Four discussed Kurt’s 
findings with Firestone *833 and turned over copies of 
Kurt’s report to Firestone.1 After examining the report, 
Firestone’s counsel, who naturally preferred the 
nondisclosure of Kurt’s adverse findings, entered into an 
agreement with Big Four which provided that if Big Four 
withdrew Kurt as a witness, withheld his report from 
plaintiff’s counsel, and refused to permit plaintiff’s 
counsel to depose him, Firestone would indemnify Big 
Four against any liability Big Four might incur arising 
from plaintiff’s injuries. In other words, Big Four agreed 
to silence its expert and withhold the information 
contained in his report from plaintiff **129 in return for 
valuable consideration indemnification from Firestone.
Big Four thereafter complied with its promise to 
Firestone, withdrawing Kurt as a prospective witness and 
rebuffing plaintiff’s ***42 attempt to depose Kurt or to 
obtain a copy of Kurt’s report. Plaintiff sought an order of 
the trial court to compel Kurt’s deposition and production 
of his report. Although the trial court authorized the 
deposition, it substantially limited the areas of plaintiff’s 
inquiry, precluding plaintiff from discovering the results 
of Kurt’s investigation and his analysis of the accident.
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Plaintiff then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the 
Court of Appeal, seeking relief from the trial court’s 
order. Although recognizing that extraordinary writs 
should not issue routinely in discovery cases, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that because the case presented 
“questions of first impression that are of general 
importance to the trial courts and to the profession” 
(Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court (1962) 
58 Cal.2d 180, 185-186, fn. 4, 23 Cal.Rptr. 375, 378, 373 
P.2d 439, 442; see also Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior 
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 169-171, 84 Cal.Rptr. 718, 
465 P.2d 854), an alternative writ should issue. After a 
hearing, the Court of Appeal ultimately determined that a 
preemptory writ of mandate should issue; we granted a 
hearing in order to resolve the novel issue of work 
product doctrine which this case presents.
Code of Civil Procedure section 2016, subdivision (b) 
provides in pertinent part, “The work product of an 
attorney shall not be discoverable unless the court 
determines that denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice 
the party seeking discovery in preparing his claim or 
defense or will result in an injustice, and any writing that 
reflects an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, 
or legal research or theories shall not *834 be 
discoverable under any circumstances.” Accordingly, 
subdivision (b) affords a conditional or qualified 
protection for work product generally, and an absolute 
protection as to an attorney’s impressions and 
conclusions. As subdivision (g) of the same section 
explains, “It is the policy of this state (i) to preserve the 
rights of attorneys to prepare cases for trial with that 
degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare 
their cases thoroughly and to investigate not only the 
favorable but the unfavorable aspects of such cases and 
(ii) to prevent an attorney from taking undue advantage of 
his adversary’s industry or efforts.”
[1] Section 2016 contains no definition of work product 
beyond extending protection to “any writing that reflects 
an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
research or theories.” The cases indicate generally, 
however, that “material of a derivative character, such as 
diagrams prepared for trial, audit reports, appraisals, and 
Other expert opinions, developed as a result of the 
initiative of counsel in preparing for trial,” are also to be 
protected as work product. (Emphasis added.) (Mack v. 
Superior Court (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 7, 10, 66 Cal.Rptr. 
280, 283; accord, Southern Pacific Co. v. Superior Court 
(1969) 3 Cal.App.3d 195, 198-199.) In San Diego 
Professional Association v. Superior Court (1962) 58 
Cal.2d 194, 204-205, 23 Cal.Rptr. 384, 373 P.2d 448, for 
example, we held that expert engineers’ “evaluation and 
opinions” commissioned by an attorney for the purpose of 
preparing for trial was work product. “Whatever the 
extent of the concept of an attorney’s work product may
be, it is clear that . . . it is . . . the attorney’s work, or that 
of his agents or employees, that is involved . . . .” 
(Emphasis omitted.) (Wilson v. Superior Court (1964) 
226 Cal.App.2d 715, 724, 38 Cal.Rptr. 255, 261 (hg. den., 
May 27, 1964).) Thus as an expert opinion, developed as 
a result of the initiative of counsel in preparing for trial, 
Kurt’s report clearly constitutes the work product of Big 
Four’s counsel.
[2] [3] The issue before us, however, is whether Kurt’s 
report, as work product of Big Four’s counsel, should be 
protected against disclosure under section 2016. While it 
may be appropriate to give broad immunity from 
discovery to an expert Consultant’s Report developed at 
the initiative **130 of counsel in preparation for trial, the 
courts agree that the initial status of the expert as 
consultant changes once the expert becomes a designated 
prospective witness. As the court stated in ***43 
Swartzman v. Superior Court (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 195, 
203, 41 Cal.Rptr. 721, 727, hg. den., Feb. 10, 1965, 
“(w)hen it becomes reasonably certain an expert will give 
his professional opinion as a witness on a material matter 
in dispute, then his opinion has *835 become a factor in 
the cause. At that point the expert has ceased to be merely 
a consultant and has become a counter in the litigation, 
one to be evaluated along with others. Such evaluation 
properly includes appropriate pretrial discovery.” (See 
also Mize v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. (1975) 46 
Cal.App.3d 436, 449, 120 Cal.Rptr. 787; Bolles v. 
Superior Court (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 962, 963, 93 
Cal.Rptr. 719; Dow Chemical Co. v. Superior Court 
(1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 1, 10, 82 Cal.Rptr. 288; Scotsman 
Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court (1966) 242 
Cal.App.2d 527, 530-532, 51 Cal.Rptr. 511.) While good 
cause normally must be shown to compel discovery of 
expert opinions in advance of trial, good cause includes a 
showing that the expert may be called as a witness. (See 
Sanders v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 270, 
279, 109 Cal.Rptr. 770.)
[4] In the present case, the expert consultant did not long 
retain his initial status as advisor, for after learning the 
favorable nature of Kurt’s report, Big Four designated 
Kurt as an expert witness to testify at trial. Indisputedly at 
this point plaintiff was entitled to discover Kurt’s report; 
if Big Four had used Kurt’s testimony at trial, the report 
would surely have remained discoverable. Before Kurt’s 
scheduled deposition took place, however, Big Four 
withdrew Kurt’s designation as a witness. Big Four 
argues that its withdrawal of Kurt as witness restored the 
immunity from discovery which Kurt’s report originally 
enjoyed. As Big Four contends, an attorney acting in the 
best interest of his client must be free to make whatever 
use of an expert’s opinion will be most likely to insure a
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good result for the client at trial; thus an attorney may 
properly decide not to call as a witness even an expert 
whose opinion is favorable to the client, if, in the 
attorney’s judgment, the client’s interests will otherwise 
be better served.
[5] [6] While a party may, indeed, enjoy the right to 
withdraw an expert witness at any time prior to disclosure 
of that witness’ proposed testimony,2 the record in the 
present case demonstrates that Big Four did *836 not 
decide unilaterally to withdraw Kurt as a matter of trial 
tactics or personal litigation strategy. Big Four’s decision 
stemmed rather from the agreement with Firestone: 
Firestone offered to pay Big Four to withdraw Kurt, in 
order to eliminate Kurt’s potentially damaging testimony 
from the trial. Thus it was under Firestone’s influence and 
in response to an offer of payment of indemnification that 
Big Four secured Kurt’s withdrawal.
We do not accept defendants’ argument that their action 
merely represents the sharing of information between two 
nonadversary codefendants, and therefore constitutes 
proper cooperation between parties sharing a common 
interest. The court in **131 Gorman Rupp Industries, Inc. 
v. Superior Court (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 28, 31, 97 
Cal.Rptr. 377, 380, explained that the fact that two parties 
are both defendants in no sense assures that they are not 
adversaries: “Each codefendant seeks to disclaim any 
responsibility for the alleged injuries, and ***44 argues 
that if there is responsibility for the alleged injuries it is 
due to the failure of the other. Certainly, there exists that 
relationship which suggests a conflict of interest. 
Petitioner (codefendant) has a vital interest in not relying 
solely on its lack of negligence or other avoidance of 
liability. Petitioner seeks to meet plaintiff’s claim by 
showing the liability, if any, is that of another defendant. 
This clearly falls within the (rule) that an ‘adverse’ party 
includes one who may likely strive to win a point at issue 
at the expense of the other.”
With respect to the issue toward which the Kurt report 
was directed defects in Firestone’s tire the interests of Big 
Four and Firestone unquestionably conflicted. Big Four’s 
interest lay in finding no negligence on its own part and in 
discovering a defect responsible for the accident in 
someone else’s product here, Firestone’s. On the other 
hand, Firestone’s interest lay in finding No defect in its 
product. Because Kurt was about to testify in favor of Big 
Four and against Firestone, only Firestone’s offer of 
indemnification could have induced Big Four not to call 
its favorable witness.
Moreover, the agreement between Big Four and Firestone 
is not as benign as “normal cooperative action” between
codefendants bound by a common interest. Agreements to 
suppress evidence have long been held void as against 
public policy, both in California and in most common law 
*837 jurisdictions.3 (See Valentine v. Stewart (1860) 15 
Cal. 387, 404, in which this court invalidated a contract to 
withdraw depositions taken in connection with litigation, 
as “affected with a fatal taint of illegality”; Rest., 
Contracts, s 554; 6A Corbin, Contracts, s 1430, at p. 380: 
“A bargain for the concealment or suppression of . . . 
evidence is of course illegal.”) The agreement at issue in 
the present case is clearly of such a nature. In return for 
Firestone’s promise to pay consideration, Big Four has 
agreed to suppress highly relevant evidence which, if 
revealed at trial, would be harmful to Firestone. 
Defendants do not nullify the agreement’s insidious effect 
by attaching to it the seemingly innocuous label of 
“contract of indemnification.”
The court in Petterson v. Superior Court (1974) 39 
Cal.App.3d 267, 114 Cal.Rptr. 20, anticipating the 
potential for encouraging just such illegal bargains, 
declared unequivocally that discovery should be allowed 
in order to deter similar suppression of evidence. In 
Petterson, counsel for one claimant under a holographic 
will disclosed to the executor the opinion of a handwriting 
expert that the will was a forgery. Subsequently, when the 
executor’s attorney sought to depose the expert, counsel 
for another claimant under the holographic will objected 
on the ground that he had hired the expert as a consultant, 
and did not propose to call him as a witness at trial.
The court rejected the assertion of work product privilege, 
and held that the privilege was waived with respect to the 
handwriting expert’s opinion by virtue of the disclosure of 
the expert’s observations and conclusions by the first 
heir’s attorney to the executor’s attorney.4 In the course of 
**132 its analysis, the court stated, “If we were to declare 
that petitioners now may prevent real parties from taking 
(the expert’s) *838 deposition, we would be setting a 
precedent which eventually could lead to subtle but ***45 
deliberate attempts to suppress relevant evidence. The 
rule predicated on fairness articulated in the decisions is a 
shield to prevent a litigant from taking undue advantage 
of his adversary’s industry and effort, not a sword to be 
used to thwart justice or to defeat the salut(a)ry objects of 
the Discovery Act.” (39 Cal.App.3d at p. 273, 114 
Cal.Rptr. at 24.)
[7] [8] [9] The Petterson court’s reasoning is instructive: 
although the work product rules are designed explicitly to 
protect a party’s expense and industry in seeking out 
expert testimony,5 no policy underlying the work product 
doctrine justifies defendants’ conduct in the present case. 
If we were to hold otherwise, nothing would preclude a 
party in a multi-party case from in effect auctioning off a 
witness’ testimony to the highest bidder. Although the 
present record does not disclose whether Big Four offered
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to retain Kurt as a witness if plaintiff bid more for his 
testimony than Firestone, we point out that in the absence 
of compelled disclosure such competitive bidding would 
remain a grim possibility. One of the principal purposes 
of discovery is to “ ‘make a trial less a game of 
blindman’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic 
issues and facts disclosed to the fullest possible extent. ’ ” 
(Greyhound v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 376, 
15 Cal.Rptr. 90, 99, 364 P.2d 266, 275.) We will not 
sanction the “gamesmanship” involved in the suppression 
of evidence by permitting Big Four to withhold an expert 
report which would have been discoverable but for the 
payment of consideration by one of the parties to this 
litigation.
[10] [11] The agreement between Firestone and Big Four 
clearly indicates the very real potential for “subtle but 
deliberate attempts to suppress relevant evidence.” The 
inevitable effect of the trial court’s order would be to 
condone defendants’ concealment of evidence, in direct 
contravention of this court’s insistence that neither party 
to such an agreement should receive the aid of a court in 
effectuating such an illegal scheme. (See Tappan v. 
Albany Brewing Co. (1889) 80 Cal. 570, 572, 22 P. 257.) 
This court cannot place its imprimatur upon planned 
stratagems of purchased suppression of evidence. Because 
Big Four’s withdrawal of Kurt directly flows from the 
illegal agreement to repress evidence, surely under section 
2016, subdivision (b) “denial of discovery . . . (would) 
result in an injustice.” We therefore must order full 
disclosure of Kurt’s report to *839 prevent Big Four and 
Firestone from reaping any untoward benefit from their 
attempted illegal agreement.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed.
BIRD, C. J., and MOSK and MANUEL, JJ., concur.
RICHARDSON, Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. As the majority opinion explains, it 
is well established that work product protection must be 
afforded to an experts’ reports and communications to an 
attorney employing him in preparation for trial at least 
until the expert has been designated as an actual trial 
witness. (See Mize v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. (1975) 
46 Cal.App.3d 436, 449, 120 Cal.Rptr. 787; Petterson v. 
Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 267, 271-272, 114 
Cal.Rptr. 20; Sanders v. Superior Court (1973) 34 
Cal.App.3d 270, 278-279, 109 Cal.Rptr. 770; Bolles v. 
Superior Court (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 962, 963, 93
Cal.Rptr. 719; Dow Chemical Co. v. Superior Court 
(1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 1, 9-10, 82 Cal.Rptr. 288; Mack v. 
Superior Court (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 7, 10-11, 66 
Cal.Rptr. 280; Scotsman Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court 
(1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 527, 529-532, 51 Cal.Rptr. 511; 
**133 Swartzman v. Superior Court (1964) 231 
Cal.App.2d 195, 202-203, 41 Cal.Rptr. 721.)
Under the foregoing rule, the Kurt report would have been 
protected from discovery by reason of Big Four’s 
announcement, prior ***46 to Kurt’s scheduled 
deposition, that Kurt would not be called to testify. The 
majority holds, however, that Big Four forfeited its work 
product protection because it agreed with Firestone to 
withdraw Kurt as a trial witness in return for Firestone’s 
promise of indemnification. The majority questions the 
legality of an agreement whereby one party “sells” his 
silence to another regarding potentially relevant evidence.
It does appear to be the general rule that “A bargain that 
has for its object or consideration the suppression of 
evidence . . . is illegal.” (Rest., Contracts, s 554; see 6A 
Corbin, Contracts, s 1430, at p. 380; see also Tappan v. 
Albany Brewing Co. (1889) 80 Cal. 570.) It is not as 
clear, however, that actual “suppression” of evidence is 
involved here. The work product rules, by very definition, 
in effect sanction a “suppression” of an expert’s report 
unless and until the decision is made to call the expert as a 
trial witness. Furthermore, assuming that the alleged 
agreement between Big Four and Firestone was illegal 
and unenforceable As between those parties, and that 
appropriate sanction might have been *840 imposed, no 
compelling reason exists for our holding that the making 
of such an agreement resulted in a waiver by Big Four of 
its work product protection Vis-a-vis the plaintiff. 
Certainly, no such waiver was intended by Big Four who, 
having engaged Kurt, should retain the right to decide For 
itself whether or not to call him as a witness. The record 
discloses that at the present time he will not be called. 
Accordingly, under the authorities cited above, the Kurt 
report remains Conditionally protected from disclosure to 
plaintiff.
Under section 2016, subdivision (b), the Kurt report 
would be discoverable upon a showing of prejudice or 
injustice. Yet the trial court herein declined to enter such 
a finding of prejudice or injustice, possibly reflecting the 
fact that plaintiff had hired his own experts to investigate 
the accident. The underlying evidence, upon which Kurt’s 
expert conclusions were reached, presumably is fully 
accessible to plaintiff’s experts; at least it is not alleged 
that this evidence is not so available. If, in fact, 
Firestone’s tire was defective and caused or contributed to 
the accident, no reason whatever appears in the record 
why plaintiff’s experts cannot reach the same conclusion
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as a result of their independent efforts. 
Subdivision (g) of section 2016 announces a policy of this 
state to prevent an attorney from taking undue advantage 
of   his   adversary’s   efforts,   as   well   as   to   protect   his 
adversary’s  privacy  which,  it  must  always  be  borne  in 
mind,  is  for  the  overriding  protection  of  the  lawyer’s 
client. “Under such a policy a party cannot substitute the 
wits  of  his  adversary’s  expert  for  wits  of  his  own  in 
analyzing  the  case.  (Citation.)”  (Swartzman  v.  Superior 
Court, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d 195, 203, 41 Cal.Rptr. 721, 
727.) 
CLARK, J., concurs. 
Rehearing denied; CLARK,J.,dissenting. 
Parallel Citations 
21 Cal.3d 829, 582 P.2d 126 
I would deny the writ. 
Footnotes 
1 The inadequacy of the record prevents our consideration of the effect of any alleged disclosure between Big Four and plaintiff. 
2 Compare Evidence Code section 413: “In determining what inferences to draw from the evidence or facts in the case against a 
party, the trier of fact may consider, among other things, the party’s failure to explain or to deny by his testimony such evidence or 
facts in  the case  against him, or his willful suppression  of evidence relating thereto, if such  be the case.”  As the court  held  in 
Breland v. Traylor Engineering & Mfg. Co. (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 415, 426, 126 P.2d 455, 461,  “The rule of (present Evidence 
Code section 413) . . . is predicated on common sense, and public policy. The purpose of a trial is to arrive at the true facts. A trial 
is not a game where one counsel safely may sit back and refuse to produce evidence where in the nature of things his client is the 
only source from which that evidence may be secured. A defendant is not under a duty to produce testimony adverse to himself, 
but if he fails to produce evidence that would naturally have been produced he must take the risk that the trier of fact will infer, and 
properly so, that the evidence, had it been produced, would have been adverse.” (Emphasis added.) 
3 Compare Penal Code section 136, subdivision (a): “Every person who willfully and unlawfully prevents or dissuades any person 
who  is  or  may  become  a  witness,  from  attending  upon  any  trial,  proceeding,  or  inquiry,  authorized  by  law,  is  guilty  of  a 
misdemeanor”; and section 136 1/2: “Every person who gives or offers or promises to give to any witness or person about to be 
called as a witness, any bribe upon any understanding or agreement that such person shall not attend upon any trial or other judicial 
proceeding, or every person who attempts by means of any offer of a bribe to dissuade any such person from attending upon any 
trial or other judicial proceeding, is guilty of a felony.” Although Firestone dealt exclusively with Big Four in attempting to silence 
Kurt, the effect of Firestone’s agreement with Big Four is certainly analogous to an agreement directly with Kurt that Kurt “not 
attend upon . . . trial.” 
4 In the present case we do not reach plaintiff’s argument that Big Four waived any work product privilege through disclosure  to 
Firestone. 
5 Contrary to defendants’ suggestion, our decision does not in any way prevent plaintiffs or defendants from arranging in advance 
jointly to engage and consult a single expert, to promote economy of litigation. 
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Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
STATE of West Virginia ex rel. Linda WARD, as 
Executrix of the Estate of L. David W ard, and 
Linda W ard, Individually and as M other and Next 
Friend of Isaac W illard W ard, Benjamin David 
W ard, Tiffany Sheree W ard and Kenneth Ryan 
W ard, Petitioners, 
v.
Honorable George W. HILL, Jr., Judge of the 
Circuit Court of Wood County; F.G. Powderly, 
M.D.; Bruce Pierson, Jr., M.D.; and Jorge E. 
Prieto, M.D., Respondents.
No. 2 3 9 8 9 . | Submitted June 3 , 19 9 7 . | Decided July 
2 , 1997.
Patient brought medical malpractice action in which three 
physicians were named as defendants. After plaintiff 
entered settlement with one physician, the Circuit Court, 
Wood County, George W. Hill, Jr., J., entered order 
which stated that remaining defendants could use 
witnesses originally listed as experts by settling physician. 
Plaintiff brought original proceeding for writ of 
prohibition, and the Supreme Court of Appeals, Starcher, 
J., held that: (1) trial court abused its discretion in holding 
hearing on motion where non-moving parties had almost 
no notice or time to prepare; (2) in litigation involving 
multiple defendants, settling defendant’s expert witnesses 
should generally not be allowed to testify for remaining 
defendants; and (3) trial court abused its discretion in 





     Remedy by appeal in particular actions or 
proceedings
Prohibition
      Errors and irregularities
In determining whether to grant rule to show 
cause in prohibition when court is not acting in 
excess of its jurisdiction, Supreme Court of
Appeals looks to adequacy of other available 
remedies such as appeal, and to over-all 
economy of effort and money among litigants, 
lawyers and courts; however, prohibition is used 
in this discretionary way to correct only 
substantial, clear-cut, legal errors plainly in 
contravention of clear statutory, constitutional, 
or common law mandate which may be resolved 
independently of any disputed facts, and only in 
cases where there is high probability that trial 
will be completely reversed if error is not 
corrected in advance.
Cases that cite this headnote
Prohibition
     Nature and scope of remedy
Because remedy sought by prohibition is 
extraordinary, exercise by Supreme Court of 
Appeals of its original jurisdiction in such 
matters is limited to circumstances of an 
extraordinary nature.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
Prohibition
     Specific acts
Although most discovery orders are 
interlocutory and reviewable only after final 
judgment, in certain circumstances involving a 
purely legal issue, a clear cut error, inadequate 
alternate remedies, and judicial economy issues, 
Supreme Court of Appeals may issue writ of 
prohibition when circuit court abuses its 
discretion with regard to discovery.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
Prohibition
      Errors and irregularities
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489 S.E.2d 24
Writ of prohibition is available to correct clear 
legal error resulting from trial court’s substantial 
abuse of its discretion in regard to discovery 
orders.
Cases that cite this headnote
Appeal and Error
     Depositions, affidavits, or discovery
Circuit court’s ruling on a discovery request is 
generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
Appeal and Error
    Proceedings Preliminary to Trial
Abuse of discretion standard is applied to orders 
reducing notice requirements established by 
Rules of Civil Procedure for motion practice. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 6(d).
Cases that cite this headnote
2 Cases that cite this headnote
Motions
     Necessity
Purpose of requirement under Rules of Civil 
Procedure that notice of motion be given prior to 
hearing on motion is to prevent a party from 
being prejudicially surprised by a motion. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 6(d).
Cases that cite this headnote
Evidence
    Determination of question of competency
Trial court abused its discretion in holding 
hearing on motion by defendant in medical 
malpractice action, who sought determination 
that he would be allowed to call at trial experts 
listed by defendant who later entered settlement 
which purportedly barred settling defendants’ 
experts from testifying for other parties, where 
non-moving parties learned only late on day 
before hearing that hearing was to be held and 
had almost no notice or time to prepare. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 6(d).
3 Cases that cite this headnote
Constitutional Law
     Process or Other Notice 
Motions
   Service and filing
While language of provision Rules of Civil 
Procedure governing notice prior to hearing on 
motion clearly permits reduction of time 
requirements for notice of hearing, where trial 
court, in so acting, reduces time requirements to 
extent that party entitled to notice is deprived of 
all opportunity to prepare for hearing, such 
action constitutes denial of due process of law 
and is in excess of jurisdiction. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 14; Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 6(d).
Appeal and Error
 Rulings on admissibility of evidence in
general
Trial
 Admission of evidence in general
Rulings on admissibility of evidence are largely 
within trial court’s sound discretion and should 
not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse 
of discretion.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
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Witnesses
   A uthority to compel attendance
Public has a right to every man’s evidence, and 
exceptions to the demand for every man’s 
evidence are not lightly created nor expansively 
construed, for they are in derogation of search 
for the truth.
Cases that cite this headnote
Compromise and Settlement
      Nature and Requisites 
Compromise and Settlement
 Validity
Law favors and encourages resolution of 
controversies by contracts of compromise and 
settlement rather than by litigation, and it is 
policy of the law to uphold and enforce such 
contracts if they are fairly made and are not in 
contravention of some law or public policy.
Cases that cite this headnote
Compromise and Settlement
 Operation and Effect
Settlement agreement between plaintiff in 
medical malpractice action and one of three 
defendants originally named, condition of which 
was that all expert witnesses listed by settling 
defendant would be withdrawn and all 
depositions of witnesses scheduled by settling 
defendant would be cancelled, was effective to 
bar remaining defendants from calling as 
witnesses experts listed by settling defendant.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
Compromise and Settlement
 Operation and Effect
Evidence
   Disqualification; bias or conflict of interest
Absent a formal agreement among defendants in 
litigation proceeding involving multiple 
defendants, circuit court should not generally 
permit settling defendant’s expert witnesses to 
testify for remaining defendants, and when 
settlement agreement between settling defendant 
and plaintiffs prohibits continued use of settling 
defendant’s experts by remaining defendants, 
circuit court, subject to discovery rules, should 
honor that agreement by not permitting 
remaining defendants to use or present such 
information in preparation for or conduct of 
trial. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 26(b)(4)(B).
3 Cases that cite this headnote
**26 *272 Syllabus by the Court
1. “ ‘In determining whether to grant a rule to show cause 
in prohibition when a court is not acting in excess of its 
jurisdiction, this Court will look to the adequacy of other 
available remedies such as appeal and to the over-all 
economy of effort and money among litigants, lawyers 
and courts; however, this Court will use prohibition in this 
discretionary way to correct only substantial, clear-cut, 
legal errors plainly in contravention of a clear statutory, 
constitutional, or common law mandate which may be 
resolved independently of any disputed facts and only in 
cases where there is a high probability that the trial will 
be completely reversed if the error is not corrected in 
advance.’ Syllabus Point 1, Hinkle v. Black, 164 W.Va. 
112, 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979).” Syllabus Point 1, State ex 
rel. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Canady, 194 W.Va. 
431, 460 S.E.2d 677 (1995).
2. “ ‘A writ of prohibition is available to correct a clear 
legal error resulting from a trial court’s substantial abuse 
of its discretion in regard to discovery orders.’ Syllabus 
Point 1, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Stephens, 188 W.Va. 622, 425 S.E.2d 577 (1992). 
Syllabus Point 3, State ex rel. McCormick v. Zakaib, 189 
W.Va. 258, 430 S.E.2d 316 (1993).” Syllabus Point 2, 
State ex rel. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Canady, 194 
W.Va. 431, 460 S.E.2d 677 (1995).
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3. “While the language of Rule 6(d) of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure clearly permits a reduction of the time 
requirements for notice of hearing, where a trial court, in 
so acting, reduces time requirements to the extent that the 
party entitled to notice is deprived of all opportunity to 
prepare for hearing, such action constitutes a denial of due 
process of law and is in excess of jurisdiction.” Syllabus, 
Cremeans v. Goad, 158 W.Va. 192, 210 S.E.2d 169 
(1974).
4. “ ‘The law favors and encourages the resolution of 
controversies by contracts of compromise and settlement 
rather than by litigation; and it is the policy of the law to 
uphold and enforce such contracts if they are fairly made 
and are not in contravention of some law or public 
policy.’ Syllabus Point 1, Sanders v. Roselawn Memorial 
Gardens, [Inc.] 152 W.Va. 91, 159 S.E.2d 784 (1968). 
Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Vapor Corp. v. Narick, 
[173] W.Va. [770] 320 S.E.2d 345 (1984).” Syllabus 
Point 1, Riggle v. Allied Chemical Corp., 180 W.Va. 561, 
378 S.E.2d 282 (1989).
5. “ ‘Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are largely 
within a trial court’s sound discretion and should not be 
disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion.’ 
State v. Louk, 171 W.Va. 639, 301 S.E.2d 596, 599 
(1983) [, overruled on other grounds, State v. Bradshaw, 
193 W.Va. 519, 457 S.E.2d 456 (1995) ]. Syllabus Point 
2, State v. Peyatt, [173] W.Va. [317] 315 S.E.2d 574 
(1983). Syllabus Point 7, State v. Miller, [175] W.Va. 
[616] 336 S.E.2d 910 (1985).” Syllabus Point 10 of Board 
o f Ed. o f McDowell County v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, 
Inc., 182 W.Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796 (1990).
6. Absent a formal agreement among defendants in a 
litigation involving multiple defendants, the circuit court 
should not generally permit a settling defendant’s expert 
witnesses to testify for the remaining defendants. When a 
settlement agreement between the settling defendant and 
the plaintiffs prohibits the continued use of the settling 
defendant’s expert witnesses by the remaining defendants, 
the circuit court, subject to Rule 26(b)(4)(B) [1988] of the 
West Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure, should honor that 
agreement by not permitting the remaining defendants to 
use or present such information in the preparation for or 
conduct of the trial.
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This original proceeding for a writ of prohibition asks this 
Court to vacate a January 24, 1997 ruling of the Circuit 
Court of Wood County allowing the defendants who 
remain in the underlying case to use the expert witnesses 
designated by the defendant who settled his portion of the 
case. The relators raise two questions in their petition: 
first, did the circuit court violate Rule 6(d) [1978] of the 
West Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure by holding a 
hearing on a substantive issue when the relators, plaintiffs 
in the underlying medical malpractice suit, were provided 
less than twenty-four hours notice of the hearing? Second, 
did the circuit court err in allowing the remaining 
defendants to use the expert witnesses of the settling 
defendant even through the settlement agreement between 
the settling defendant and the relators prohibited such use 
of the settling defendant’s experts? Because the circuit 
court erred, we grant the requested writ.
I.
Facts and Background
The underlying case is a medical malpractice action 
brought by the Estate of David Ward, filed by his 
executrix and widow, Linda Ward, and the children of the 
decedent (the plaintiffs). The defendants were the 
decedent’s three (3) treating physicians, Jorge E. Prieto, 
M.D., F.G. Powderly, M.D., and Bruce Pierson, M.D. 
Trial in the case was scheduled for April 21, 1997 in the 
Wood County Circuit Court.1
A discovery order entered on March 20, 1996 required the 
plaintiffs to identify their expert witnesses sixty (60) days 
after taking the defendants’ depositions. The defendants 
were required to identify their expert witnesses sixty (60) 
days from the disclosure of the plaintiffs’ expert 
witnesses, provided plaintiffs’ experts were “available for 
taking of their discovery depositions within the 
designated 60 day [sic] period.”
WestlawNext © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
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Plaintiffs identified their experts on June 17, 1996 with a 
supplement filed on June 21, 1996. On August 20, 1996, 
defendant Powderly filed his identification of expert 
witnesses naming one physician, and he included the 
following reservation:
This Defendant reserves the right to 
designate additional experts if it 
becomes necessary based on the 
testimony of Plaintiff’s [sic] 
experts.
On August 16, 1996, defendant Pierson filed his 
identification of expert witnesses naming two physicians, 
and he included the following reservations:
Defendant reserves the right to call any witness 
identified by any other party to this litigation.
Defendant reserves the right to call any expert witness 
needed to impeach the credibility of plaintiff’s [sic] 
expert witnesses.
Defendant reserves the right to supplement this expert 
witness list following further discovery.
Defendant Prieto, after requesting and receiving an 
extension, filed his identification of expert witnesses on 
December 17, 1996. Defendant Prieto identified by name 
ten physicians, including the three defendants, and 
generally any other physician associated with the 
decedent’s care.
Depositions of the plaintiffs’ experts were taken in the fall 
of 1996 through January 1997, and settlement 
negotiations between defendant Prieto and the plaintiffs 
were undertaken.
On January 17, 1997, the defendant Prieto and the 
plaintiffs appeared to reach a settlement. According to a 
letter dated January 22, 1997 from plaintiffs’ counsel to 
counsel for defendant Prieto, the settlement was accepted 
based on the following pertinent conditions:
**28 *274 (2) The withdrawal of all experts listed by 
you on behalf of Dr. Prieto as experts to be called to 
testify on behalf of Dr. Prieto on ANY  issue, including 
causation as well as negligence. (These experts are to 
have no contact with any party or that party’s 
representative without court order authorizing and 
approving the same.)
(3) The immediate cancellation of any depositions 
scheduled by you on behalf of Dr. Prieto of any
witness, including any expert retained by and on behalf 
of Mrs. Ward. (emphasis in original).
There was no formal agreement among the defendants 
concerning the use of the expert witnesses. Counsel for 
remaining defendant Pierson attended a meeting during 
which the settling defendant’s expert had discussed his 
potential testimony. However, none of the remaining 
defendants ever paid or, according to the plaintiffs, ever 
offered to pay for the services of the settling defendant’s 
experts. There was no communication regarding shared 
usage, and no information was furnished by the remaining 
defendants to the settling defendant.
On January 22, 1997, the date of the settlement 
acceptance letter, counsel for remaining defendant 
Pierson communicated, via facsimile, to counsel for the 
plaintiffs that he wished to depose several of the experts 
identified by the settling defendant. According to counsel 
for remaining defendant Pierson, he telephoned plaintiffs’ 
counsel on January 22, 1997, indicating his intention to 
use the settling defendant’s witnesses and to seek a 
hearing on the expert witness issue on January 24, 1997. 
On January 23, 1997, plaintiffs’ counsel, via facsimile, 
objected to any contact with the settling defendant’s 
expert witnesses.
On January 23, 1997, plaintiffs’ counsel received a notice 
of a hearing set at the request of counsel for remaining 
defendant Pierson for the next day (January 24, 1997) at 
4:00 p.m. The notice arrived at approximately 5:00 p.m. 
at the offices of plaintiffs’ lawyers. One of the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers did not personally receive notice of the hearing 
until 10:30 a.m. on January 24, 1997; the other lawyer for 
the plaintiffs received a telephone call on January 23, 
1997 informing him of the hearing.
On January 24, 1997, plaintiffs’ counsel, arguing 
insufficient notice of the hearing under Rule 6(d) [1978] 
of the West Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure and 
insufficient time to research applicable West Virginia law, 
objected to the hearing and requested that the hearing be 
continued.
The hearing was held as scheduled. Except for counsel for 
remaining defendant Pierson who appeared in person, 
counsel for the other parties appeared by telephone. The 
hearing was conducted without a court reporter. 
According to plaintiffs’ counsel, the hearing lasted only 
ten (10) minutes and plaintiffs’ counsel had difficulty 
hearing “all of the conservation between Judge Hill and 
the defendant’s counsel.” The circuit court, after 
dismissing plaintiffs’ objections based on inadequate 
notice, ruled that remaining defendants could talk to and
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use at trial any expert listed by any defendant, including 
the settling defendant.2 Claiming both procedural error 
and substantive error, the plaintiffs petitioned this Court 




Criteria for Awarding a Writ o f  Prohibition
[1] Our general criteria for determining if we should issue 
a rule to show cause in prohibition were stated in Syllabus 
Point 1 of Hinkle v. Black, 164 W.Va. 112, 262 S.E.2d 
744 (1979), which provides:
In determining whether to grant a 
rule to show cause in prohibition 
when a court is not acting in excess 
of its jurisdiction, this Court will 
look to the adequacy of other 
available remedies such as appeal 
and to the over-all economy of 
effort and money among litigants, 
lawyers and courts; however, this 
Court will use prohibition **29  
*275 in this discretionary way to 
correct only substantial, clear-cut, 
legal errors plainly in contravention 
of a clear statutory, constitutional, 
or common law mandate which 
may be resolved independently of 
any disputed facts and only in cases 
where there is a high probability 
that the trial will be completely 
reversed if the error is not corrected 
in advance.
In accord Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. W.Va. Fire & 
Casualty Co. v. Karl, 199 W.Va. 678, 487 S.E.2d 336, 
(1997); Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. George B. v. 
Kaufman, 199 W.Va. 269, 483 S.E.2d 852 (1997); 
Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. 
v. Canady, 194 W.Va. 431, 460 S.E.2d 677 (1995).
[2] We continue to emphasize the extraordinary nature of a 
writ of prohibition. Because the remedy sought by 
prohibition is extraordinary, we have limited the exercise 
of our original jurisdiction “to circumstances ‘of an 
extraordinary nature.’ ” Fidelity, id. 194 W.Va. at 436, 
460 S.E.2d at 682, quoting, State ex rel Doe v. Troisi, 194 
W.Va. 28, 31, 459 S.E.2d 139, 142 (1995). See State ex 
rel. Smith v. Maynard, 193 W.Va. 1, 454 S.E.2d 46 
(1994), overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. Mitchem 
v. Kirkpatrick, 199 W.Va. 501, 485 S.E.2d 445 (1997); 
State ex rel. Allen v. Bedell, 193 W.Va. 32, 454 S.E.2d 77 
(1994).
[3] [4] Although most discovery orders are interlocutory 
and reviewable only after final judgment, in certain 
circumstances involving a purely legal issue, a clear cut 
error, inadequate alternate remedies and judicial economy 
issues, this Court may issue a writ of prohibition when a 
circuit court abuses its discretion with regard to 
discovery. See Fidelity, supra, 194 W.Va. at 437, 460 
S.E.2d at 682-83 for a discussion of the criteria for 
issuing a writ of prohibition involving discovery issues. 
Syllabus Point 1 of State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Stephens, 188 W.Va. 622, 425 S.E.2d 
577 (1992) states:
A writ of prohibition is available to 
correct a clear legal error resulting 
from a trial court’s substantial 
abuse of its discretion in regard to 
discovery orders.
In accord Syllabus Point 2, Fidelity, supra; Syllabus 
Point 3, State ex rel. McCormick v. Zakaib, 189 W.Va. 
258, 430 S.E.2d 316 (1993). See Nutter v. Maynard, 183 
W.Va. 247, 250, 395 S.E.2d 491, 494 (1990)( 
“extraordinary relief [may be granted] where a discovery 
order presents a purely legal issue in an area where the 
bench and bar are in need of guidelines”); State ex rel. 
Bennett v. Keadle, 175 W.Va. 505, 334 S.E.2d 643 
(1985).
In this case, we are asked for a writ of prohibition based 
on two issues. The first issue concerning the amount of 
notice required under Rule 6(d) [1978] of the West 
Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure presents a clear-cut 
issue without adequate alternate remedies because of the 
time factor. The second issue concerning the use of a 
settling defendant’s expert witnesses by remaining 
defendants in violation of the settlement agreement 
presents a legal issue requiring immediate resolution 
because of judicial economy, namely, avoiding a second 
trial because of a high probability of reversal on appeal. 
Because these two issues should be addressed before a
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final judgment, we exercise our original jurisdiction to 
resolve them.
B.
Rule 6(d) o f the West Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure
[5] Generally this Court reviews a circuit court’s ruling on 
a discovery request for an abuse of discretion. The 
importance of the West Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure 
was noted in Fidelity, 194 W.Va. at 439, 460 S.E.2d at 
685, quoting, McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W.Va. 229, 
235, 455 S.E.2d 788, 794 (1995) by stating:
“[T]he West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure allocate 
significant discretion to the trial court in making ... 
procedural rulings. As the drafters of the rules appear to 
recognize, ... procedural rulings, perhaps more than any 
others, must be made quickly, without unnecessary fear 
of reversal, and must be individualized to respond to 
the specific facts of each case.... Thus, absent a few 
exceptions, this Court will review all aspects of the 
circuit court’s **30 *276 determinations under an 
abuse of discretion standard.” (citations omitted).
In Fidelity, 194 W.Va. at 439, 460 S.E.2d at 685, we also 
noted that a heighten review is given where the circuit 
court has not followed the preference stated in the civil 
procedure rule or where “the trial court makes no findings 
or applies the wrong legal standard[.]” Fidelity, quoting 
McDougal, 193 W.Va. at 238, 455 S.E.2d at 797, quoting, 
State v. Farley, 192 W.Va. 247, 253, 452 S.E.2d 50, 56 
(1994). “Where our Rules of Civil Procedure display a 
preference for a particular outcome, our review of 
decisions under those rules is sometimes more searching.” 
Fidelity, 194 W.Va. at 439, 460 S.E.2d at 685.
With these standards of review in mind, we consider the 
issue of notice under Rule 6(d) [1978] of the West 
Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure. Rule 6(d) provides:
For Motions—Affidavits.—A
written motion, other than one 
which may be heard ex parte, and 
notice o f the hearing thereof shall 
be served not later than 7 days 
before the time specified fo r  the 
hearing, unless a different period is 
fixed by these rules or by order of 
the court. Such an order may for
cause shown be made on ex parte 
application. When a motion is 
supported by affidavit, the affidavit 
shall be served with the motion; 
and, except as otherwise provided 
in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits 
may be served not later than 2 days 
before the hearing, unless the court 
permits them to be served at some 
other time. (emphasis added).
[61 [7] Rule 6(d) requires notice of a hearing to be served 
“not later than 7 days” before the hearing, unless a 
different period is fixed “by order of the court.” In this 
case, notice of the hearing was given about 24 hours 
before the hearing. The purpose of the notice requirement 
of “Rule 6(d) is to prevent a party from being 
prejudicially surprised by a motion.” Daniel v. Stevens, 
183 W.Va. 95, 104, 394 S.E.2d 79, 88 (1990). In Daniel, 
we found that because the party opposing the motion was 
not prejudicially surprised by the issue presented in the 
motion, the lack of notice was harmless. In Cremeans v. 
Goad, 158 W.Va. 192, 194-95, 210 S.E.2d 169, 171 
(1974)(3 hours notice insufficient time to prepare for a 
hearing), we noted that Rule 6(d) is not a hard and fast 
rule, but sufficient time must be provided so that the 
parties have time to prepare. The Syllabus of Cremeans 
states:
While the language of Rule 6(d) of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly 
permits a reduction of the time 
requirements for notice of hearing, 
where a trial court, in so acting, 
reduces time requirements to the 
extent that the party entitled to 
notice is deprived of all opportunity 
to prepare for hearing, such action 
constitutes a denial of due process 
of law and is in excess of 
jurisdiction.
The relators-plaintiffs maintain that they were prejudiced 
because they were unable to submit a brief to the circuit 
court outlining their position on the substantive question 
of expert witnesses. Although it appears that a deposition 
scheduled for early February by the settling defendant of 
one of his expert witnesses was the reason for holding the 
hearing, this reason, while justifying some advancement 
of the hearing, does not justify an immediate hearing. In 
this case, the relators-plaintiffs were prejudiced because 
they were unable to prepare for the hearing involving the 
substantive issue concerning a settlement agreement and 
the use of expert witnesses and were unable to present
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their arguments in written form advising the circuit court 
of West Virginia precedent.
[8] [9] Given the language of Rule 6(d) permitting the 
reduction of notice requirements, we apply an abuse of 
discretion standard to the orders reducing Rule 6(d)’s 
notice requirements. On the first issue of the lack of 
notice under Rule 6(d), we find that the circuit court 
abused its discretion in holding a hearing when the 
non-moving parties were given almost no notice and no 
time to prepare. Based on this finding, we grant a writ 
prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing its January 24, 
1997 ruling.
C.
Use o f Expert Witnesses Identified by Settling 
Defendants
[10] The second issue concerns the use by the remaining 
defendants of expert witnesses **31 *277 identified by 
the settling defendant, in violation of the settlement 
agreement between the plaintiffs and the settling 
defendant. Our standard of review of evidentiary matters 
is the well-settled rule stated in Syllabus Point 10 of 
Board o f Ed. o f McDowell County v. Zando, Martin & 
Milstead, Inc., 182 W.Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796 (1990):
“ ‘Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are largely 
within a trial court’s sound discretion and should not be 
disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion. ’ 
State v. Louk, 171 W.Va. 639, 301 S.E.2d 596, 599 
(1983) [, overruled on other grounds, State v. 
Bradshaw, 193 W.Va. 519, 457 S.E.2d 456 (1995) ]. 
Syllabus Point 2, State v. Peyatt, [173] W.Va. [317] 
315 S.E.2d 574 (1983).” Syllabus Point 7, State v. 
Miller, [175] W.Va. [616] 336 S.E.2d 910 (1985).
See West Virginia Dept. o f Highways v. Mountain, Inc., 
167 W.Va. 202, 279 S.E.2d 192 (1981); Casto v. Martin, 
159 W.Va. 761, 230 S.E.2d 722 (1976).
[11] The issue of use by the remaining defendants of the 
settling defendant’s expert witnesses presents two 
important competing policies. One policy is based on the 
principle that “ ‘the public ... has a right to every man’s 
evidence.’ ” U.S. v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S.Ct. 
724, 730, 94 L.Ed. 884, 891 (1950), quoting, John H. 
Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (3rd ed.). “[E]xceptions to the 
demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created 
nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of
the search for the truth. (footnote omitted).” U.S. v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3108, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039, 
1065 (1974).
[12] The other policy is the encouragement of settlement 
rather than litigation to resolve controversies by 
upholding contracts fairly made that do not contravene 
public policy. Indeed, “[t]he law favors and encourages 
the resolution of controversies by contracts of 
compromise and settlement rather than by litigation; and 
it is the policy of the law to uphold and enforce such 
contracts if they are fairly made and are not in 
contravention of some law or public policy.” Syllabus 
Point 1, Sanders v. Roselawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 
152 W.Va. 91, 159 S.E.2d 784 (1968). In accord Syllabus 
Point 1, Riggle v. Allied Chemical Corp., 180 W.Va. 561, 
378 S.E.2d 282 (1989); Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. 
Vapor Corp. v. Narick, 173 W.Va. 770, 320 S.E.2d 345 
(1984).
[13] However, the dilemma between these competing 
policies was created by the remaining defendants who 
then sought rescue from the circuit court claiming a right 
to all available evidence. At this stage of discovery in a 
medical malpractice case, the policies are in conflict. But, 
the dilemma could have been avoided by the remaining 
defendants. The remaining defendants had the same 
opportunity as the settling defendant to select their own 
expert witnesses and to identify those experts to the 
plaintiffs, or the defendants could have agreed to a formal 
arrangement to share expert witnesses. Neither was done 
in this case.
We have addressed the issue of use of the settling 
defendant’s expert witnesses by the remaining defendant 
on two occasions. In Riggle v. Allied Chemical Corp., 
supra, we upheld the denial of a continuance for the 
remaining defendant to obtain its own experts. The 
request for the continuance occurred after Allied, a 
co-defendant, settled after the first day of trial by a “Mary 
Carter” settlement agreement.3 Because of the “Mary 
Carter” settlement, Allied, who remained as a defendant, 
“did not present the extensive defense it had originally 
planned.” 180 W.Va. at 564, 378 S.E.2d at 285. In 
upholding the denial of the continuance we “point[ed] out 
that appellant had years to prepare its case, and had no 
right to rely on expert evidence developed by Allied to 
fight the plaintiffs’ claims.” 180 W.Va. at 569, 378 S.E.2d 
at 290. After noting that settlement was a possibility, we 
said, “if appellant wanted to fight plaintiffs’ claim, it 
could have prepared its own case rather than relying on 
Allied’s experts.” Id. We found the appellant **32 *278 
“had only itself to blame for the result.” Id.
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A similar approach was taken in Board o f Ed. of 
McDowell County v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 
supra, when Zando, Martin & Milstead (“ZMM”), the 
remaining defendant, attempted to call the expert 
witnesses of the settling defendant in violation of the 
settlement agreement. In Zando, although the settlement 
prohibiting the use of the settling defendant’s expert 
witnesses was reached several weeks before trial, ZMM 
attempted to use these experts at trial. The circuit court 
granted “ZMM a recess to attempt to obtain an expert of 
its own, but when trial resumed five days later, ZMM 
asserted that it had been unable to locate any witnesses 
who could offer the same testimony. (footnote omitted).” 
Zando, 182 W.Va. at 613, 390 S.E.2d at 812. In Zando, 
we upheld the circuit court’s refusal to allow the 
remaining defendant, ZMM, to use the settling 
defendant’s expert witnesses. In Zando, id., we 
concluded:
It is obvious to any sophisticated 
trial lawyer that in litigation 
involving multiple defendants there 
is the likelihood that settlements 
will occur before trial. To rely on 
another party defendant’s witnesses 
without some formal agreement as 
to shared use is to invite the 
consequences that arose in Riggle 
and in the present case. The end 
result is that no error can be 
claimed.
[14] Based on reasoning underlying Riggle and Zando, we 
hold that, absent a formal agreement among defendants in 
a litigation proceeding involving multiple defendants, the 
circuit court should not generally permit a settling 
defendant’s expert witnesses to testify for the remaining 
defendants. When a settlement agreement between the 
settling defendant and the plaintiffs prohibits the 
continued use of the settling defendant’s expert witnesses 
by the remaining defendants, the circuit court, subject to 
Rule 26(b)(4)(B) [1988] of the West Virginia Rules of 
Civil Procedure, should honor that agreement by not 
permitting the remaining defendants to use or present 
such information in the preparation for or conduct of the 
trial.4
Two other courts have addressed the question of public 
policy and an expert witness limitation. The Texas 
Supreme Court in Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 
S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex.1990) rejected the settlement 
agreement’s redesignation of expert witnesses to preclude 
the witnesses from testifying based on “[t]he primary 
policy behind discovery is to seek truth so that disputes
may be decided by facts that are revealed rather than 
concealed.” However, this approach was rejected in Wolt 
v. Sherwood, a Div. O f Harsco Corp., 828 F.Supp. 1562, 
1567 (D.Utah 1993), which after comparing the Texas 
Supreme Court’s reasoning to our reasoning in Zando, 
said that “the court is persuaded that West Virginia more 
accurately states the rule that should be followed by this 
court.” The Wolt court found that the purposes of 
discovery were not frustrated by “allowing a plaintiff to 
purchase the expertise of a settling defendant” because of 
the availability of the “ ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
[exception] under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B). (footnote 
omitted).” 828 F.Supp. at 1568.5 The determination of 
upholding a settlement agreement that precludes the 
testimony of a settling defendant’s expert witnesses “is 
designed to promote fairness by precluding unreasonable 
access to an opposing party’s diligent trial preparation.” 
Wolt, 828 F.Supp. at 1568, quoting, Durflinger v. Artiles, 
727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir.1984) (discussing
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B)).
In this case, the remaining defendants claim that the 
reservations contained in their identification of expert 
witnesses supposedly give them the “right” to use any 
experts **33 *279 named by any other defendant or party. 
These declarations are not a formal agreement about 
sharing expert witnesses; they provide no notice to the 
plaintiffs, and therefore, they should not be considered 
adequate preparation in a litigation involving multiple 
defendants. Such self-serving statements should not 
deprive the plaintiffs of the settlement bargain which 
included the removal of the settling defendant’s expert 
witnesses.6 We note that in this case the remaining 
defendants may still have the time and the opportunity to 
develop their own defense. The effect of our holding in 
this case is simply to prevent the remaining defendants 
from using the trial preparation of the settling defendant, 
who agreed not to allow such use in the settlement 
agreement.
We find that the circuit court abused its discretion in 
allowing the remaining defendants to use the settling 
defendant’s expert witnesses in violation of the settlement 
agreement. The plaintiffs should not be deprived of the 
settlement bargain they gained by their strategy of divide 
et impera.1
For the above stated reasons, the petition for a writ of 
prohibition is granted. The underlying case shall proceed 
below in accordance with the principles set forth in this 
opinion.
Writ granted.
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Because a writ of prohibition is sought, the factual information presented in this opinion is based on the petition, with attached 
exhibits and the responses, with attached exhibits.
Because of an unrelated matter, Judge Hill voluntarily recused himself from the case about a week later. Thereafter the case was 
reassigned to another judge.
In Riggle v. Allied, 180 W.Va. at 563 n. 5, 378 S.E.2d at 284 n. 5, we noted that the name for this type of settlement is derived from 
Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So.2d 8 (Fla.App.1967), overruled, Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385 (Fla.1973).
Rule 26(b)(4)(B) [1988] of the West Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure provides:
A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another 
party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as 
provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking 
discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. (emphasis added).
The exceptions permitting discovery provided in Rule 26(b)(4)(B) [1988] of the West Virginia Rules o f Civil Procedure are similar 
to the exceptions in the current federal rule.
In his supplemental response, remaining defendant Pierson argues that the circuit court’s ruling had no effect on the settlement 
because, by order entered on March 18, 1997, the settling defendant was dismissed with prejudice. However, the plaintiffs by 
petition filed on February 18, 1997, were already seeking review of the circuit court’s order allowing use of the expert witnesses.
According to J. Bartlett, Familiar Quotations (16th ed.1992) 118, divide et impera [divide and rule] is an ancient anonymous 
political maxim cited by Machiavelli.
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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